The irrationality of ‘nuclear deterrence’
a doctrine of mutual assured destruction……..in the case of nuclear arms, retaliation – whereby, in response to half the world being destroyed, you decide to destroy the other half – would not only be morally inexcusable, but irrational. Welcome to the nuclear hall of mirrors…..
there’s one thing that deterrence doesn’t protect against – the possibility of nuclear accident.
If a world without nuclear weapons is achievable, it will require political leadership. A country giving up its own would be a rare and shining thing: an altruistic act in world affairs. The cost would be minimal, the savings great, and it would make us far more convincing when trying to dissuade others from acquiring nuclear capability. Britain should do it.
It’s time to leave the nuclear hall of mirrors, 
Guardian, David Shariatmadari, 6 Oct 15
Deterrence isn’t enough to keep us safe: the prospect of a nuclear accident alone justifies ridding the world of these weapons. Britain should lead the way “Nuclear weapons can wipe out life on Earth, if used properly.” Despite being found in the liner notes of a Talking Heads album, this is the sentence I think best captures the bizarre contradictions of the atomic age. Human beings have manufactured bombs explicitly designed to unleash destructive forces equivalent to hundreds of thousands of tonnes of TNT. Deploy them and millions die; civilisation as we know it could disappear. And yet, they’re not actually supposed to be used. In fact, their proper function is to remain in the ground, or at sea, or in the air. Launch, fire or drop ‘em and the whole system has failed. Is there any other device so intricately constructed in order to decrease the likelihood of its own use?
Last week, Jeremy Corbyn, a man with at least a chance of being entrusted with the launch codes for 225 British warheads, stated that he would never press the nuclear button. I asked philosopher Jonathan Glover, whose book Humanity: A Moral History of the 20th Century, includes a study of the Cuban missile crisis, about the comments. He confirmed most analyses so far. “On the assumption that if he’s PM he has full say, that would indeed get rid of any deterrence”. In other words, were Corbyn to gain power, those weapons would become immediately impotent. His shadow defence secretary, Maria Eagle, called the remarks “unhelpful”.
Corbyn had let the air out of the nuclear balloon, given the game away. Despite what David Cameron said yesterday: “There are circumstances in which its use would be justified” – the truth is that no one is going to press the big red button – not Cameron, not George Osborne, Theresa May or whoever follows him. To do so would either be grossly disproportionate (against a non-nuclear state) invite our own destruction (against a nuclear-armed one) or be grossly immoral (a futile retaliation against civilians). But the important thing isn’t to say so…….
a doctrine of mutual assured destruction emerged. If either side initiated a nuclear conflict, it could expect to be met with an overwhelming response in kind. Planners therefore focused on making sure their capacity to retaliate would not be wrecked by any first strike – and that the counterpunch would be crippling, targeting civilians in cities, rather than just military installations…….in the case of nuclear arms, retaliation – whereby, in response to half the world being destroyed, you decide to destroy the other half – would not only be morally inexcusable, but irrational. Welcome to the nuclear hall of mirrors…..
there’s one thing that deterrence doesn’t protect against – the possibility of nuclear accident.
Cold war strategists tended to neglect the possibility that a nuclear war might be triggered not by geopolitics, but by simple cock-up. An accidental explosion could be interpreted by the other side as an act of aggression, provoking a full-scale response. Given that weapons systems were often placed on hair-trigger alert, the possibility of a false signal leading to Armageddon was quite real. And though the likelihood of a deliberate nuclear conflict has receded, it’s not clear that the risk of accident has……
“If you’re worried about the danger of accidental nuclear war, as no doubt we should be, then it’s actually much safer if you’ve got the formula in the lab, but don’t actually have the dangerous weapons on the runway.” He continues: “Ideally, there’d be an agreement not to have them at all. Nothing is foolproof in this area: they can’t be uninvented. But a monitoring system to prevent their re-emergence is probably, while fallible, no more fallible and much less worrying than the danger of accidental war.”
Jonathan Glover tells me that he agrees with what Corbyn says and wouldn’t feel unsafe in a country that didn’t have its own nuclear weapons, like Sweden. “It doesn’t seem to be that anyone is seriously threatening a nuclear attack on us – the only people who might be are terrorists who manage to acquire them. But I suspect they’re not the sort of people that you can deter.”
If a world without nuclear weapons is achievable, it will require political leadership. A country giving up its own would be a rare and shining thing: an altruistic act in world affairs. The cost would be minimal, the savings great, and it would make us far more convincing when trying to dissuade others from acquiring nuclear capability. Britain should do it. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/05/nuclear-deterrence-accident-weapons-britain-jeremy-corbyn
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