Antinuclear

Australia’s West Bank Abdication: The Comfort of Complicity

Twelve nations put a price on Israel’s illegal settlements. Canberra sat at the table for months, then remembered it had a Security Council seat to win.

URBAM WRONSKI WRITES, 29 Sept 26

Do we have principles?

Strutting what it sees as the high moral ground of the world stage, Australia is wont to pose as the honest broker, champion of the underdog and even warden of the mystical rules-based order, a form of words that rivals the Nicene Creed for opacity and is chanted with the same glazed piety, loudest by those least inclined to live by it.

Hypocrisy? If we don’t like our principles, as Groucho almost said, we have others.

This month twelve nations put their names to trade sanctions on Israel’s illegal settlements in the West Bank: the UK, France, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.

Four diplomatic sources told the ABC that Australia stayed in the talks until close to the end. One EU official had seen an earlier draft with Australia written in.

Whether Canberra ever agreed to be there, nobody will say.

Then the pens came out and Australia remembered a pressing engagement elsewhere.

Two EU officials were “surprised”. Another was “disappointed”. A Nordic official said Canberra had “missed an opportunity”.

That is how you talk about a mate who didn’t show.

We are not so much walking back our stance against illegal settlements as not walking the talk at all.

Before we go there, let’s look at what hides behind the benign euphemism of the word settlement.

What the word hides

The settlements are Israeli civilian towns built on land Israel captured in 1967.

Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention forbids an occupying power to move its own civilians into the territory it occupies. In July 2024 the International Court of Justice found the occupation itself unlawful and said the settlements must be evacuated.

Some settlements are cities with shopping malls and council rates. Others are one caravan, one flag and a flock of sheep on a hilltop.

Both do the same job.

Take Ras Ein al-Auja, a Bedouin village in the Jordan Valley. This is innovation. Who needs a bulldozer?

In late December 2025 settlers set up an outpost beside it. They ploughed the village land, tore up the road and cut the power cables. They blocked the canal and the grazing grounds.

They drove their herds to people’s doorsteps and gathered in groups at night.

On 8 January, 26 households, more than 100 people, left in a single day, +972 Magazine reports.

“They threatened to kill us, chased us, beat us,” said Abu Taleb al-Omari, 75. “In the end, they said they would slaughter us here if we didn’t leave.”

Muhammad Eshaq Rashid, 55: “I’ve never cried in my life until today.”

The settlers’ parting words, as one resident recalls them: “You lost. Wherever you go, we’ll come.”

Ras Ein al-Auja is not an aberration.

Amnesty International counts 117 herding and Bedouin communities fully or partly driven out between January 2023 and April 2026. That is 5,910 people. Of 363 unauthorised outposts, 212 went up under the present government………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Penny Wong told the Senate that Australia would pursue “further targeted measures in coordination with international partners.”

Which measures. Against whom. By when. The Senate was not told. Neither were we.

A touch of the reverse Robin Hood. We won’t tax the people taking Palestinian land, out of tender concern for the Palestinians whose land is being taken.

No-one’s buying the government guff………………………………………………………………….

Targeted measures. The very thing Canberra says it prefers. They were on the table. Canberra left them there.

And the targeted measures we already have?

In June 2025 Australia joined Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Norway in sanctioning Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. Good.

Now look at what that leaves. We sanction the man who runs the settlement project, then decline to touch the project.

The foreign policy equivalent of thoughts and prayers.

Wong is not confused about the stakes. She has said that settlement growth, E1 and “flagrant settler violence” are “extinguishing the possibility of a two-state solution.”

The Foreign Minister has read the death notice. She is still deciding on flowers.

Nor is the law in doubt. The ICJ told every state to refrain from aid or assistance in maintaining the occupation, and to take steps to prevent trade or investment relations that help keep it going.

Trade relations. The Court named the lever. Twelve nations have pulled it.

The domestic alibi

So why walk? The ABC’s sources point home.

On 14 December 2025, gunmen killed 15 people at a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach. That was antisemitic terror and the grief is real.

A royal commission followed. Its report is due on 18 December.

Several diplomats told the ABC that the pressure on Albanese since Bondi may have shaped Canberra’s decision.

Here is what the government will not say.

Jewish Australians are not the Israeli cabinet. A Hanukkah gathering on Bondi Beach is not a caravan on a hilltop in the Jordan Valley. A tariff on settlement goods is not an act against a faith.

Treat it as one and you accept the settlers’ own case: that the settlements belong to every Jew, everywhere.

Plenty of Jewish Australians see the difference. The Jewish Council of Australia, a progressive group sharply critical of Israeli government policy, wants settlement goods banned.

“Once again,” said its executive officer Bart Shteinman, “Australia is at the back of the pack when it comes to upholding our international law obligations.”

Jewish Australians call for the ban. The government cites Jewish Australians as its reason to refuse it.

Canberra is choosing which Jews to hear.

In London, Ed Miliband announced Britain’s measures and was promptly called antisemitic. Miliband is Jewish, as Rachel Withers notes in Crikey.

A charge that fits everyone is no guide to policy………………………………………………… https://urbanwronski.com/2026/09/29/australia-west-bank-abdication-comfort-of-complicity/

October 1, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics | Leave a comment

Submission to AUKUS Inquiry – Unwise to integrate Australia into USA’s military power -David Jonathan Beardsmore.

147 – extract of a long submission

“…………………………………My submission advances three core arguments. First, that AUKUS operationally integrates
Australia into United States power projection in a way that serves US strategic interests rather
than Australian ones, and exposes Australia to risks it cannot control.

Second, that the
opportunity cost of AUKUS is indefensible, the soft power strategy that would actually serve
Australian regional security is being systematically underfunded while $368 billion is
committed to submarines that may never arrive on schedule, if at all.

Third, that a right-sized,
conventionally capable, agile defence force, including the asymmetric and drone capabilities
that have proven decisive in recent conflicts, oriented toward genuine Australian territorial
defence and regional partnership would serve Australian security better and at a fraction of the
cost.

AUKUS Was Conceived in a Strategic Environment That No Longer Exists
AUKUS was announced in September 2021 under a specific set of assumptions about the
international environment: that the United States was a reliable, rules-based actor committed
to multilateral institutions; that the primary strategic challenge was Chinese military
expansionism requiring a conventional military counterbalance; and that deep operational
integration with the United States would enhance rather than constrain Australian strategic autonomy. Each of those assumptions has been fundamentally called into question by subsequent events.

The United States has withdrawn from or undermined multiple international agreements and
institutions. It has used economic coercion against allied trading partners including Australia. It
has made explicit territorial claims over allied and sovereign territory, including Greenland and
assertions about the Panama Canal. Its current National Defense Strategy includes explicit
assertions of US dominance over the Western Hemisphere that echo 19th century Monroe
Doctrine thinking, with implications for how it would expect allied military assets to be
deployed.

I put a direct question to the inquiry that has not been adequately answered in public debate:
how does Australia procuring nuclear-powered submarines align with the actual current US
defence strategy? That strategy, as articulated under the current administration, appears to
prioritise the Western Hemisphere and Latin America as the primary zone of US strategic
concern, while effectively ceding leadership in Southeast Asia. If the US is reorienting toward
its own hemisphere, the strategic rationale for Australia acquiring submarines designed to
operate in partnership with US forces in the Indo-Pacific requires urgent re-examination. We
may be purchasing a capability designed to serve a US strategic posture that the US itself is
abandoning.

I put a further direct question: if Australia were to have a Virginia class submarine operating
under shared protocols with the United States Navy today, would Australia be in a position to
refuse if the United States requested operational support for naval activities in the Caribbean,
the Gulf of Mexico, or the waters around Venezuela or Cuba? The deeper the operational
integration, the harder the answer to that question becomes. AUKUS does not merely procure
submarines, it structurally commits Australia to follow the United States wherever its strategic
interests lead, for the next fifty years.

I also note that the AUKUS commitment appears to have been made without the standard due
diligence that would be required of any comparable major public or private investment. There
is no publicly available independent cost-benefit analysis. There is no published risk
assessment. The business case, to the extent one exists, has never been released. A
commitment of this magnitude made without this foundational work did not follow due process
by any reasonable standard, and the inquiry should name that failure directly.

A $368 billion commitment made on the basis of strategic assumptions that have demonstrably
shifted, without adequate due diligence, deserves to be revisited. That is not an anti-American
argument. It is the most basic principle of prudent risk management. I note in this context that
the terms of the deal have already changed significantly, Australia will now receive three
second-hand Virginia class submarines rather than the originally planned mix of new and used
boats. The goalposts have moved before a single submarine has been delivered. This ought to
raise serious questions about what further changes lie ahead over a fifty-year programme.

The Difference Between Alliance and Operational Integration
I wish to draw a distinction that has been largely absent from the public debate on AUKUS.
There is a meaningful difference between maintaining an alliance relationship with the United
States and being operationally integrated into US power projection.

Australia has maintained an alliance with the United States for over eighty years. That alliance
has served Australian interests in some respects and has drawn Australia into conflicts that did
not serve Australian interests in others, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan being the most obvious
examples. In each case, the alliance logic made refusal politically costly even when the
strategic case for participation was weak or non-existent.

AUKUS takes that logic and embeds it in steel and nuclear reactors. Nuclear-powered
submarines operating under shared US protocols, based at HMAS Stirling near Perth, are not
a defensive capability for protecting Australian territory and maritime approaches. They are a
contribution to US power projection across the Indo-Pacific and potentially beyond. That is a
fundamentally different strategic posture, and it has been adopted without the Australian
people being given the opportunity to debate or decide it.

I submit that Australia can and should maintain its alliance relationship with the United States
while declining to be operationally integrated into US power projection. New Zealand has done
exactly this, maintaining its alliance relationships while exercising greater strategic
independence, and it has not been invaded or left without allies. The argument that Australia
must choose between full operational integration with the United States and strategic isolation
is a false binary that serves the interests of the defence industry and alliance managers, not
the Australian people.

The Opportunity Cost: Soft Power Is Australia’s Greatest Strategic Asset

Australia’s greatest strategic asset in the Indo-Pacific is not military capability. It is trust,
proximity, shared vulnerability to climate change, and a history of engagement with Pacific and
Southeast Asian nations that cannot be replicated by either the United States or China. That
asset is being systematically squandered while $368 billion is committed to submarines.

The Pacific Islands Forum member nations have been explicit about their strategic priorities.
Their existential threat is climate change, not Chinese military aggression. When Australia
commits $368 billion to nuclear submarines while cutting development assistance and climate
finance to Pacific Island nations, it sends a clear message that Australian strategic priorities
have nothing to do with their actual needs. That message drives Pacific nations toward China,
not because they embrace Chinese authoritarianism, but because China is building ports,
hospitals, roads and renewable energy infrastructure while Australia is buying submarines.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative has created genuine dependency across the Indo-Pacific, in
Southeast Asia, and in Africa. That dependency is not the same as military conquest, but it
represents a form of strategic influence that shapes the decisions of governments and
peoples. The way to counter it is not submarines, it is offering a genuine alternative at scale.
Australia, in partnership with Japan, South Korea, India and European allies, has the capacity
to offer such an alternative. What has been lacking is the political will and financial commitment
to do so. AUKUS forecloses that option by consuming the resources that would make it
possible.

I submit that every dollar committed to AUKUS is a dollar not available for the development
finance, climate adaptation support, educational exchanges, diplomatic engagement, and
multilateral institution-building that constitute genuine soft power, and that would do more to
advance Australian security and regional influence than any number of nuclear submarines.

A Considered Assessment of the Chinese Strategic Challenge

I wish to be clear that I do not dismiss the Chinese strategic challenge. China’s militarisation of
disputed features in the South China Sea, its coercive economic behaviour toward trading
partners including Australia, its dismantling of Hong Kong’s democratic institutions in breach of
the Sino-British Joint Declaration, its treatment of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang, and the
ongoing military threat to Taiwan are all matters of genuine concern that deserve serious policy
responses. However, I submit that the appropriate Australian response to these challenges is
not submarines. It is the consistent application of international law, multilateral diplomatic
engagement, support for regional institutions, economic diversification to reduce dependency on any single trading partner, and the kind of soft power investment described in the previous section.

ASEAN, the ten-nation Southeast Asian bloc that sits between Australia and China, has
explicitly and consistently rejected the framing of a binary choice between Washington and Beijing. ASEAN’s strategic preference is for a rules-based regional order maintained through
multilateral institutions, not through US or Chinese military dominance. AUKUS cuts across
that preference and makes Australian diplomacy in ASEAN more difficult, not less. A
submission from Australia to the region that says ‘we are deploying nuclear-powered
submarines under US protocols’ is not the same as a submission that says ‘we are investing in
your development, your climate resilience, and your institutional capacity.’

On the question of Taiwan specifically, I acknowledge the genuine complexity of its historical
and legal status, and I recognise the democratic character of its 23 million people and their
right to determine their own future free from military coercion. However, the question for
Australian strategic policy is not whether Taiwan matters, it is whether AUKUS submarines
would meaningfully alter the outcome of a conflict over Taiwan without catastrophic
consequences for Australia. The answer to that question is clearly no. A war between the
United States and China over Taiwan, fought with Australian submarines alongside the US
Navy, would not save Taiwan and would expose Australia to retaliatory strikes against facilities
including HMAS Stirling, making Perth one of the first targets in a conflict that would threaten
the survival of Australian society as we know it.

This risk is compounded by the observable instability of United States policy on Taiwan itself.
The recent Trump administration’s engagement with China, including high-level diplomatic
contact and signals of reduced commitment to Taiwan’s defence, demonstrates that US
Taiwan policy is subject to rapid reversal depending on the domestic political calculations of
any given administration. Australia should not be structuring a fifty-year strategic commitment
around the reliability of US Taiwan policy when that policy has demonstrably shifted within a
single presidential term. We risk being entangled in a conflict the United States itself may
choose to step away from.

A Right-Sized Defence Force for Australia’s Actual Security Needs

Australia’s genuine defence needs can be summarised as follows:

• Maritime patrol and surveillance capability sufficient to monitor Australia’s vast
  exclusive economic zone and maritime approaches.
• Cyber capability, the most likely domain of future conflict affecting Australian interests,
  which is chronically underfunded relative to conventional platforms.
• Rapid response forces capable of responding quickly to crises across the Indo-Pacific,
  including disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping operations that
  build regional relationships.
• Conventional deterrence sufficient to make any direct attack on Australian territory
  prohibitively costly for any potential adversary.
• Space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability that provides
  genuine strategic awareness without dependence on US systems.
• Advanced asymmetric capabilities, including drone swarms, loitering munitions,
  electronic warfare, and autonomous underwater vehicles, that represent the cutting
  edge of modern warfare at a fraction of the cost of conventional platforms.

None of these requirements needs nuclear submarines. All of them could be funded at world-
class levels for a fraction of $368 billion, with substantial funds remaining for the soft power

investment that is Australia’s most effective strategic tool………………………….

The Unresolved Nuclear Waste Question and True Cost of AUKUS

I note with serious concern that no credible answer has been provided to the question of where
the high-level nuclear waste generated by AUKUS submarines will be stored. This is not a
minor administrative detail. It is a fundamental question about the use of sovereign Australian
territory that affects First Nations communities, environmental values, and Australia’s
international standing as a non-nuclear-weapons state.

I wish to draw the inquiry’s attention to a question about the $368 billion cost estimate that I do
not believe has been adequately addressed in public debate: does that figure include
decommissioning costs? For nuclear facilities, decommissioning costs typically exceed the
original capital cost of construction, sometimes by a significant multiple, and extend across
decades after the facility ceases operation. If the $368 billion figure does not include the full
lifecycle cost of nuclear waste storage, management, and eventual decommissioning of the
submarines themselves, the true cost to Australian taxpayers and their descendants is
substantially higher than has been publicly stated. The inquiry should require a full lifecycle
cost disclosure before any further commitments are made.

Australia has ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapons state. To
be clear, the AUKUS submarines will be nuclear-powered but conventionally armed, the
nuclear technology is in the propulsion system, not in the weapons they carry. The Australian
government and its AUKUS partners argue that this arrangement complies with the written
terms of the NPT because the treaty relates only to nuclear materials associated with nuclear
weapons, not propulsion. However, this compliance is genuinely contested and unresolved.
The arrangement involves the transfer of tonnes of highly enriched uranium to Australia, the
same material used in nuclear weapons, and cooperation in developing capabilities for nuclear
submarine operations that IAEA safeguards were not expressly designed to cover.

The Arms
Control Association and independent non-proliferation experts have noted these concerns.
Australia would become the first non-nuclear-weapons state to acquire nuclear-powered
submarines, setting a precedent that could significantly undermine the global non-proliferation The Arms
Control Association and independent non-proliferation experts have noted these concerns.
Australia would become the first non-nuclear-weapons state to acquire nuclear-powered
submarines, setting a precedent that could significantly undermine the global non-proliferation

I submit that the AUKUS commitment should not proceed, and certainly should not consume
further public resources, until the full lifecycle cost, including waste storage and
decommissioning, has been publicly disclosed, and until the waste storage question has been
answered transparently and publicly with full community consultation including First Nations
communities on whose land nuclear waste storage may ultimately be proposed.

The Democratic Deficit
Regardless of one’s view on the strategic merits of AUKUS, the process by which it was
decided represents a democratic failure that this inquiry should name clearly.

A commitment of up to $368 billion, extending obligations across multiple generations of
Australians who have not been consulted and cannot consent, was made in secret, announced
without prior parliamentary debate, and has been shielded from meaningful parliamentary
scrutiny by bipartisan political agreement. The argument that bipartisan support makes
parliamentary scrutiny unnecessary inverts the purpose of parliamentary democracy.
Bipartisan agreement between major parties is precisely the circumstance in which
independent scrutiny becomes most essential.

I submit that this inquiry should recommend that no further commitments under AUKUS be
made without a full parliamentary debate and vote, that the complete terms of existing
agreements be made public, and that an independent cost-benefit analysis, including full
lifecycle costs, be commissioned and publicly released before the submarine acquisition
proceeds further.

Conclusion and Recommendations

I summarise my recommendations to the inquiry as follows:

1. Suspend further AUKUS commitments pending independent review of the changed
   strategic environment, including the altered behaviour and reliability of the United
   States as an alliance partner and the shift in US strategic focus toward the Western
   Hemisphere.
2. Commission and publicly release an independent full lifecycle cost-benefit analysis,
   including decommissioning and nuclear waste storage costs, comparing AUKUS
   against alternative defence capability options and against redirecting equivalent
   resources to soft power, development finance, and regional engagement.
3. Resolve the nuclear waste storage question transparently and with full community
   consultation, including First Nations communities, before any further nuclear-related
   commitments are made.
4. Require a full parliamentary debate and vote before any further AUKUS commitments
   are entered into.
5. Develop and resource a comprehensive Indo-Pacific soft power strategy, including
   development finance, climate adaptation support, educational engagement, and
   multilateral institution-building, as Australia’s primary tool for countering Chinese
   regional influence and building genuine security relationships.
6. Commission a comprehensive review of Australia’s defence capability mix in light of
   the lessons of the Ukraine and Lebanon conflicts, with specific assessment of investment in asymmetric, drone, autonomous, and cyber capabilities as alternatives to or complements of conventional platform spending.
7. Right-size Australia’s defence force around its actual security needs, territorial defence, maritime surveillance, cyber capability, rapid response, asymmetric deterrence, and regional partnership, rather than around the requirements of US power projection.
8. Maintain the alliance relationship with the United States while declining operational integration that commits Australia to US military adventures beyond its own strategic interests.

September 27, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics | Leave a comment

Submission to the AUKUS Public Inquiry – Australia’s diplomatic relations – John Leslie Lander

The strategic rationale for AUKUS is founded on the patently false premise that China presents a kinetic threat to Australia.

The executive power of the Commonwealth under Section 61 of the Constitution,
does not extend to granting any foreign nation operational control of Australian
defence or intelligence facilities, or territory,

I am making this submission of the basis of long-term professional involvement in
diplomatic relations with China…….China is likely to become an enemy only if Australia insists on making it one.

In 1971-72 I was actively engaged in the process of establishing diplomatic
relations with the Peoples Republic of China and dismantling diplomatic relations
with the Republic of China. I was Deputy Ambassador to China 1974-76 and
subsequently Head of the China Section of DFAT on three separate occasions over
the course of thirty years. In that capacity, I was personally responsible for
negotiating the arrangements for the establishment of Consular Relations with
China. After retirement from DFAT, I have been a frequent visitor to China,
especially since 2001.

Dubious Rationale of AUKUS

The strategic rationale for AUKUS is founded on the patently false premise that
China presents a kinetic threat to Australia. Across the millennia of its history,
China has not invaded any other country, and certainly not since WW2, although it
was itself invaded by Imperial Japan, whose attempt to invade Australia was, to a
significant extent, thwarted by Australia’s ally – China. At no time in the past 80
years has China ever evinced the slightest inclination to attack Australia, let alone
expressed a policy of hostility towards Australia. It has consistently expressed a
policy of encouraging mutually beneficial relations, even during the brief period of
so-called “economic coercion”, where China was quite clearly reacting to the overt
hostility expressed by the Morrison government.

China is only likely to become an enemy if Australia insists on making it one. The
current Australian attitude of antipathy includes frequent actions of antagonism
towards China, (e.g. military incursions into China’s sovereign territory of the
province of Taiwan, which Australia is legally bound to observe as One China).
These stem especially from AUKUS and other aspects of US militarisation of
Australia, and push inexorably towards war.

The economic growth of China, where it now equals the US in terms of Purchasing
Power Parity, and China’s concomitant growth in military strength, to counter the
threat from the US military bases and naval forces ranged against it, have often
been cited as indicators of the potential threat from China.

Part of the rationale for AUKUS is the requirement to protect Australia’s sea lanes
from possible interdiction by China, ignoring the fact that China has an existential interest in keeping those same sea lanes open, because it is the largest trading
partner of the vast majority of the world. The only country poised to blockade
them is the US. Australia’s prosperity depends on trade, a full third of which is with
China and most of it carried on Chinese ships. To argue that AUKUS is necessary
for war against China in order to keep open Australia’s trade with China is
paradoxical and schizophrenic.

The US antagonism towards China is based on the US desire for global supremacy,
which is evidently being undermined by China’s growing ability to provide an
alternative source of finance and economic development to the Global Majority,
who lie outside the small group of Western countries. The US has made no secret
of its intention to embroil China in a debilitating war conducted by the US proxy
network of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Australia, in order to
derail China’s economic growth and impede its ability to cooperate with the
countries of the Global Majority.

Far from seeking to undermine a genuine rules based international order, China
has constantly reiterated its policy of promoting reform and strengthening of the
United Nations system to make it more effective and fairer to all member States. AUKUS forms a
key part of Australia’s increasingly futile attempt to uphold the US version of the
international rules based order, designed by and for the benefit of the US and its
Western allies. This is an order whose rules are frequently flouted by the US and
Australia, whenever they might hamper the pursuit of US geopolitical ambitions.

China’s policy towards Australia has consistently been one of amity. Even if
nefarious intentions are attributed to China, going to war against it is
counter-productive, in terms of preserving Australia’s security. Countless
simulations by the Rand corporation of a US/China war have without exception
demonstrated that the US would lose. Australia, even if part of the network of
proxies, would have even less chance of emerging intact from war against China.

Any pragmatic assessment of the respective military capabilities of Australia and
China would demonstrate that China is immensely more powerful than Australia,
which will never be able to match it. Given the time-frame in which the US insists
the war against China is to occur, Australia would have already been devastated
long before the delivery of the putative benefits of AUKUS.

The only guarantee of security for a small nation like Australia is the nurturing of
mutually beneficial relations with China and the countries in Australia’s region, all
of whom have engaged in economic development projects with China and none of
whom share Australia’s antipathy towards China. AUKUS makes Australia’s
neighbours very nervous about its intentions and isolates it from the region which espouses constructive relations with China.

Legal/Constitutional Dubiety of AUKUS

The system of governance in Australia, under the Constitution, requires the
Executive to work through the Parliament, not independently of it. International
Treaties – and Agreements having the force of treaty – require ratification by
Parliament in order to have effect in Australian domestic law. The legal question is
not whether the Agreement exists as an international instrument. The real
question is whether the Australian government has valid domestic legal authority
for the specific acts required to give effect to it inside Australia.

The executive power of the Commonwealth under Section 61 of the Constitution,
does not extend to granting any foreign nation operational control of Australian
defence or intelligence facilities, or territory, or to committing Commonwealth
expenditure in connection with such arrangements, without statutory authority
conferred by the Parliament.

The government may argue that the executive has inherent power to spend
without a specific Act of Parliament, since Parliament had appropriated funding in
the budget. The High Court, in Williams v. Commonwealth (2012)248 CLR 156,
disagreed unanimously with this view. Appropriation alone does not authorise the
executive to spend on whatever it likes. For significant executive acts with real
domestic legal consequences, there must be a lawful source of authority.

That principle applies directly to AUKUS, which is adjunct to the even more
egregious Force Posture Agreement with the US, which also runs counter to the
principle established by the High Court. Committing billions in expenditure;
granting operational control of Australian facilities to a foreign military force (e.g.
Stirling Naval Base); authorising construction works; permitting prepositioning of
foreign materiel within Australian territory: all of these are acts with significant
domestic legal consequences. For each, the Commonwealth must identify a valid
legal source of authority.

The central and unanswered problem is that no one has identified that statute. The
Defence Act 1903 does not expressly authorise the grant of operational control to
a foreign military force. Neither does any other Commonwealth law. This is a real
gap in the law which the Commonwealth would have to answer if challenged in the
High Court.

Three Constitutional Questions

The constitutional case focuses on three questions that must each be answered.

First: does the executive have authority to commit Australian bases and resources
in domestic law? Signing an international agreement does not automatically
produce domestic legal consequences. The operational control, the prepositioning
rights, and the expenditure obligations all require a domestic legal foundation. No
treaty can shortcut that requirement.

Second: can the defence power fill the gap? The Commonwealth may argue that
section 51(vi) of the Constitution supports the arrangements. That argument must
be taken seriously. But while the defence power is a legislative power, which
empowers Parliament to make laws about defence, it does not automatically
authorise ministers to act without legislative backing. If specific infrastructure
works, access arrangements, and expenditure decisions are to rest on the defence
power, there must still be a valid legal pathway, a statute or regulation that
properly authorises each particular act.

Third: if neither executive power nor the defence power supplies the necessary
authority, are the implementation measures vulnerable? Under Williams v.
Commonwealth, yes. Executive spending and domestic legal commitments cannot
rest on appropriation and ministerial preference alone.

A successful High Court challenge by a Parliament unwilling to authorise in public
what has been done without its knowledge, would affirm the principle of
responsible government, by ensuring that agreements of strategic and
constitutional significance are subject to prior Parliamentary approval and public
scrutiny. It would be a major reassertion of an independent Australian foreign
policy. It would no longer mortgage Australian treasure, Australian territory and
Australian lives to American strategic preferences without the Australian people
ever having been asked.

The constitutional challenge to AUKUS is not anti-American. It is pro-Australian. It
is a demand that decisions of this magnitude be made by the Parliament of
Australia, in public, with accountability to the people who would bear the
consequences.

September 22, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics | Leave a comment

Submission to AUKUS Public Inquiry – Australia needs regional co-operation, not coercion -Erik D Nielsen

Submission no.84, SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSION TO THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO AUKUS
Subject: The Definition of “Stability” and Regional Perception

Context and Purpose
Following my initial submission regarding the lack of a coherent strategic vision for AUKUS, I wish to
provide a supplementary analysis specifically addressing the Inquiry’s scope question: “What are the
implications of AUKUS for regional peace and security?

The core issue lies in the definition of “stability”. While the Australian government frequently invokes
the need for a “stable Indo-Pacific,” recent foreign policy actions suggest a definition that diverges
significantly from the understanding held by Australia’s neighbors in ASEAN and the Pacific Islands.

The Gap Between Rhetoric and Action

The government’s stated vision of stability implies a region governed by international law,
cooperation, and mutual security. However, the government’s recent conduct in the Middle East
provides a contradictory signal:

Alignment in Gaza: Australia’s consistent diplomatic and material support for Israel during
the ongoing crisis in Gaza, despite widespread international condemnation and evidence of
severe humanitarian catastrophe, signals that Australia prioritizes alliance loyalty over
international humanitarian law. 

Alignment with US Military Actions: Australia’s alignment with US military posturing and
operations in the region (including recent escalations involving Iran) reinforces the
perception that “stability” is synonymous with the projection of force by the US-led alliance.

The Regional Interpretation of “Stability”

When Australia calls for “stability” in the context of AUKUS, it is crucial to recognize how this message
is received by the nations of the Indo-Pacific. 

Dominance vs. Cooperation: Given the government’s track record, neighboring nations are ikely to interpret Australia’s call for “stability” not as a desire for peace, but as a demand for
acquiescence to a US-dominated order. 

The Coercive Nature of AUKUS: If “stability” means maintaining the status quo where the US
and its allies retain military supremacy, then AUKUS is not a defensive measure for Australia,
but a tool for enforcing that hierarchy. 

Erosion of Trust: For Pacific Island nations and ASEAN members who have historically
advocated for nuclear-free zones and non-alignment, the combination of AUKUS and
Australia’s Middle East posture confirms that Australia is willing to sacrifice regional
sovereignty and international law to serve the strategic interests of Washington.

The Logical Conclusion

If the Australian government’s concept of stability is indeed based on dominance rather than
cooperation and adherence to international law, then:

1. AUKUS is a destabilizing force: It introduces nuclear-capable assets into a region that has
   explicitly rejected them, directly challenging the Treaty of Rarotonga and the aspirations of
   the Global South.
2. The “Rules-Based Order” is a euphemism: It becomes clear that the “rules” being enforced
   are those that benefit the dominant powers, not the collective security of the region.
3. Security is Illusory: A nation that bases its security on the coercion of others cannot expect
   to be secure in the long term. It invites resistance, arms races, and diplomatic isolation.

Recommendation for the Inquiry
The Inquiry must not accept the government’s definition of “stability” at face value. It must explicitly
investigate: 

How the government’s recent foreign policy actions in the

Middle East influence the
perception of Australia’s intentions in the Indo-Pacific.  Whether the “stability” AUKUS promises is actually a mechanism for enforcing a specific
geopolitical hierarchy rather than fostering genuine regional peace. 

How the Inquiry can account for the regional fear that AUKUS represents a shift from
cooperative security to coercive dominance.

Conclusion: Real security cannot be built on a foundation of selective adherence to international law
and the projection of force. If Australia’s vision of the future is one where “stability” means the
continuation of US hegemony and the suppression of dissent, then AUKUS is a commitment to a
future that the rest of the region rightly fears.

The Inquiry must ask: What kind of stability Australia wants to foster in the region and how has this
been supported by Australia’s recent actions in a way that our neighbors understand this in the
same way?

September 20, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics | Leave a comment

AUKUS — controversial, secretive but given a bipartisan blank cheque

By Dave Sweeney | 12 September 2026, https://independentaustralia.net/politics/politics-display/aukus–controversial-secretive-but-given-a-bipartisan-blank-cheque,21546

This week marks the fifth anniversary of the AUKUS announcement, a $368 billion defence project shrouded in secrecy with major party bipartisan support that fundamentally changed the Australian political landscape, writes Dave Sweeney. 

FIVE YEARS AGO THIS WEEK, the Australian political landscape fundamentally changed when then Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced on September 15 2021, that our nation would join a defence pact with the U.S. and the UK based around the acquisition of nuclear submarines. 

The decision was made without scrutiny, consultation, evidence or any Parliamentary process or review.

It was an idea conceived in secrecy and delivered in a highly politicised context, with then Labor Opposition leader Anthony Albanese given negligible time or information before positioning to avoid being wedged and portrayed as “soft” on national security ahead of the looming federal election. 

Without clear detail, analysis, or consultation, the Labor leadership signed off on the deeply flawed plan, and since then a short-term political tactic has set the path for a long-term national error.  

The years since have seen federal Labor inexplicably defend and extend AUKUS despite growing concerns and multiple opportunities to take an exit ramp.

State premiers in the frontline states of SA and WA have become project promoters, with talk of Class A predators and triple AAA economic ratings, while many trade unions have been seduced or enmeshed with the promise of union jobs.

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) have been granted special powers and the Canberra song sheet is tightly scripted and enjoys bipartisan major party support 

The intervening years since have also seen profound political changes here and with our AUKUS partners. The U.S. in particular has become increasingly unreliable and petulant.

The U.S. has also become increasingly enmeshed in Australian military positioning, with a recent Guardian report highlighting unfettered access to over 50 per cent of Australia’s military bases. 

Of particular concern to many is the fact that Australia currently accepts America’s policy of nuclear ambiguity or “don’t ask, don’t tell” in relation to the presence of nuclear weapons.  

The American B-52 bombers now based at RAAF Tindal near Katherine in the Northern Territory and Virginia-class submarines set to become a regular presence at HMAS Stirling near Fremantle have the potential to carry nuclear weapons.

There is currently no policy or legal protection for Australia against our nuclear-armed AUKUS partners bringing nuclear arms to our skies or seas.

Federal Labor has a national platform commitment to sign the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and this is urgently needed to provide clear guardrails and a red line against our nation drifting towards being either a nuclear weapons enabler or target.  

To date, Federal Labor has proven far more adept at managing AUKUS perceptions and protest than in managing the AUKUS program.

There are growing concerns over whether submarines will ever arrive and over the capacity of U.S. and UK shipbuilding yards. These are amplified by wider concerns including spiralling costs and the government’s continued refusal to detail either plans or processes around weapons-grade radioactive waste management.  

And it’s not just the usual suspects — many military hawks are questioning the literal bang for the buck or surge in autonomous weapons while fiscal conservatives are aghast at the lack of scrutiny, constraint and the poor track record of Defence in delivering major projects.  

Ahead of the July ALP national conference in Adelaide, which was masterfully curated to hide AUKUS concerns, the internal advocacy group Labor against War was joined by over one hundred Labor branches in a call to scrap AUKUS.

In the absence of a Parliamentary inquiry into the plan, a citizen-crowdfunded public inquiry headed by former Labor minister and Midnight Oil frontman Peter Garrett has toured the country, taking hundreds of submissions and detailed evidence and is due to make recommendations and findings later this year.

Pacific Civil Society Groups have joined their Australian partners and allies, with over 170 formally endorsing a new civil society Declaration against nuclear weapons in Australia. 

At the moment, these concerns are a slow burn compared to the fast rate of AUKUS, but the planning problems are growing and there is only so far that political spin can cover deep structural flaws.

Against a backdrop of cost-of-living pressure and escalating global tensions, more Australians are asking why this controversial and secretive process is being given a blank public-dollars cheque.

The concerns and questions are likely to grow — and as Australians know, a change in the wind can see a slow burn quickly turn into a firestorm. 

Yesterday in Melbourne, a packed house gathered at the MCG to watch two American NFL clubs, but there was no such media attention or scrutiny of the wider American game.

Not all touchdowns are cause for celebration and when it comes to nuclear weapons, Australians have both the right to know and to say no. 

September 14, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics | Leave a comment

Skidding Pacts: An AUKUS Delusion Update

9 September 2026 Dr Binoy Kampmark, https://theaimn.net/skidding-pacts-an-aukus-delusion-update/

In the unpardonable ecosystem of graft, favours and corruption that is defence contracting, defence conferencing and all matters tanking over the thinking – in short, the world of defence – the convenient delusion will always have truck over the inconvenient empirical. Phantoms are elevated and celebrated; bogeymen are treasured by the entire security apparatus that links obeisant academics, overpaid consultants and waxwork politicians. Budgets of criminally unaccountable proportions are approved, not least because the fictional threat is so impressive as to scare the living daylights out of an imbecilic political class.

Even as the Australian public inquiry into the tripartite security pact with the United States and the United Kingdom known as AUKUS rumbles along, the devotees of delusion continue to be busy in Canberra and beyond. For them, defence is not a reality so much as a style: the need to be seen on the circuit, the necessity of keeping the wheels of alliances greased. The Australian establishment hankers to be clubbable, and that club is known as the Anglosphere. On September 2, Michael Pezzullo, a figure disgraced by his conduct when Secretary of the Home Affairs Department, took the stage as sage and pontificator before that very same inquiry. In addressing its members, he was convinced about the Chinese threat. “It’s an aggressive and assertive combination of Marxist-Leninist politics, Chinese nationalism, and aggressive positioning in Asia, that is as terrifying to Japan and the Philippines and other countries in Asia as it should be to us.”

The following comments, published in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s outlet The Strategist, are even less guarded and worthy of mention. While the publication claims them to be an edited version of Pezzullo’s address, those edits were made with some muscle. In essence, “Australia would favour fighting an offensive campaign, without having to call on the combat forces of the United States or anyone else.” Expressed like a true hardboiled warmonger. Given its limitations, Pezzullo suggests that Australia would find itself going on the defensive “until allied help arrived, until the United States prevailed to the point where it could dictate terms or until conflict was contained in an uneasy truce that arrested a slide into the nuclear abyss of planetary destruction.”  

After this febrile nonsense, the sort that makes Tom Clancy’s unspeakable prose passable, Pezzullo hits his stride. Previous submarine plans were not pursued. He has pleasant words for the Rudd government’s 2009 submarine plan that never eventuated, largely because this mirror-gazing bureaucrat was, at the time, deputy secretary of defence. But never mind. “The AUKUS program puts us back on track.” As with so much writing on defence strategy, the language resembles that of a narcotics addict awaiting that cathartic hit: the gift is just around the corner, even if that corner is excruciating in distance. “Acquiring submarines of the US Virginia class and then the Anglo-Australian SSN-AUKUS class – or if the latter fails, joining the USN SSN-X program – will give us a pathway to undersea warfare dominance.” This is playground posturing at its worst. 

The logistics of acquiring these needless hulks is not explained, because their relevance is assumed. Pezzullo is a self-styled Ur-warrior, drinking from ancient wells of numbing power. “More crucially, by integrating our submarine industrial and technology base with those of the United States and Britain, we will forge an exclusive club of undersea dominance.” It would be far more accurate to recast dominance as subservience, with the Australian taxpayer providing enormous sums to the submarine industrial bases of both the US and the UK without any enforceable undertaking of returns.

It is worth noting that Pezzullo’s appearances in the media as a specialist – a term so stretched as to have lost meaning – are never qualified by the spoiling conduct that demonstrated his inadequacy as a fair-minded public servant giving advice on the issues of the day. It would be good for audiences to know that one of Australia’s formerly most powerful bureaucrats was a meddlesome sot crazed by visions of war and a shaky grasp of history, not least the US-Australian relationship. He was sacked in November 2023 after revelations that he had used WhatsApp to communicate at length with former New South Wales Liberal Party deputy director Scott Briggs, offering gobbets of advice on party room politics. Frank views about various cabinet ministers were also offered, hardly in keeping with the best traditions of a supposedly uncorrupted public service. An inquiry into Pezzullo’s conduct, a redacted version of which was obtained under Freedom of Information in April, identified 14 breaches of the government code of conduct. Instead, we find his biography on the United States Studies Centre website making no mention of his reputational soiling. “He is now retired, after almost 37 years of service, principally in the areas of defence, national security, immigration, and border protection.” 

While Pezzullo was making his interventions in the AUKUS debate, the toadying Defence Minister Richard Marles, whose significance in the AUKUS relationship never rises above that of implausible water carrier, made a journey to the United Kingdom to catch up with the unnervingly chilly Wes Streeting. While Australia’s politicians delude themselves about American submarines they will never receive in the form of their choosing, if at all, the UK side of the bargain, which envisages the construction of the SSN-AUKUS, is even more dubious. In terms of boat production, the British submarine base has proven even tardier than their US counterparts. Sharp reservations have also been expressed about the nuclear reactor core project of the SSN-AUKUS, notably by the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA), incarnated as the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA). IPA’s report released at the start of 2025 is grave on the subject: “Successful delivery of the project appears to be unachievable.” It identified“major issues with project definition, schedule, budget, quality and/or benefits delivery, which at this stage do not appear to be manageable or resolvable. The project may need re-scoping and/or its overall viability assessed.”

The British proved keen to assure the press – and a credulous Marles – that AUKUS had continued standing and vitality. “AUKUS,” according to Streeting, “says to our adversaries that if you attack one of us, you are challenging a coalition that is willing to stand together to defend the values we cherish and to fight alongside one another.” With little by way of justification, Streeting went so far as to suggest that AUKUS was “global” in nature, able to deliver submarines “which can be deployed everywhere from the Euro-Atlantic to the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific.” (Australian personnel, take note.) The US ambassador to the UK, Warren Stephens, was also keen to chant the mantra. “We should be under no illusion,” he stated, “that there are many who do not want this partnership to succeed. It’s not a secret.” 

What is also not a secret is that the pact is skidding. The defence establishment operates a permanent, around the clock rinsing facility for the sketchy and mediocre, fostering a tribalism by seeking enemies that, at best, resemble fantasy woodland creatures. On this occasion, the fictional enemy is set to be confronted by fictional nuclear-powered submarines – at enormous cost. Australia, in its remarkable fortune of location and creation, has every reason to be the congenial middleman of international relations, the sage of diplomatic partiality and cool arbitration. Instead, it has opted for the role of Freudian paralytic and emotional cripple, drunk on the terror of abandonment and keen, therefore, to be client, vassal and a sort of wretched facsimile of Jeeves. If only its representatives were as capable.

September 13, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics | Leave a comment