Antinuclear

The AUKUS operations are stalled because Australia cannot meet the nuclear waste disposal requirements of the non-proliferation treaty regime

13 Aug 24
Despite the somewhat difficult or convoluted language in the Agreement it gives the power and agreed authority to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to demand a proper and safe means for the storage and disposal in accordance with the prescriptions of IAEA of all nuclear material including waste generated in or acquired by Australia by whatever means and for the continuing inspection and audit of that material by IAEA

This applies specifically to the nuclear waste generated by the rotational visits of the nuclear powered submarines of the United States and the United Kingdom with Australia being solely responsible for the management and disposal of that waste

Irrespective of the strength of AUKUS by the involvement of the United States and the United Kingdom the requirements of IAEA under the Agreement will be strongly demanded by the member states who are
signatories to the non-proliferation treaty regime

The international demands on this issue will be readily adopted since they go to the most basic principles of nuclear safety and both the United States and the United Kingdom are known to have serious problems with the management of their own nuclear waste

COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT

From the latest available information the Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement as described below has still not been varied which means
that the AUKUS arrangements cannot be fully implemented for the
purposes of the non-proliferation treaty regime

The reason is that Australia cannot meet all the safety requirements of
IAEA by not having the proper means for the management and disposal
of all the nuclear waste generated by the AUKUS activities in
accordance with its prescriptions as outlined in the publication by IAEA
as to Disposal of Radioactive Waste No. SSR-5 and other
prescriptions.

There is the problem of the disposal of all the
nuclear waste generated initially by the rotational visits of nuclear submarines of the United States and the United Kingdom to Stirling in Western Australia.

Australia by its foreign minister has advised IAEA that it is seeking
appropriate sites on Defence land for a facility for the AUKUS
generated nuclear waste but this has been insufficient for the variation
of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and hence is delaying
the implementation of AUKUS

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COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
The problem for Australia is that without a variation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement as it is commonly
called it will be difficult for Australia to implement the AUKUS
arrangements yet at the same time remain within the non –
proliferation treaty regime.

In order to achieve the variation Australia must show that it
has or is in the latter stages of planning a nuclear waste
facility for the permanent disposal of the nuclear waste to be
generated by the AUKUS operations.

COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
PROVISIONS

AGREEMENT BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968
and which entered into force on 5 March 1970

NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE
USED IN NON-PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES

Article 14
If Australia intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is
required to be safeguarded under this Agreement in a nuclear activity which
does not require the application of safeguards under this Agreement, the
following procedures shall apply:

(a) Australia shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear:

(i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military
activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking Australia may
have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the nuclear material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity;
and
(ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the
nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) Australia and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, only while
the nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in this
Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent
possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be
applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall
apply again as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful
nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and
composition of such unsafeguarded nuclear material in Australia and of any
export of such nuclear material; and

(c) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. Such
agreement shall be given as promptly as possible and shall relate only to
such matters as, inter alia, temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, and shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of
the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.

APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS
Article 2
The Agency shall have the right and the obligation to ensure that safeguards
will be applied, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source
or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the
territory of Australia, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control
anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not
diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

±±The relevant provision of INFCIRC/153 is paragraph 14

Paragraph 14 provides for the “non- application” of “the safeguards
provided for in the Agreement”, but only while the nuclear material is in
the non-proscribed military use. 15 Feb 2022

August 12, 2024 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international, wastes, weapons and war