Antinuclear

The incoherent mix in Australian defence policy

Defence policy should be about defending Australia, and nothing else

John Quiggin’s Blogstack, 19 Dec 25

Discussions of defence policy in Australia typically start from two underlying presumptions. The first is that the protection of our freedom and sovereignty from foreign conquest is too fundamental to be subject to the kind of cost- benefit analysis that is, or ought to be, normally applied to public expenditure. The second is that defence policy can be used to promote a wide variety of goals, such as projecting power and influence through peacekeeping and disaster relief.

Unfortunately, these presumptions are mutually inconsistent, and lead to incoherent policy responses. This is most evident in the case of AUKUS, the largest single defence purchase in Australian history, and a major change in policy with the shift to nuclear-powered submarines. There has been no explanation of the strategic rationale for AUKUS, let alone any attempt to weigh costs and benefits. Yet there has been extensive discussion of the potential for increased employment of skilled trades workers. Given the expenditure involved and the relatively modest numbers of workers required, this ought to be a third-order consideration, yet it appears to have had a significant influence on the design of the program.

As the case of AUKUS suggests, the interaction between defence and industry policy is a tangled one. In particular, the strong political demand from South Australia for manufacturing industries to replace motor vehicle building has weighed heavily on policy choices, effectively ruling out “off-the-shelf” purchases of submarines, and placing a high premium on including some Australian contribution to production of such high-cost items.

A Future Made in Australia ?

Given that the stated aim of policy is “A Future Made in Australia” , a more rational policy approach would provide direct subsidies to manufacturing of all kinds, while leaving open the option of off-the-shelf purchases of defence equipment. Paying higher costs to encourage a domestic armaments industry entails the opportunity cost of forgoing assistance that might be provide to other industries with greater social and economic benefits.

There is a defence rationale for maintaining a capacity to produce some armaments. In the event of a long conventional war, Australia might be unable to import crucial supplies. Hence, it would make sense to seek some degree of self- reliance in this respect.

However, the goals of industry policy and defence self- reliance are often poorly aligned. Large-scale procurement projects such as AUKUS and the F-35 program often involve some element of local production and assembly, but the resulting capacity would not necessarily be of value in the event of a conflict in which Australia was isolated from allied support

……………………………. the claimed industrial benefits of AUKUS involve integration into United Kingdom and United States supply chains. This is consistent with an industry policy goal of increasing exports of elaborately transformed manufactures. But it is directly contrary to the defence goal of enhancing our independent capacity to protect ourselves in an emergency. In the event of a conflict that cut off international supply chains, we would be unable to secure parts and repair services except for the subset that happened to be allocated to Australia.In many cases, the appropriate response to the possibility of supply disruptions will be a combination of stockpiles and (for items with civilian use, such as fuel) rationing, rather than the maintenance of high-cost production capacity.

The Grey Zone

Lying between policies designed for national defence and those aimed at delivering non-defence benefits is the aptly named “grey zone” . As the name implies, this term is poorly defined and covers a wide range of hostile actions by other nation states and non-state actors, ranging from aggressive disputes over maritime boundaries to cyber-attacks and election disinformation. Crucially, the term is used almost entirely in the context of defence policy, and to support the implication that a military response of some kind is appropriate.

In general, however, the capabilities required to address grey zone problems will bear little relationship to those required to defend Australia against invasion. For example, the resolution of maritime disputes might involve the deployment of patrol boats and coast guard vessels. But, despite a long history of such disputes, dating back to the “Cod Wars” between the UK and Iceland, serious armed conflict remains vanishingly rare. Moreover, the possession of more powerful naval forces is of little value, as the failure of the Royal Navy in three successive “wars” over fishing rights indicates.

An incoherent mix of objectives

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. As political scientist Daniel Drezner has observed, if everything is a national security issue, nothing is. Rather than expanding the role of the defence forces, while exempting defence expenditure from normal assessments of costs and benefits, we should begin by building a force capable of protecting Australia against any plausibly possible threat of attack or invasion (bearing in mind, the impossibility of protecting ourselves against nuclear missiles). Having done that, any expansion of the mission should be tested both for cost-effectiveness and for consistency with our broader policy objectives. https://johnquigginblog.substack.com/p/the-incoherent-mix-in-australian?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=806934&post_id=182047815&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

December 20, 2025 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war