Antinuclear

Scrap submarines project before it’s too late says former public service boss, Michael West media, by Jon Stanford | Feb 3, 2020 Australia’s $225 billion SEA 1000 submarine project is so high risk, it would be better for Department of Defence to scrap it and start again, writes former public service chief, Jon Stanford, in the final instalment of his Second Rate Leadership series. In addition to some very serious problems with progress with the SEA 1000 program, there are some more fundamental questions to be addressed in the longer term. The first of these is whether the Attack class will embody the technologies required to be successful in its operations in the mid-2030s and beyond. In other words, will it be fit for purpose? An associated question is around the submarine’s cost effectiveness. The escalating cost of this acquisition means that the opportunity cost is also going up. With the submarines being designed mainly for joint operations with the US Navy, there are also significant risks in the future around whether a continuing US presence can be assumed.

In regard to the first question, it is very difficult to be able to judge whether the submarines will be fit for purpose if we do not know what that purpose is. Based on comments and submissions to Parliamentary inquiries from former Australian submariners we can be fairly confident that our submarines’ main area of operations (AO) is in the South China Sea, 3,500 nautical miles from base. But once there, we are not told what they do. In Australia at least, the missions the submarines undertake are classified…..

……..In addition, at a whole of life cost of $225 billion, this deterrent, such as it is, has a very high opportunity cost. Two former RAAF Chiefs have recently proposed that the ADF needs to acquire a long-range bomber force. Even if the new American B-21 bomber delivers only half the capability currently being spruiked, the early acquisition of two squadrons – 48 aircraft off the shelf – at a cost of around $50 billion looks an attractive power projection proposition. By comparison, the ability to put one conventional submarine on station “up threat” at any time at an acquisition cost of $80 billion, with associated doubts around its effectiveness and survivability, must be of questionable value……….