Antinuclear

 If it is true, it means India was Pakistani AQ Khan’s previously unknown “fourth customer” of nuclear technology and know-how (the others were Libya, Iran and North Korea).

In basic terms, this means those I strongly criticised for wrongly touting India’s “exemplary” nuclear proliferation record (here, here, here and in a side note here) – including the Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard – must reconsider the concessions made to long-standing party policy in order to accommodate India within Australia’s nuclear family.

Indeed, even prior to the Australian Labor Party’s decision in December last year, a number of incontrovertible links between the illegal Khan network and India had already been established.

As noted by Jeffrey Lewis on the influential arms control blog, Arms Control Wonk:

“Let’s get one thing straight: The evidence is incontrovertible that India was a customer of the Khan network.  South African court documents state that South African elements of the network sold UF6-resistant flow meters to India.  Moreover, Pakistani officials, including Khan himself,** have openly stated that India acquired centrifuge design information from the network, usually blaming deceased individuals within the network for operating independently. We all have known about these relationships for some time, as well as the fact that the Indian centrifuge design bears a family resemblance to Pakistan’s P2.”….

It also takes India’s involvement in the network to a level where – if it is to be believed – she must no longer be trusted.

Australia in particular, along with the United States and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, must review recent decisions to positively discriminate in order to permit nuclear dealings with India.

What’s necessary now is a reassessment of the evidence that India acquired its civilian and military nuclear capability through clandestine networks such as AQ Khan’s.

Even if there is some doubt, surely continued nuclear cooperation with a state that defiantly remains outside of the world’s peak nuclear nonproliferation instruments becomes untenable.

Gillard and co, therefore, really did make a grave mistake publicly agreeing to sell Australian uranium to India – and they need to read Playboy very closely before the Senate next sits in February if they are to realise that, despite appearances, India is perhaps an unsuitable partner. http://blogs.crikey.com.au/this-blog-harms/2012/01/18/gillard%E2%80%99s-sexual-education/