Antinuclear

Australia’s evolving nuclear posture: avoiding a fait accompli (Part 1 of 2)

Pearls and Irritations, By Vince Scappatura, Oct 12, 2024

A monumental transformation: There has been a great deal of public criticism of Australia’s decision to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) via the AUKUS security partnership. The criticism has been both broad and deep, spanning political and industrial challenges, budgetary consequences, safety and environmental concerns, strategic risks, and the erosion of national sovereignty.

While these are all worthy issues to bring to the fore of the public debate, one set of issues that have not received nearly as much attention are the ways in which AUKUS implicates Australia in US nuclear war planning.

From one perspective this is understandable given AUKUS does not involve plans for Australia to acquire nuclear-armed submarines or to station US nuclear weapons on Australian soil. However, when viewed from a wider perspective, AUKUS epitomises Australia’s geostrategic transformation and evolving nuclear posture within the US alliance.

The significance of this transformation is reflected in the fact that Australia will soon become ‘the only ally in the world to host and support military operations by forward-deployed US strategic bombers and SSN attack submarines’. This comes in addition to hosting mature US expeditionary Marine capabilities and a more recent rotational presence of US Army personnel and permanent associated support infrastructure.

Perhaps more significant than providing a ‘vast military launchpad’ for multiple forms of US power projection is the developing role of the ADF to seamlessly integrate with American military forces and to provide what is approaching full-spectrum support operations, including for nuclear missions.

AUKUS and nuclear war

Although the focus of AUKUS ‘pillar one’ is the acquisition by Australia of nuclear-powered, but conventionally-armed submarines, there are in fact several nuclear war planning dimensions to the broader security partnership.

The Australian government refuses to publicly broach the questions of how, where and against whom Australia’s future SSN force might be expected to operate both in peacetime and in the event of conflict. …………………………………………….

It would not be surprising if all of these contingencies are perceived by Beijing as posing an existential threat, particularly as China’s nuclear submarine deterrent continues to develop into an assured second-strike capability…………………………………………………………………

Australia’s evolving nuclear posture

AUKUS is more than just an international arms agreement. By Scott Morrison’s admission the political framework is intended to secure a ‘forever partnership’ and a ‘forever responsibility’ between Australia and the United States. The unprecedented scale, cost, time frame and interdependence generated by the singular AUKUS deal clearly signals a decision to lock Australia into America’s distinctive military strategy for containing China into the future.

A key objective of America’s strategy is to achieve seamless high-end defence integration with its global network of allies and partners. While obstacles to full realisation remain, Canberra’s embrace of ‘integrated deterrence’ is already transforming Australia into both a critical base of operations and provider of full-spectrum support for US force projection into the region. It is also leading to the development of a new and unprecedented role for the ADF in support of US nuclear operations.

………………………………………………………………………………………. Avoiding a fait accompli

The situation emerging is one of enduring high-level tactical and institutional integration between the defence forces of Australia and the United States, creating the conditions for extreme political pressure and expectations from Washington of Australian support for any future US war with China……………………………………………………………..

The time to put a halt to any plans for expanding Australia’s nuclear posture is now. If no public pressure is forthcoming the Australian government is likely, in time, to move forward with precommitments to support US nuclear operations behind closed doors, and if presented to the public at all, will be done so as a fait accompli, as was the case with AUKUS, the forward-deployment of B-52 bombers and the US Force Posture Initiatives generally.  https://johnmenadue.com/australias-evolving-nuclear-posture-avoiding-a-fait-accompli-part-1-of-2/

October 12, 2024 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war