TODAY. Ethics, intelligence, literature, and nuclear reprocessing
What on Earth has literature got to do with nuclear power? Well, nothing, really, I suppose.
And yet…….
An article today, about nuclear reprocessing, brought to mind the dilemma for Shakespeare’s Macbeth as he continues on the path to his doom.
Macbeth decides to go on, though he knows it is hopeless:
“I am in blood
Stepp’d in so far that, should I wade no more,
Returning were as tedious as go o’er“
He decides to just keep doing the same thing, rather than to stop, and think about alternatives:
” Strange things I have in head, that will to hand; Which must be acted ere they may be scann’d.”
“They have invested too much money in the program to give up on it halfway“
That’s the reason why the Japanese government will continue with this $97 billion massive white elephant of the Rokkasho nuclear reprocessing plant.
Even if the reprocessing plant is completed, it can treat only 800 tons of spent nuclear fuel annually at full capacity, compared with 19,250 tons of spent fuel stored nationwide.
Calls have grown over the years to abandon the nuclear fuel cycle project. – The Asahi Shimbun.
What has intelligence got to do with it? Well, meaning common sense, (rather than spying) – it would be intelligent to stop this futile project, and take some different actions, such as stopping making this toxic trash.
Finally – what has ethics got to do with this?
Well, everything. The Japanese government won’t face up to the truth. Neither will world leaders. It’s all too hard – leave it to our great-grandchildren to deal with the radioactive trash, and all the environmental, social, and weapons-and war-dangers of this noxious industry.
‘Poison portal’: US and UK could send nuclear waste to Australia under Aukus, inquiry told
Labor describes claims as ‘fear-mongering’ and says government would not accept waste from other nations.
Tory Shepherd, Tue 2 Apr 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/02/poison-portal-us-and-uk-could-send-nuclear-waste-to-australia-under-aukus-inquiry-told
Australia could become a “poison portal” for international radioactive waste under the Aukus deal, a parliamentary inquiry into nuclear safety legislation has heard.
New laws to establish a safety framework for Australia’s planned nuclear-powered submarines could also allow the US and UK to send waste here, while both of those countries are struggling to deal with their own waste, as no long-term, high-level waste facilities have been created.
The government introduced the Australian naval nuclear power safety bill in November last year. If passed, it will establish a nuclear safety watchdog, allow for naval nuclear propulsion facilities to be created, including for storing or disposing of radioactive waste from Aukus submarines. A second bill to enable the regulator to issue licenses was introduced at the same time.
Both have been referred to a Senate inquiry, which is due to report on 26 April.
Dave Sweeney, the Australian Conservation Foundation’s nuclear free campaigner, said the issue of waste disposal was “highly disturbing” and that the Aukus partners could see Australia as a “a little bit of a radioactive terra nullius”.
“Especially when it’s viewed in the context of the contested and still unresolved issue of domestic intermediate-level waste management, the clear failure of our Aukus partners to manage their own naval waste, the potential for this bill to be a poison portal to international waste and the failure of defence to effectively address existing waste streams, most noticeably PFAS,” he said.
The defence minister, Richard Marles, has previously accused the Greens of “fearmongering” when they raised similar concerns, saying the government would not accept waste from the other nations.
However, the legislation allows for the creation of facilities for “managing, storing or disposing of radioactive waste from an Aukus submarine”, and defines an Aukus submarine as either an Australian or a UK/US submarine, and “includes such a submarine that is not complete (for example, because it is being constructed or disposed of)”.
The Greens defence spokesperson, David Shoebridge, said HMS Dreadnought, one of the UK’s first nuclear submarines, had been “rusting away” since being decommissioned in 1980.
“You can go on Google Maps and look at them rusting away in real time, can’t you?” Shoebridge asked Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (Arpansa) chief regulatory officer, James Scott.
“Yes. There is no disposal pathway yet,” Scott said, adding he was “aware of the UK plans to establish a deep geological repository somewhere in the 2050s to 2060s”.
“There’s no exact date,” he said.
“The UK is pursuing a disposal pathway, and Australia will need to do the same. We are fully aware of this; we are engaging with our own radioactive waste agency, ARWA, on this, and it’s something that needs to be dealt with now, not later.”
The Dreadnought’s nuclear fuel has been removed to be stored safely. This has happened with some but not all of the submarines, but there is still no permanent disposal facility. The US also removes nuclear fuel for temporary storage.
The $97 billion mess – spent nuclear fuel reprocessing in Japan
The reprocessing plant was initially scheduled for completion in 1997.
Including expenditures for the future decommissioning of the plant, the total budget has reached 14.7 trillion yen. (close to $97 billion)
Even if the reprocessing plant is completed, it can treat only 800 tons of spent nuclear fuel annually at full capacity, compared with 19,250 tons of spent fuel stored nationwide.
“They have invested too much money in the program to give up on it halfway,“
Another delay feared at nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Aomori
By AKI FUKUYAMA/ Staff Writer, April 1, 2024, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15183716
Long-flustered nuclear fuel cycle officials fear there could be another delay in the project.
In a surprise to hardly anyone, the “hopeful outlook” for completion in June of a spent fuel reprocessing plant, a key component in Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle project, was pushed back in late January.
The facility is supposed to extract plutonium and uranium from used nuclear fuel. The recycled fuel can then be used to create mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, which can run certain nuclear reactors.
But the incompletion of the plant has left Japan with 19,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel with nowhere to go.
The nuclear waste stockpile will only grow, as the administration of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is turning to nuclear energy to cut Japan’s greenhouse gas emissions and reduce the country’s dependence on increasingly expensive fossil fuels.
Under the plan, 25 to 28 reactors will be running by 2030, more than double the current figure. Tokyo Electric Power Co. is seeking to restart reactors at its Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant in Niigata Prefecture this year.
31 YEARS AND COUNTING
A sign reading “village of energy” stands near Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.’s nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture.
The site, which is 159 times the size of Tokyo Dome, is lined with white buildings with no windows.
Construction started 31 years ago. It was still being built in late November last year, when it was shown to reporters.
The reprocessing plant is located on the Shimokita Peninsula at the northern tip of the main Honshu island.
Crops in the area are often damaged by cold humid winds during summer, so Rokkasho village accepted the plant in 1985 for local revitalization in place of agriculture.
Employees of privately-run Japan Nuclear Fuel, which is affiliated with nine major power companies, and other industry-related personnel account for more than 10 percent of Rokkasho’s population.
After repeated readjustments to the schedule, Naohiro Masuda, president of Japan Nuclear Fuel, said in December 2022 that the plant’s completion should come as early as possible during the first half of fiscal 2024, which is April to September 2024. More specifically, he pointed to “around June 2024.”
But at a news conference on Jan. 31 this year, Masuda said it is “inappropriate to keep saying the plant will be completed in June.”
The reprocessing plant was initially scheduled for completion in 1997.
Many insiders at the plant say it will be “quite difficult” to complete the work within the first half of fiscal 2024.
If officially decided, it will be the 27th postponement of the completion.
PROLONGED SCREENING, ACCIDENTS
One of the reasons for the delay of the completion is prolonged screenings by the Nuclear Regulation Authority.
Flaws were identified one after another in the company’s documents submitted to the nuclear watchdog, and around 400 Japan Nuclear Fuel employees are working on the papers within a gymnasium at the plant site.
Mechanical problems have also hampered progress. In 2022, for example, a system to cool high-level radioactive liquid waste broke down.
Masuda visited industry minister Ken Saito on Jan. 19 to report on the situation at the plant.
Saito told Masuda about the construction, “I expect you to forge ahead at full tilt.”
Masuda stressed his company “is fully devoted to finishing construction as soon as possible,” but said safety “screening is taking so much time because we have myriad devices.”
The cost to build the reprocessing plant, including new safety measures, has ballooned to 3.1 trillion yen ($20.57 billion), compared with the initial estimate of 760 billion yen.
Including expenditures for the future decommissioning of the plant, the total budget has reached 14.7 trillion yen. (close to $97 billion)
Even if the reprocessing plant is completed, it can treat only 800 tons of spent nuclear fuel annually at full capacity, compared with 19,250 tons of spent fuel stored nationwide.
Kyushu Electric Power Co. said in January that it would tentatively suspend pluthermal power generation at the No. 3 reactor of its Genkai nuclear power plant in Saga Prefecture. The reactor uses MOX fuel.
Kyushu Electric commissioned a French company to handle used fuel, but it recently ran out of stocks of MOX fuel.
Kyushu Electric has a stockpile of plutonium in Britain, but it cannot take advantage of it because a local MOX production plant shut down.
HUGE INVESTMENT
Calls have grown over the years to abandon the nuclear fuel cycle project.
Many insiders of leading power companies doubt whether the reprocessing plant “will really be completed” at some point.
But the government has maintained the nuclear fuel cycle policy, despite the huge amounts of time and funds poured into it.
“The policy is retained just because it is driven by the state,” a utility executive said.
Hajime Matsukubo, secretary-general of nonprofit organization Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, said the government’s huge investment explains why the fuel cycle program has yet to be abandoned.
“They have invested too much money in the program to give up on it halfway,” Matsukubo said.
Xi Jinping’s Thoughts on China’s Nuclear Weapons
Xi noted the increased readiness those new silos might provide was necessary to prepare to respond to foreign military intervention. That sounds more defensive than aggressive. ……………….. China’s long-standing commitment not to use nuclear weapons first at any time or under any circumstances.
UCS is concerned about the future direction of Chinese nuclear weapons policy. We agree with Gen. Cotton that “the PRC’s long-term nuclear strategy and requirements remain unclear.” We urge influential US voices, including the media, to refrain from encouraging the public, and especially US decision-makers, to jump to conclusions the available evidence does not support. We also urge the Biden administration, and the US Congress, to wait until they have a clearer understanding of Chinese nuclear thinking before making precipitous decisions about the future of the US nuclear arsenal.
April 1, 2024, Gregory Kulacki, China Project Manager, This blog was co-authored with UCS China analyst Robert Rust. https://blog.ucsusa.org/gregory-kulacki/xi-jinpings-thoughts-on-chinas-nuclear-weapons/
Last month UCS published a critique of a New York Times article that claimed Chinese military strategists, “are looking to nuclear weapons as not only a defensive shield, but as a potential sword — to intimidate and subjugate adversaries.” We examined the evidence and found it did not support that claim.
However, there was one piece of evidence in the article we could not examine; a speech by Chinese leader Xi Jinping to China’s Second Artillery in December of 2012. It operates China’s conventional and nuclear missiles and was renamed the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force in 2016. We’ve since obtained a copy of that speech and found it doesn’t support the New York Times claim either. There is no language in Xi’s speech that suggests he thinks about the purpose of China’s nuclear arsenal differently than his predecessors.
We posted the original Chinese text with an English translation. It is classified as an “internal publication” that should be “handled with care.” It was printed and distributed to all Chinese military officers at the regimental level and above by the General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in February 2014.
Why is this speech worth reading?
UCS first learned about the speech ten years ago when a Chinese colleague drew our attention to language in a commentary on the speech by generals Wei Fenghe and Zhang Haiyang, the commander and party secretary of the Second Artillery at the time. Our colleague noticed it contained new language describing the alert level of Chinese missiles. He thought the two officers might be trying to influence Xi’s thinking. UCS took note of that the new language in our 2016 report on a possible change in China’s nuclear posture.
That report concluded China may shift some of its nuclear forces to what is called a “launch on warning” or “launch under attack” alert status that would give Chinese leaders the option to launch those nuclear missiles quickly before they could be destroyed by an incoming attack. Traditionally, China kept its nuclear missile force off-alert, and the Second Artillery trained to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike only after being struck first. Currently, China is believed to keep most of its nuclear warheads in storage, separated from the missiles that carry them, to prevent an accidental or unauthorized launch.
Although China may still be moving to a launch on warning posture, the full text of Xi’s December 2012 speech, and the phrase it contains related to alert levels, reveals Xi did not discuss nuclear strategy or announce an intention to put Chinese nuclear forces on alert. He addresses more general concerns about the combat readiness, ideological orientation, and human qualities of Chinese military officers. Every Chinese head of state since 1842, when the United Kingdom defeated Imperial China in the Opium War, shared the same concerns. Xi did not say anything new, specific, or surprising. There is no language in his speech that justifies the suggestion he communicated aggressive new nuclear ambitions that day.
What did Xi say?
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