Seven deadly sins in the Defence industry
In the light of such revelations, and of the fact that nuclear-propelled submarines are really suitable only for deep sea operations, not littoral defence, Richard Marles’s obduracy in continuing to pursue Virginia-Class Attack submarines is astonishing.
It is also about whether the Australian tax payer will be ripped off in the process of acquiring them.
By Richard Broinowski Jul 27, 2023 https://johnmenadue.com/seven-deadly-sins-in-the-defence-industry/
If previous defence acquisitions are any guide, the enormous cost of nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy will almost certainly escalate well beyond the estimated but un-itemised initial price of $A368 billion. The record of corruption of the two US submarine builders suggests that the project will also probably suffer from mismanagement. The final bill is likely to be astronomical.
In my article ‘AUKUS exposes Australia’s incoherent defence policy’, (Pearls and Irritations 14 February 2022), I mentioned the findings of Fred Bennett, Chief of Capital Procurement in the Australian Department of Defence from 1984 to 1988. Bennett listed what he called the seven deadly sins of defence procurement projects – novelty, uncertainty, complexity, interdependence, resource limitations, creative destruction and political constraints. (Security Challenges Vol 6 No 3 Spring 2010).
Bennett claimed that all have been present to a greater or lesser degree in most acquisition projects, and none can be entirely evaded or eliminated. The record over several decades, both in Australia and Britain supports his view.
The Australian Jindalee over the horizon radar system suffered similar delays. The Lockheed Martin F-35 joint strike fighter, designed as a low-cost, lightweight high-performance stealth aircraft, is none of these things, and its project director was sacked in 2010 for cost overruns, schedule delays and a troubling performance record. The BAE Hunter class frigate program has been plagued by design changes which made the ships heavier and slower than intended.
Trying to adhere to a prime contract comprising 22,000 pages with 600 sub contracts, the Collins class submarine all but lost its way in a forest of complexity. This was exacerbated when Wormald, the lead corporation in the submarine consortium changed hands. The head of Wormald was also chair of the Australian Submarine Corporation. The ASC lost its CEO and a period of chaos followed.
But it is not just Bennett’s seven deadly sins we have to worry about with regard to the acquisition of US nuclear powered submarines. Nor is it just about confusion about their primary role, and whether they will be the best possible platform available to realise it. It is also about whether the Australian tax payer will be ripped off in the process of acquiring them.
There are precedents. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
In the light of such revelations, and of the fact that nuclear-propelled submarines are really suitable only for deep sea operations, not littoral defence, Richard Marles’s obduracy in continuing to pursue Virginia-Class Attack submarines is astonishing. Much cheaper conventional submarines with air-independent propulsion (AIP) are available from Sweden, Germany, Korea or Japan. They are quieter than nuclear submarines, have the capacity to lurk undetected for 30 days or more, are almost as fast, and are very unlikely to suffer the kind of cost blow-outs we are likely to face in nuclear-powered Virginias. We could also get them sooner.
The pro-nuclear lobby in Australia is excited by the prospect that possession of nuclear-powered submarines will lead to the capacity to develop a complete nuclear industry in Australia. This is a pipe dream. Operating experience with ANSTO’s one small Argentinian-designed research reactor at Lucas Heights does not enhance our capacity to enrich uranium, fabricate fuel rods, construct power reactors, or permanently dispose of nuclear waste. Few if any local councils would welcome construction of power reactors in their backyards. Australia still has no designated burial place for low-level medical nuclear waste. A growing number of high-level highly toxic spent fuel rods remain unprocessed at Lucas Heights. Uranium and plutonium residue from rods that have been processed overseas remain in temporary storage.
One can only hope that it is not too late to abandon the purchase of Virginia submarines in favour of much cheaper non-nuclear boats with AIP.
[problems in defence procurement, submarines, corruption, AUKUS, faulty steel plate, nuclear propulsion versus AIP]
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