Antinuclear

Desperately seeking submariners: why keeping nuclear-powered boats afloat will be Australia’s biggest Aukus challenge.

Ben Doherty, Guardian, 21 Oct 25

A vast and highly trained workforce is needed to command, crew, supply and maintain nuclear submarines. Some say that’s impossible for Australia.

“Vice-Admiral Mead, you’re free to go home … good to see you cracking a smile.”

The head of the Australian Submarine Agency had spent a withering three hours before Senate estimates, parrying a barrage of questions about Australia’s ambitious Aukus nuclear submarine plan: interrogatives on consultants, on hundreds of millions of dollars sent to US and UK shipyards, on sclerotic boat-building on both sides of the Atlantic.

But while so much focus has been on Australia’s nuclear submarines’ arrival, their price tag and their “sovereign” status, the greatest challenge to the Aukus project, Mead told the Senate, would be finding the people to keep them afloat and at sea.

“Ensuring Australia has the workforce to deliver this program remains our biggest challenge,” he said.

If Australia’s nuclear submarines arrive on these shores – and that remains a contested question, with expert opinion ranging from an absolute yes to a certain no – will Australia be able to crew, supply and maintain them?

“It is a challenge we are continuing to meet,” Mead told senators. “Australian industry and navy personnel continue to build critical experience through targeted international placements.”

Others are less sanguine.

“The Aukus optimal pathway is a road to a quagmire,” says a former admiral and submarine commander, Peter Briggs, arguing that Australia’s small submarine arm can’t be upscaled quickly enough. “It’s not going anywhere. It will not work.”

Onshore trades, too, are perilously short. Without an additional 70,000 welders by 2030, that trade’s peak body says: “The Aukus submarine program is at serious risk of collapse.”

Mead was asked directly by senators: “Are you still confident of meeting the government’s agenda and timings?”

“Yes,” he replied, “I am.”

‘An eye-wateringly long process’

Briggs, a past president of the Submarine Institute of Australia, says the Aukus plan reads like one “designed by a political aide in a coffee shop”.

The navy’s submarine arm is approximately 850 sailors and officers (the defence department declined to give exact figures). The former chief of navy previously told parliament it needed to grow to 2,300 by the 2040s.

But Briggs estimates that to crew and support Australia’s Virginia-class, and later, Aukus-class submarines, the navy will need to more than treble its existing complement to about 2,700.

Virginias are massive submarines – nearly 8,000 tons – and carry a crew of 134, more than twice the existing Collins-class crew of 56. The Aukus submarines to be built in Adelaide will be bigger again. More tonnage, more people.

“That’s a huge increase in what is already in very scarce supply,” Briggs argues…………………………………………………………

The new generation of submariners is needed for between three and five Virginia-class submarines, then up to eight Australian-built Aukus boats.

“To get to be chief engineer of a nuclear submarine takes 16 to 18 years,” Briggs says. “It’s an eye-wateringly long process and of course you lose people along the way.

“That’s why you need a broad base, a critical mass, and Australia simply doesn’t have that right now. There is no way a navy the size of ours can manage this mix.”

Briggs does not believe the US will withdraw from Aukus: the presence of nuclear submarine bases on Australian soil is too great a prize for a superpower wanting to project power into the Pacific. But Australia’s unreadiness could lead to nuclear submarines under domestic command being delayed.

“We’ve got no warranty clause, no guarantee of anything. The cop-out could come in 2031, the US might say, ‘Look, you’re not quite ready yet, let’s push everything back three years, check in again in 2034.’ And it’s Australia that’s left exposed.”

‘Beyond frustrating, it’s dangerous’

Beyond the complexity of commanding and crewing a nuclear submarine, the vessels need a vast and highly trained workforce to keep them supplied, afloat and at sea………………………………………………………………………

“This is not just a workforce challenge,” its chief executive, Geoff Crittenden, said in a statement. “It’s a full-blown capability crisis … If we don’t address this issue now, Aukus will fail.”

Aukus represented a “perfect storm”, he said, and failure to address worker shortages was “beyond frustrating, it’s dangerous”.

“A once-in-a-generation opportunity like Aukus demands a long-term, strategic response, not just investment in ships and steel, but in people. We estimate that Australia will be at least 70,000 welders short by 2030. Without immediate action, the project is doomed to delays, cost blowouts, or worse.”…………………………………………………………………………

The first cohort won’t be Australian. “In the short term there will have to be an influx of international talent, as we train and upskill our own people.”

Tier two is a nuclearised workforce of skilled professionals – scientists, electrical and mechanical engineers, technical managers, reactor operators and health physicists – with advanced training and between seven and 10 years’ experience. The majority of a submarine crew would sit in this tier. Obbard estimates that about 5,000 tier-two workers will be needed.

Tier three is a further cohort of “nuclear-aware” workers – between 5,000 and 6,000 again – tradespeople including machinists, fitters and welders, who will require some nuclear training.

“The Aukus plan cannot work without building this workforce and the wider engineering community this workforce is drawn from.”

Does it make sense?’

Jack Dillich is uniquely placed to observe Australia’s transformation to a nuclear submarine power. A former submarine officer, he holds an advanced degree in nuclear engineering and served on the executive of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, where he was responsible for the country’s sole nuclear reactor, and as head of the regulatory branch at the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency. He now teaches a nuclear course at the Australian Defence Force Academy………………………………….

[Dillich says] Australia needs to be asking, ‘Does it make sense to try to build a tiny fleet here?’ Maybe 25 years from now, Australia could have eight nuclear-propelled submarines: they would be very, very expensive.”……………………………..https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/oct/20/aukus-submarine-workforce-nuclear-powered-boats-australia

October 21, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

‘Folly’ of nuclear submarines plan floated

A former navy chief warns outsourcing nuclear subs is risky, raising questions about AUKUS, sovereign capacity and local industry.

Callum Godde, Grace Crivellaro, The Mandarin, 3 Oct 25

The former head of Australia’s submarine squadron has urged Australia against outsourcing boat construction overseas, as bureaucrats express confidence that the US won’t scuttle AUKUS.

A parliamentary inquiry on Thursday ran the ruler over the Geelong treaty, a 50-year AUKUS co-operation agreement between Australia and the UK signed in July.

Under AUKUS, the US has promised to sell at least three Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines to Australia from the early 2030s.

A submarine solution closer to home should be examined instead, retired navy rear admiral Peter Briggs argued.

“Depending on an overseas supply chain for such a critical capability as our submarines is a folly,” he told the inquiry.

Briggs had serious concerns with the plan, including its potential to limit Australia’s commercial interests. He suggested that the nation should build more submarines, as it had previously done with the diesel-electric Collins class.

“There is no minimum protection in the treaty for a guaranteed work share for genuine Australian industry,” he said.

“The Collins project has established a viable submarine supply chain within Australia.

“We should build on this, not sign a treaty mandating it out of existence.”

Briggs cast doubt on Australia receiving submarines from the US on time, pointing to its falling behind in building its fleet.

Bernard Philip from the Department of Defence said advice was being provided to the federal government on extending the life of Australia’s ageing Collins-class fleet.

The Pentagon has been investigating the AUKUS pact to ensure it aligns with President Donald Trump’s “America-first” agenda.

The review by Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby sparked speculation that Trump could walk away from the deal, which is estimated to cost up to $368 billion across 30 years.

Nikkei Asia on Tuesday reported the US would not make changes, with an unnamed member country official declaring AUKUS was “safe”.

Mikaela James from the Australian Submarine Agency strongly hinted that the US would not walk away from the deal.

“(We’re) obviously aware of the US review that is underway, and we are confident the US will continue to find that the program is in line with its interests,” she told the committee.

The review is expected to finish before Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to the White House on October 20.

Tim Deere-Jones, who has 40 years of experience researching the UK government’s system for monitoring marine radioactivity, said managing nuclear waste was expensive and caused environmental issues.

“You’ve got to build the facilities to remove it from the boats,” he said.

“Then you’ve got to be looking for a long-term, hopefully perpetual dump site for it, none of which we’ve managed to do in the UK despite having many decades of nuclear submarines.”

It was inevitable some waste would be discharged into the ocean, he said.

Nationals MP Alison Penfold said such concerns had the potential to undermine public confidence in AUKUS………………………………………………………………….https://www.themandarin.com.au/300512-folly-of-nuclear-submarines-plan-floated/

October 7, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

‘Life and death’: Penny Wong’s nuclear AI warning to UN Security Council

Nuclear weapons could be fired by artificial intelligence, Australia’s Foreign Affairs Minister has warned the United Nations.`

Blair Jackson, 26 Sept 25, https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/life-and-death-penny-wongs-nuclear-ai-warning-to-un-security-council/news-story/8ca47bc22b428922edb720dcfffe5458

Nuclear weapons could be fired by artificial intelligence, Australia’s Foreign Affairs Minister has warned the United Nations.

Speaking to the UN in New York on Thursday US time, Penny Wong issued a stark speech about technological advancements and armed conflict.

“AI’s potential use in nuclear weapons and unmanned systems challenges the future of humanity,” she said.

“Nuclear warfare has so far been constrained by human judgment, by leaders who bear responsibility and by human conscience. AI has no such concern, nor can it be held accountable.

“These weapons threaten to change war itself and they risk escalation without warning.”

Senator Wong has been with Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Communications Minister Anika Wells at the UN this week, promoting Australia’s world-first under-16 social media ban.

Australia’s representatives have also been pushing to become one of 10 smaller nations to gain a 10-year non-permanent seat on the UN’s Security Council.

Senator Wong delivered the doomsday warning to the Security Council.

“Decisions of life and death must never be delegated to machines, and together we must set the rules and establish the norms,” she said.

“We must establish standards for the use of AI to demand it is safe, secure, responsible and ethical.

“To ensure AI transforms the tools of conflict and diplomacy for the better, the Security Council must lead by example – to strengthen international peace and security and ensure it is not undermined.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy delivered a similar warning to the UN’s General Assembly a day prior.

“It’s only a matter of time, not much, before drones are fighting drones, attacking critical infrastructure and targeting people all by themselves, fully autonomous and no human involved, except the few who control AI systems,” he said.

“We are now living through the most destructive arms race in human history because this time it includes artificial intelligence.”

September 28, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

Could Australia defend itself?

by Rex Patrick | Sep 7, 2025 , https://michaelwest.com.au/could-australia-defend-itself/

Supporters of the Australian Defence Force being more closely integrated with the US military, and of AUKUS, seem convinced that we need the US to defend ourselves. Former senator and submariner, Rex Patrick, explains why they’re wrong.

While there are clear concerns in the US and Australia with China’s growing military power and how that power might be utilised, no-one reasonably thinks China has aspirations of attacking Australia. But, for defence purposes, we plan for worse-case, and so in assessing whether Australia could defend itself, a Chinese attack is a convenient scenario to explore.

Nuclear attack

It’s estimated China possesses more than 500 operational nuclear warheads, and by 2030, they’ll have over 1,000. Most of those will be aimed at US targets – US air and military bases in Guam and Hawaii, US bases in the territories of America’s allies in north-east Asia – Japan and South Korea; as well as a growing list of strategic facilities and cities in the continental United States itself.

And as China enters an era of nuclear weapon abundance, there’ll be long-range missiles and warheads to spare for US-related targets down under – the signals intelligence facility at Pine Gap near Alice Springs, the submarine communications station near Exmouth, the RAAF base at Darwin and naval facilities at Garden Island south of Perth.

It’s clear that an expanding US military presence in Australia has increased the likelihood of nuclear weapons being directed at us by China.

Our best protection against the risk of nuclear war is a government policy of support for the system of mutual deterrence and effective arms control. In this, the AUKUS program isn’t helpful, as Australia’s past diplomatic engagement on nuclear arms control and non-proliferation has been downgraded. We are trying to persuade other nations that Australia should be permitted to receive weapon-grade plutonium in the reactors of our anticipated US- and UK-sourced submarines.

Conventional conflict and the tyranny of distance

Launching a conventional attack on Australia is a very hard thing to do.

Geography is our great advantage. What historian Geoffrey Blainey called the “tyranny of distance” is a big problem for any country wanting to attack Australia. In World War II, the invasion of Australia was operationally and logistically a bridge too far for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy.  During the Cold War, Australia enjoyed defence on the cheap because there was no direct conventional military threat from the Soviet Union.

We’re a long way from China, surrounded by a ‘moat’ and are further assisted in our defence by an inhospitable vastness between a hostile force landing on our northern shores and our major population centres.

We can also afford to defend ourselves if we sensibly reallocate the $365B cost of eight AUKUS submarines to focus on the defence of Australia first.

Here’s how.

Keeping a watch

An intelligence capacity, focused on areas of primary strategic interest to support an independent defence of Australia, is crucial. This would involve cooperation with other nations (including as part of 5Eyes), defence-focused spying by the Australian Secret Intelligence Service and eavesdropping by the Australian Signals Directorate, covert submarine intelligence missions and intelligence collection by deployed RAN surface ships and RAAF surveillance aircraft.

Open source intelligence should not be discounted.

We also need a highly capable surveillance capability for detecting, identifying and tracking potentially hostile forces moving into our military area of interest. 

Australia should invest in satellite surveillance system ($5B, leaving $363B in available funds from cancelling the $368B AUKUS program) to complement our three Over-The-Horizon Radars at Longreach in Queensland, Laverton in WA and at Alice Springs in the NT and double the size of our P-8 Maritime Patrol and Response fleet from 8 to 20 aircraft ($6B, $357B).   

We should also invest in deployment of long-range acoustic systems ($1B, $356B), e.g. in places like Christmas Island to detect and identify foreign submarines transiting the Lombok Strait.

We need to ensure we have reliable ships and submarines with well-trained crews deployed in our northern approaches, particularly near the many southern exit points of the Indonesian archipelago.

Defending the moat

Defence of Australia, in the lead-up to conflict, would require sea and air denial.

To do this, we need all relevant defence assets to be capable of launching stand-off anti-shipping missiles, in particular the Naval Strike Missile and Joint Strike Missile, which will be made in a Kongsberg facility being built in Newcastle.

These missiles would be an essential capability in our 20 air-independent propulsion submarines ($30B, $326B), our expanded surface fleet with a further 10 frigates ($10B, $316B), our F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.

We also need to boost our airborne capabilities with additional fighter aircraft ($25B, $291B) oriented towards maritime strike, land, and more air-to-air refuelling capacity ($1B, $290B) to support these fighter jets. We also need to enhance our land-based anti-air defences ($1B, $289B).

Closer to shore, we should expand our capability to utilise sea mines. Since World War II, mines have damaged and sunk more vessels than any other means; they are a highly effective asymmetric weapon that the ADF has only recently reintroduced into its inventory, and we should expand our capabilities and capacity in this area. ($1B, $288B). 

At the same time, we need to beef up our anti-submarine warfare capabilities to protect our sea lanes, stop foreign submarines passing through choke points in our northern approaches and to protect our new strategic fleet ($20B, $268B), which Prime Minister Albanese promised but has not delivered on, critical for supporting continued economic activity and our defence effort in our northern coastal waters 

Protecting defence, economic and population assets

In protecting Australia, we would need to have regard to keeping open our northern, naval and major ports, which would be vulnerable to enemy mines. Australia’s mine countermeasures have atrophied. This would have to be reversed ($5B, $263B).

Turning to ground forces, we need to be able to deal with lodgements on our territory or major raids. We need to be able, assisted by our geography, to oppose any march south, whilst also being able to supply our forces to the north. We need to double our heavy airlift capability with a further large transport aircraft ($4B, $259B).

Lessons from Ukraine are particularly relevant; the rise of drone systems and their effects on force architectures and land warfare, the effects of electronic warfare on the modern battlefield, the challenges of sustaining logistics in a contested environment (mindful of the huge distances involved in supporting Australian forces in the top end) and air defence.

In addition to existing Army programs, Australia must spend money to capitalise on the lessons learned. We need to be investing in drone and anti-drone capabilities ($2B, $257B), indigenous electronic warfare capabilities ($5B, $252B), 12 additional tactical transport aircraft ($2B, $250B), 48 additional utility helicopters ($2B, $248B), unmanned ground logistics vehicles ($2B, $246B) and shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles ($2B, $244B).

Other priorities

Distance is not a barrier to effective cyber warfare. Australia must ensure our highly electronic and network-connected utilities are not disrupted by conflict. We need to increase investment in our cyber warfare capabilities ($5B, $239B).

We also need to address a huge deficit in our fuel security. ensuring we have a minimum 90 days in-country fuel supplies ($8B, $231B) and that we have a resilient general industry capability and self-sufficiency of critical commodities ($60B, $171B) that can keep the country running during conflict (or a pandemic).

We need to further learn the lessons of our Ukrainian friends and boost the capability and capacity to produce missiles and other munitions here. That includes the full gamut of weapons we use, from small arms to missiles to bombs to torpedoes, and many of the other consumables of war that can quickly run out. An investment in the order $10B is required ($5B, $166B).

Finally, the Government must stop embarking on highly costly and risky defence programs that don’t work out. It should be buying off-the-shelf capabilities, some built here where it makes sense, and enhanced by Australian industry. Industry would need to be configured to properly sustain all of our critical military capabilities onshore.

Yes, we can

With the US becoming more and more unreliable, it’s time for Australia to tilt to independence in defence. No-one can believe we are the US’s most important friend (the PM is still trying to get a meeting with Trump), or that they will stand by us in conflict. Those days have passed.

While China attacking Australia is a remote possibility, we must plan for the worst, an invasion of Australia. The good news is that the tyranny of distance is working in our favour. With determination and reform in Defence procurement, Australia can independently defend itself. We can make ourselves such a hard and difficult target that no one will try it on, or try to coerce us.  

The numbers throughout this article show that we can cancel AUKUS and do what’s required, and walk away with over $150B left in consolidated revenue to do more for education, increasing productivity, economic advancement and social support. 

Rex Patrick

Rex Patrick is a former Senator for South Australia and, earlier, a submariner in the armed forces. Best known as an anti-corruption and transparency crusader, Rex is also known as the “Transparency Warrior.”

September 11, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

SSN AUKUS – Heading for a quagmire (Part II)

Peter Briggs, September 6, 2025 , https://johnmenadue.com/post/2025/09/ssn-aukus-heading-for-a-quagmire-part-ii/

In the first part, I identified the factors mitigating against the sale of 3-5 Virginia class submarines to cover the gap until the arrival of the British designed SSN AUKUS.

In the final analysis, the USN remains well short of its target of 66 attack submarines and it will be this shortfall in numbers that will be the deciding factor.

Could be SSN AUKUS be fast tracked to fill the gap? SSN AUKUS depends on the UK’s capacity to design and build two new classes of nuclear-powered submarines.

The first priority for the UK’s submarine design and building capability is four of the large, Dreadnought class ballistic missile submarines, to replace the ageing, worn out Vanguard class, which have reached their end of life.

The UK’s second priority, the Astute attack submarine program is late, over-budget and experiencing reliability issues. Of the five submarines delivered currently none are at sea:

• Astute has just entered mid-life refit, joining her sister ship Audacious in Devonport dry docks.
• Ambush is alongside in the submarine base in Faslane and has not been to sea for three years, along with her sister ship, Artful, which has not been to sea for two years.
• The fifth and final operational SSN, Anson, has just returned to Faslane.

Two of the class are yet to be delivered.

The UK’s third priority is SSN AUKUS.

The UK’s Submarine Arm appears to have fallen below critical mass, evidenced by the difficulties they have experienced in replacing the senior submarine leadership. Recovery will be challenging and prolonged. A recent decision to allow rescrubs on the UK’s submarine commanding officer’s course (it was called the “Perisher”, as failure meant exiting the submarine arm) illustrates the compromises in standards now required. An expansion to meet the government’s recently announced goal of 12 new attack submarines, delivered at 18-month intervals, would be a huge challenge. The call comes as the UK struggles to meet higher priority defence challenges in implementing its “ NATO first” policy.

The UK’s submarine design, supply chain and build capability are in no better shape to meet this political goal. Such a program would require:

• Laying down an attack submarine every 18 months.
• Having sufficient space for the resultant production line:
• For example, a delivery interval of 18 months and a build time of say, 10 years, means there will be 6-7 submarines in various stages of construction at the peak of the program.
• A shipyard with sufficient space and equipped to accommodate this is required.
• The second critical input is the workforce to staff the production line and supply chains.
• None of these capabilities exists today.
• Is SSN AUKUS the solution for Australia?

Is SSN AUKUS the solution for Australia?

The new SSN AUKUS is to be over 10,000 tonnes, more than 27% larger than the Virginias proposed to be sold to Australia. Why Australia needs such a large, expensive submarine has not been explained.

The submarine is still being designed – there are no costings, no production schedules and no milestones publicly available to validate “schedule free” assurances that all is well. Earlier talk of a mature design is no longer heard.

The project to manufacture the reactor cores for the new ballistic missile submarines and SSN AUKUS is in serious difficulties. Three successive years of red cards from the UK’s independent auditor, which noted that “Successful delivery of the project appears to be unachievable” – another mess! Unlike its predecessors, no shore base prototype has been built to de-bug and validate the design. Any delay in manufacturing the reactor cores will impact delivery of the new ballistic missile submarines and hence, delay starting on the SSN AUKUS production line.

Based on past performance and the issues set out above, the British program to deliver SSN AUKUS cannot be fast tracked. Indeed, it is highly likely that it will be late, over budget and with the first of class issues which are a feature of any new design.

The final mess: the Australian Government has proved unwilling to increase the Defence vote to fund the program. Instead, funds are being diverted from other important defence capabilities – Australia’s SSN AUKUS program is eating everyone else’s lunch.

Decision-making and funding for essential infrastructure to support the capability is now years behind schedule. This is similar to the situation which has led to Britain’s inability to sustain its submarines.

The existing plan is, therefore, comprised of multiple, serial risks; I would describe it as a quagmire.

With Australia’s access to Virginia class submarines in grave doubt and SSN AUKUS, at this stage, a high-risk design project, Australia is in danger of losing its submarine capability. Far from increasing Allied submarine capability, AUKUS now threatens to reduce both the US and Australian operational submarine forces.

AUKUS Pillar 1, Australia’s transition to a sovereign, nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarine capability is a good idea. However, the path we are on leads elsewhere, to a series of unmanageable risks, many beyond our control.

The government needs to change course, to avoid others’ unmanageable risks and better manage our own:

• Plan B should settle on one class of submarine, not the impractical, highly unlikely to arrive, Virginia/SSN AUKUS mix now envisaged.
• The submarine selected should be based on a mature design, in production, not, as SSN AUKUS is, a new design from questionable antecedents.
• There are two obvious options; a Virginia derivative, or the French Suffren.
• It will have to be built in Australia; there is no spare capacity in the US, Britain or France. The KISS rule applies.
• Perhaps a competitive process should select the best fit, easiest to build in Australia option?

Australia must control its own destiny, not outsource it to become part of someone else’s unmanageable risk. However, the path we are on leads elsewhere, to a series of unmanageable risks and a drop in Allied submarine capability/deterrence when we can least afford it.

Changing at this late stage would not inject further delay; it will most likely be quicker. The current plan is not going to deliver a sovereign, operational capability any time soon and, given the uncertainties set out above, certainly not as planned and possibly, never. Since we have no accurate, contracted costings for the current plan, it is difficult to conclude that an accurately priced contract for a known design would be more expensive compared to the great unknown and serial delays which await SSN AUKUS. Yes, it would require political courage, but given the growing concerns over the current plan, a change that provides greater sovereignty, increased Allied submarine capability, plus improved certainty over costs and timings would be a welcome.

When ambition meets reality, reality always wins – eventually! Time for Plan B!

Read Part 1 of this series.

September 6, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

Billions in Israel defence contracts put Australia at risk.

by Stephanie Tran | Aug 17, 2025, https://michaelwest.com.au/billions-in-israel-defence-contracts-put-australia-at-risk/

The Australian Government risks breaking international law, splashing billions in public money on Israel weapons deals. A Stephanie Tran analysis.

The Australian government has funnelled $2.5 billion of taxpayer funds to Israeli arms manufacturers over the past two decades via government contracts.

An analysis of Austender data shows that since 2004, the Australian government has signed dozens of deals with Israel’s largest defence companies, making them some of the country’s most significant foreign suppliers of arms.

But this is just the tip of the iceberg. The true sum is certainly much higher, as the government is not required to disclose subcontracting arrangements, such as the $900 million deal between Elbit Systems and South Korean firm Hanwha to supply the Australian Army with armoured vehicles.

The breakdown of the funds is as follows:

• $1.92 billion to Elbit Systems and its subsidiaries Elistra Electronic System Ltd, Universal Avionics Systems, Geospectrum Technologies and Ferranti Technologies
• $307 million to Israel Aerospace Industries and its subsidiaries, Elta Systems and Elta Electronics industry
• $180 million to Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, its subsidiary Pearson Engineering and a joint venture with Australian company Varley Group, “Varley Rafael”
• $10 million to Israel Military Industries, also known as IMI Systems. (Note: IMI Systems was acquired by Elbit Systems in 2018)
• $870,000 to Plassan
• $210,00 to Rada Electronic Industries

Breaking international law

Lara Khider, Senior Lawyer at the Australian Centre for International Justice, said the contracts place Australia at risk of breaching its international legal obligations.

“States have been put on notice that Israel may be committing internationally wrongful acts in relation to its military and other operations in Gaza and through its unlawful occupation of Palestinian territory,” Khider said, citing multiple International Court of Justice (ICJ) rulings in the South Africa v Israel genocide case and its advisory opinion on Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory. 

“On this basis, States have an obligation to cease aid and assistance to Israel in relation to the commission of these acts. Otherwise, States may be deemed complicit in internationally wrongful conduct.”

She said the ICJ was unequivocal that all states must avoid trade or economic dealings that entrench Israel’s unlawful presence in occupied Palestinian territory and refrain from aiding or assisting its maintenance. Under the Arms Trade Treaty, to which Australia is a signatory, governments are required to block weapons transfers if there is an overriding risk they would be used to commit serious violations of the Geneva Conventions.

The Australian Centre for International Justice has called for a two-way arms embargo “as a bare minimum” to ensure Australia does not contribute directly or indirectly to violations of international law in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Department of Defence did not respond – does it ever?

The Department of Defence did not respond to a request for comment regarding whether it would cancel its existing contracts and refrain from entering into new contracts for the procurement of arms from Israeli defence companies in light of the ongoing genocide in Gaza.

Greg Barns SC, a spokesman for the Australian Lawyers Alliance, said continuing the contracts undermines Australia’s moral and legal credibility.

“Australia has an obligation to comply with all of the international agreements, treaties and covenants to which it is a signatory. That any Australian government would allow the supply of defence equipment to a country committing war crimes and genocide is morally reprehensible and a clear breach of international law,” Barns said. “This reduces Australia’s standing globally in terms of adherence to the rule of law.”

August 20, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

Australia’s F-35 exports a “facilitation of war crimes”: US expert.

Following Sydney’s huge protest against Israel’s killing and starvation of Palestinians in Gaza, the federal government has doubled down on its misinformation about Australia’s arms exports to Israel

Undue Influence, Michelle Fahy and Elizabeth Minter, Aug 17, 2025

The Labor government’s word games continue as it tries to persuade an increasingly sceptical public that Australia’s hands are clean when it comes to complicity in Israel’s genocidal war against the Palestinian people.

An expert on US arms exports has given short shrift to the Albanese government’s misleading mantras, telling ABC radio last weekend that Australia was facilitating war crimes by exporting F-35 parts and components to Israel.

When asked how he would describe the Australian military’s recent direct supply of F-35 parts to Israel, former US State Department official Joshua Paul said: “It’s directly a facilitation of war crimes. There’s no question about it, to my mind.”

Mr Paul made international headlines in 2023 as the first US official to resign publicly in protest over the Biden administration’s policy of expediting weaponry to Israel for its current war on Gaza, stating that America knew the weapons were to be used to commit human rights violations. Mr Paul was director of congressional and public affairs at the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, a US State Department agency that works closely with the Pentagon on weapons transfers.

Defence Minister Marles squirms under scrutiny

Also last weekend, on ABC TV’s Insiders, Defence Minister Richard Marles criticised what he labelled “misinformation” about Australia’s arms exports to Israel. Yet he refused to answer basic questions on the topic, resorting repeatedly to the government’s discredited mantra that Australia is not supplying weapons to Israel.

Mr Marles also passed the buck for his role in personally approving Australia’s continued export of F-35 parts and components, deflecting responsibility for the F-35 global supply chain onto prime manufacturer, Lockheed Martin.

Without providing any justification, Mr Marles claimed that Australia’s F-35 exports presented a “very different question” and were a “separate issue” from other arms exports.

Australia’s F-35 exports cannot be separated out from the overarching question of Australia’s arms exports to Israel during its genocidal war on Gaza.

The Defence Department has stated that more than 75 Australian companies have contributed to the F-35 global supply chain, which has been working overtime – at “breakneck speed” – for almost two years to increase spare part supply rates to ensure Israel’s F-35s remain operational.

In her June report, From economy of occupation to economy of genocide, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories, Francesca Albanese, named Lockheed Martin and the members of its F-35 supply chain as enhancing Israel’s ability to sustain its genocide of Palestinian people.

Mr Marles’ claims are also at odds with a significant UN statement last year: ‘States and companies must end arms transfers to Israel immediately or risk responsibility for human rights violations’, which named 11 multinationals, including Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems. These companies, by sending weapons, parts, components, and ammunition to Israeli forces, risk being complicit in serious violations of international human rights and international humanitarian laws, the statement said.

UK-based BAE Systems is one of Lockheed Martin’s three major partners in the F-35 supply chain. Its Australian subsidiary is also involved in supplying parts and components.

Australia’s export of F-35 parts and components into the supply chain is essential to the assembly of new aircraft and the maintenance and operation of the global fleet, including Israel’s F-35s.

Australia is the sole global source of some F-35 parts and components including, for example, the high-tech mechanism that opens and closes the weapons bay doors, enabling Israel to drop bombs on Gaza.

Despite this, foreign minister Penny Wong repeated in the Senate last month the ludicrous assertion she and Richard Marles first aired last year that the Australian-made parts and components in the world’s most lethal fighter jet are “non-lethal”. (Watch SBS News clip.)………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Could Australia make a difference?

Undue Influence last year reported comments by the head of the US-based F-35 joint program office, Lieutenant General Michael Schmidt, that the just-in-time F-35 global supply situation was “too risky”.

Despite claims from Mr Marles and Ms Wong that Australia has no power to make any impact on Israel’s military activities in Gaza, Josh Paul’s insights reinforce the fact that Australia could make a difference, should it have the courage to do so.

Australia could announce it will cease its export of F-35 parts and components unless or until the other member nations of the F-35 consortium agree to cease exporting to Israel. https://undueinfluence.substack.com/p/australias-f-35-exports-a-facilitation?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=297295&post_id=171175147&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

August 18, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

The AUKUS Submarine Deal is Dead

National Security Journal, By Andrew Latham, 7 Aug 25

– Key Points and Summary – The central promise of the AUKUS security pact—to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines—is reportedly no longer viable due to a severe crisis in the U.S. and UK defense industrial bases.

-The U.S. Navy is struggling to build and maintain its own submarine fleet and cannot spare any Virginia-class boats, while the UK’s industry has no surplus capacity to make up the shortfall.

-This leaves Australia facing a dangerous capability gap.

-As a result, Canberra is now forced to upgrade its aging Collins-class submarines and fast-track its own domestic submarine production, a process that will take over a decade.

The AUKUS Submarine Deal Looks RIP

The central element of AUKUS was always the promise to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines. According to the terms of the agreement, the US would provide Australia with at least three Virginia-class boats, and the UK and Australia would begin development on their own SSN-AUKUS platform. This plan is no longer viable.

The United States can’t provide the submarines; the United Kingdom can neither make up for the shortfall nor co-develop such a submarine in a reasonable timeframe; and Canberra must now face the unpleasant truth that the promises made in 2021 were more fantasy pledges than realistic commitments.

…………………..there was a tacit acknowledgement all along that a nuclear submarine program was more than a propulsion system—it was an entire industrial ecosystem. It needs an industrial base, a trained workforce, a secure supply chain, and, most critically, decades of institutional memory. AUKUS made the assumption that the United States could build Virginia-class submarines for itself and its AUKUS partners. That is no longer a reasonable assumption.

The US Navy is two boats short of its target force, it’s fielding a rate of barely 1.2 boats a year (far short of a two-per-year benchmark), and it has a chronic maintenance backlog that leaves a third of its force in port. It is unable to uprate its skilled labor pool, reactor modules, or dry dock capacity, and there is no margin in the shipyards even with billions in new money being injected into the program. Canberra had pledged US$2bn by the end of 2025 to help build up US industrial capacity. The yards at Groton and Newport News have no space to spare even for that investment. The bottleneck is a systemic one.

Admiral Daryl Caudle was frank in testimony last month. The US industrial base, he testified, would have to double its attack submarine output for America to meet its obligations under the AUKUS agreement with Australia and the United Kingdom.  In April, the Pentagon initiated a 30-day review to see if it could simultaneously meet the needs of the US Navy and the Australian demand. Four months later, the review is still not public, but the answer is already clear: the US cannot do both. It cannot, even if it wanted to, turn over one or two boats to Australia, because the Navy has none to spare. Even if it did, the optics of transferring high-end submarines to another country while its own force contracts would be impossible for Congress to accept.

And the UK simply cannot provide subs in place of the promised but undeliverable American boats. The Royal Navy has already made an in-principle commitment to the SSN-AUKUS program. Still, Britain’s existing submarine program, which produces the Astute-class submarine, has suffered from years of delays, budget overruns, and production shortfalls since it was first launched. And BAE Systems, the prime contractor in the British submarine industry, has minimal spare capacity to increase the rate of production beyond its existing domestic orders. In short, there are no surplus subs—and, more importantly, no realistic possibility of any near-term export of nuclear-powered boats to Australia before the 2040s. Political will aside, industrial capacity isn’t there. The UK cannot bail out the US shortfall, and the AUKUS partnership as a viable trilateral supply chain has effectively ceased to exist. That, in turn, leaves Australia with no option but to fast-track its submarine industrial base; a process which it is already doing, quietly but steadily.

Canberra is already responding. The Collins-class submarines, at more than 20 years old, are being upgraded and their lifespan extended………………………. Australia will not be launching a domestically built nuclear submarine before the late 2030s. That is a decade away. The capability gap is real, and the risk profile is increasing.

The idea that the US could transfer a Virginia-class boat or two to make good the gap was floated early on. The politics have since moved against it. Congress is increasingly dubious about hardware transfers when the state of American readiness is already so poor. The Navy itself is against anything that would take boats from its already underpowered undersea fleet. The situation is not in flux: it is set. Washington cannot deliver what it promised. The internal Pentagon review, which has already been provided to Congress, reportedly makes that clear. The language might be diplomatic; the reality is not…………………………………………………… https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/the-aukus-submarine-deal-is-dead/

August 9, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

Australia won’t receive Aukus nuclear submarines unless US doubles shipbuilding, admiral warns

Former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull says there is a ‘very, very high’ chance Virginia-class subs will never arrive under Australian control.

Ben Doherty, 28 July 25, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/28/aukus-australia-nuclear-submarines-us-subs-navy-admiral

The US cannot sell any Virginia-class nuclear submarines to Australia without doubling its production rate, because it is making too few for its own defence, the navy’s nominee for chief of operations has told Congress.

There are “no magic beans” to boosting the US’s sclerotic shipbuilding capacity, Admiral Daryl Caudle said in frank evidence before a Senate committee.

The US’s submarine fleet numbers are a quarter below their target, US government figures show, and the country is producing boats at just over half the rate it needs to service its own defence requirements.

Testifying before the Senate Committee on Armed Services as part of his confirmation process to serve as the next chief of naval operations, Caudle lauded Royal Australian Navy sailors as “incredible submariners”, but said the US would not be able to sell them any boats – as committed under the Aukus pact – without a “100% improvement” on shipbuilding rate

The US Navy estimates it needs to be building Virginia-class submarines at a rate of 2.00 a year to meet its own defence requirements, and about 2.33 to have enough boats to sell any to Australia. It is currently building Virginia-class submarines at a rate of about 1.13 a year, senior admirals say.

“Australia’s ability to conduct undersea warfare is not in question,” Caudle said, “but as you know the delivery pace is not what it needs to be to make good on the pillar one of the Aukus agreement which is currently under review by our defence department”.

Caudle said efficiency gains or marginal improvements would not be sufficient to “make good on the actual pact that we made with the UK and Australia, which is … around 2.2 to 2.3 Virginia-class submarines per year”.

“That is going to require a transformational improvement; not a 10% improvement, not a 20% improvement but a 100% improvement,” he said.

Under pillar one of the Aukus agreement, Australia is scheduled to buy between three and five Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the US, starting in 2032.

The UK will build the first Aukus-class submarine for its navy by “the late 2030s”. The first Australian-built Aukus boat will be in the water “in the early 2040s”. Aukus is forecast to cost Australia up to $368bn over 30 years.

US goodwill towards Australia, or the import of the US-alliance, would be irrelevant to any decision to sell submarines: Aukus legislation prohibits the US selling Australia any submarine if that would weaken US naval strength.

Australia has already paid $1.6bn out of an expected total of $4.7bn (US$3bn) to help the US boost its flagging shipbuilding industry.

But the US itself has been pouring money into its shipbuilding yards, without noticeable effect.

A joint statement on “the state of nuclear shipbuilding” issued by three rear admirals in April noted that while Congress had committed an additional US$5.7bn to lift wages and shipyard productivity, “we have not observed the needed and expected ramp-up in Columbia-class and Virginia-class submarine production rates necessary”.

Caudle, himself a career submariner, said the US would need “creativity, ingenuity, and some outsourcing improvements” if it were to meet its shipbuilding demands and produce 2.3 Virginia-class vessels a year.

“There are no magic beans to that,” he told the Senate hearing. “There’s nothing that’s just going to make that happen. So the solution space has got to open up.”

‘Why is there no plan B?’

The former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull, who first reported on Caudle’s testimony to the Senate, told the Guardian that there was “no shortage of goodwill towards Australia” from the US in relation to Aukus, but the realities of a shortfall of submarines meant there was a “very, very high” probability that Virginia-class submarines would never arrive under Australian control.

Turnbull said the language coming from US naval experts was “framing expectations realistically”, essentially saying that, without dramatic reform, the US could not sell any of its Virginia-class boats. With the Collins class nearing the end of their service lives, and the Aukus submarine design and build facing delays in the UK, Australia could be left without any submarine capability for a decade, potentially two, Turnbull argued.

“The risk of us not getting any Virginia-class submarines is – objectively – very, very high. The real question is why is the government not acknowledging that … and why is there no plan B? What are they doing to acquire alternative capabilities in the event of the Virginias not arriving?”

Turnbull – who, as prime minister, had signed the diesel-electric submarine deal with French giant Naval that was unilaterally abandoned in favour of the Aukus agreement in 2021 – argued the Australian government, parliament and media had failed to properly interrogate the Aukus deal.

“When you compare the candour and the detail of the disclosure that the US Congress gets from the Department of the Navy, and the fluff we get here, it’s a disgrace. Our parliament has the most at stake, but is the least curious, and the least informed.

On Friday, the defence minister, Richard Marles, told reporters in Sydney “work on Aukus continues apace”.

“We continue to work very closely … with the United States in progressing the optimal pathway to Australia acquiring a nuclear-powered submarine capability,” he said.

“In respect of the production and maintenance schedule in the United States, we continue to make our financial contributions to that industrial base.”

Marles cited the $1.6bn paid to the US to boost its shipbuilding industry already this year, with further payments to come, and said that 120 Australian tradespeople were currently working on sustaining Virginia-class submarines in Pearl Harbor.

“All of that work continues and we are really confident that the production rates will be raised in America, which is very much part of the ambition of Aukus.”

The Guardian put a series of questions to Marles’s office about Caudle’s Senate testimony.

July 28, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

AUKUS Submarine Regulations: FoE Adelaide submission

Friends of the Earth Adelaide > Publications > Adelaide FoE Notes > AUKUS Submarine Regulations: FoE Adelaide submission

Philip White July 24, 2025, https://adelaidefoe.org/aukus-submarine-regulations-foe-adelaide-submission/

Friends of the Earth Adelaide today (24 July 2025) sent a submission in response to the government’s call for public comments on draft Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulations. These Regulations were drafted under the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Act, which was passed in October last year. Our submission can be accessed here.

The consultation is open until 30 July 2025. Details can be found on the following web site: https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/australian-naval-nuclear-power-safety-regulations-public-consultation

FoE Adelaide’s submission can be summarised as follows:

— AUKUS should be cancelled. It compromises Australia’s sovereignty and is not in our strategic, economic, or environmental interests.

— If it is not cancelled, there should be a proper consultation about the Stirling and Osborne designated zones, which were declared in the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Act without consultation.

— The principles of “free, prior and informed consent” should be followed in siting any site for storage and disposal of radioactive waste.

— That includes respecting laws of State and Territory governments that restrict or prohibit siting of nuclear waste facilities.

— The Regulator must be completely independent of the Defence portfolio. In the current proposal it will be answerable to the Minister for Defence.

— All submissions should be published in full, unless the submitter specifically requests otherwise. Government representatives informed us on 17 July at a public forum in Port Adelaide that they only intend to publish a summary put together by bureaucrats.

July 25, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

Trillion dollar AUKUS subs plus nuclear waste in perpetuity?

by Rex Patrick | Jul 22, 2025 , https://michaelwest.com.au/trillion-dollar-aukus-subs-plus-nuclear-waste-in-perpetuity/

Everything about AUKUS nuclear waste is a political secret, including the cost, which will more than double the $368B announced AUKUS price tag. Former submariner Rex Patrick with the story.

Rex Patrick with the story.

If we ever get these subs, the total price tag may well be over $1 trillion. I’m in the Federal Court at present, trying to pry open a November 2023 report into how the Government intends to deal with the high-level nuclear waste from AUKUS submarines.

But there’s already a lot we can deduce by combining what has been extracted from the Government using Freedom of Information (FOI) laws, from Senate testimony and also looking at how the United States does and doesn’t take care of its naval nuclear waste.

Cost explosion

For starters, there was a short but insightful exchange in Senate Estimates last year between Senator Lidia Thorpe and the head of the Australian Submarine Agency (ASA), Admiral Jonathon Mead.

After making quick reference to the cost of nuclear waste facilities overseas, Senator Thorpe asked about the waste costs for AUKUS, “There’s no costing as yet; is that right?” Mead responded, “That’s correct”.

For an organisation that is required to cost its capability from cradle to grave, including support facilities, it’s a huge omission. It might be the case that

“they’re too frightened to do the math.”

As I will set out below, the price of safely storing AUKUS waste is likely to double the AUKUS price tag. But first, we need to take a look at what radioactive waste AUKUS will produce and what will be done with it.

Low-level waste

We know that Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines will produce small amounts of low-level waste every year (disposable gloves, wipes, reactor coolant and Personal Protective Equipment). ASA Senate Estimates briefs obtained under FOI suggest that this will amount to “roughly the volume of a small skip bin each year.”

This, along with low-level waste from US and UK submarines operating out of Perth, will be stored at HMAS Stirling until the Australian Waste Management Agency builds and commissions the National Radioactive Waste Management Facility.

Barely noticed by the national media, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works approved the construction of a ‘Controlled Industrial Facility’ at HMAS Stirling in August 2024.

High-level waste

When each AUKUS submarine decommissions, Australia will need to handle the recovery, transport, storage and disposal of two different types of high-level nuclear waste: spent nuclear fuel, about the size of a small hatchback, and the reactor compartment, about the size of a four-wheel drive.

Noting the total lack of transparency around Australia’s plans, MWM is making a reasonable assessment as to how this waste will be handled by looking to the US.

Fuel rods will be removed from the submarine at a decommissioning yard (possibly Henderson in WA for the Virginia Class and Osborne in SA for the SSN-AUKUS submarines).

The hull is cut open, and a defueling enclosure is installed on the submarine to provide a controlled work area. The fuel is removed into a shielded transfer container and moved to a wharf enclosure. It’s then placed into a specially designed shipping container for transfer to, in the case of the US, an intermediate ‘storage site’ in Idaho. Despite 70 years of nuclear-powered submarine operations (USS Nautilus was commissioned in 1955), the US has not yet sorted out its long-term ‘disposal site’.

It is not clear whether Australia will have an intermediate ‘storage site’ and a ‘disposal site’ or a combined site. Certainly, both storage and disposal are talked about in the information that has been released under FOI.

Australia is not permitted, by the text of the AUKUS Treaty and by commitments made to the International Atomic Energy Agency, to reprocess the fuel. Reprocessing involves separating the plutonium and fissile uranium from the spent fuel to reduce the amount of spent fuel that needs to be stored long term, but doing so raises nuclear weapon proliferation concerns.

For Australia, we have to find a geologically suitable place to bury the fuel in the state it was when it left the submarine. Whilst the Defence Minister has declared this will be on ’Defence land’, the ASA can identify a news site and the Minister can compulsory acquire it – anywhere in Australia.

Reactor compartment

To deal with the reactor compartment, all of the elements of the reactor that will remain in the compartment – the pressure vessel, piping, tanks and fluid system components – are drained to the maximum extent practicable. About 2% of the liquid remains trapped in discrete pockets.

All openings are then sealed.

The reactor compartment is then cut from the submarine, and with the pressure hull remaining as part of the disposal package, the high-strength steel serves as an outer seal.

In the United States, the reactor compartment is transported to “Trench 94” in Washington state.

It is not yet known whether the Australian Government will bury the reactor compartments in a final disposal site.

Looking after high-level nuclear waste is complex. You can’t responsibly just bury it or dump it in a deep mine shaft.

Nuclear waste facility

A waste facility must be carefully located, away from seismic activity, away from flooding and other weather events and generally where geological structure allows for deep, very long-term storage. Geoscience Australia has looked at suitable locations for a high-level radioactive Waste store on occasions between 1976 and 1999 (subject to a National Archives request).

It must also be located with suitable transport pathways from the submarine dismantling yard or possibly several yards.

The site must be prepared and built/bored. It must have access to electricity supplies, water, communications and sewerage. It must allow for the safe receipt and storage of fuel and the reactor compartments, it must be resilient to loss of heating or ventilation, loss of electricity, flow blockages, structural failures, etc.

“It must be resilient for well over a millennium.”

It must also be designed with the necessary security in mind, with access control, constant monitoring, intrusion detection and central alarms in place, and be secure in relation to protest and sabotage and have a co-located response capability. It must provide for safe long-term storage, with multiple barriers in place to prevent release of radioactive material, and be designed to deal with large accidental radioactive releases.

At the same time, the facility will be subject to international non-proliferation safeguards overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which will require periodic access and perhaps remote monitoring and surveillance.

It will likely need a level of remoteness, but be able to be staffed by relevantly qualified personnel, and to receive surge responders in the event of an emergency.

Design and construction would take close to ten years.

What will it take?

The Government has committed to consultation as it selects a site for long-term disposal, yet the law does not require it.

The decision to locate a National Radioactive Waste Management facility at Kimba in South Australia involved a lot of communication, some consultation, but very little listening. The Federal Court ultimately found that the decision-making process for that site was seriously flawed. The Liberals get a D minus.

Labor got the Parliament to declare both HMAS Stirling in Perth and the shipyard precinct at Osborne in Adelaide a ‘designated zone’ for nuclear activities. There was no consultation, so they get an F.

Section 10(2)(c) of the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Act 2024 allows the minister to designate more zones. The consultation can be of a ‘tick-the-box’ nature.

While we don’t know what the cost of an underground storage/disposal facility would be, documents released under FOI show that a 2019 cost estimates study by Altus Expert Services placed the cost of an above ground facility at Kimba at $923 million. We could reasonably expect a deep storage facility could cost billions.

Then there are the ongoing operational costs of the facilities, over several hundred years.

Even at an annual cost of only $30 million per annum, that’s close to $4B over 120 years. And if the site is then sealed for 100,000 years, as the Finnish intend to do with their underground facility, there’s even more cost. Even if monitoring of sealed waste only cost 1/10th of the yearly operating cost, say $3million, the cradle-to-grave cost of dealing with AUKUS high level waste will add up to more than $300 billion; $300B that seems to have slipped ASA’s minds.

One thing’s for sure, there’s been too much secrecy around this radioactive hot potato. Maybe things will fall my way in the Federal Court. But it would be much better if the Government was just be up-front with everyone, particularly as we tax-payers have to pay for it.

Rex Patrick

Rex Patrick is a former Senator for South Australia and, earlier, a submariner in the armed forces. Best known as an anti-corruption and transparency crusader, Rex is also known as the “Transparency Warrior.”

July 24, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

Australians recruited for Israel’s ‘weaponised aid’ project in Gaza

by Yaakov Aharon | Jul 1, 2025 , https://michaelwest.com.au/australians-recruited-for-israels-weaponized-aid-project-in-gaza/

A Melbourne company is recruiting Australians to work on a mysterious Israeli and American-backed aid project in Gaza. Could it be the infamous Gaza Humanitarian Foundation? 

An ad posted by Claymore Personnel – named after an anti-personnel landmine – promises that successful candidates will “be looked after.”

Workers will have accommodation expenses in Israel covered, operate in American-led teams, and receive payment in US dollars.

While it remains impossible to verify exactly who Claymore is working with, the shortlist of aid agencies that fit Claymore’s description ranges from bad to worse.

There is precisely one self-described ‘aid agency’ thriving in Gaza right now, and that is the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF). Fogbow lags in a distant second place.

The Israeli and American governments back both agencies; both agencies rely on private security contractors to distribute aid; both agencies’ founders are American military and intelligence officials; both have been implicated in massacres at Gaza aid sites.

This month alone, at least 450 have been killed and 3500 injured while waiting for food at sites operated by GHF, a Mossad and CIA-backed front.

Looking for adventure?

Before GHF had begun its Gaza operations on May 27, it was already the subject of condemnation in a joint statement issued by aid agencies. The letter condemned GHF as “a dangerous and politicised sham” and “a blueprint for ethnic cleansing”.

Claymore posted ads on seek.com and on its official website on May 28, a day after GHF hit the ground. The first batch of recruits left for Gaza two weeks later.

Reports of massacres at sites of American-led aid projects did not dampen Claymore’s spirits. Its mission to recruit carried on throughout June, with the ad saying workers deployed to Gaza will have a “3-month contract with strong potential for multiple extensions”.

While most aid sites in Gaza were closing down, prospects for Claymore’s partners were expanding. “A large humanitarian distribution centre is now operating in Gaza”, Claymore’s ad said.

The recruitment agency sought Australian labourers, truck drivers, and forklift operators willing to work for low wages paid in USD ($3250-$6000 monthly). Successful candidates enjoyed full travel sponsorships. The ad on Claymore’s website assured applicants that there would be no police checks. The seek.com ad said otherwise.

On each workday, the workers would be provided with “secure transport” from Israeli accommodation to worksites at “secure zones” in Gaza.

MWM spoke to Senator Mehreen Faruqi, the Greens Spokesperson for International Aid, who condemned “any so-called ‘humanitarian’ effort that operates at the whim of the genocidal Israeli military”.

“I’m concerned that Australian companies appear to be inserting themselves into a brutal system where ‘aid’ is delivered at gunpoint, guarded by soldiers and private contractors, while starving Palestinians are forced to risk their lives just to access basic supplies.”

Chasing ghosts

Tracking yesterday’s leftover footprints at Bondi Beach is easier than following Claymore’s digital footprints.

The LinkedIn profile of the company’s sole director, Tanya Molloy, provides no information beyond her role at the small business, which was founded in 2023. Trusted aid agencies and union officials told MWM on background they were not aware of Claymore, nor of any project it may be associated with in Gaza.

The recruitment agency’s address is listed as CSS Partners, a small accounting firm in Keilor East, Victoria. MWM called CSS’s landline and asked to be put through to Claymore. The receptionist said they were not aware that Claymore had listed its address as CSS Partners, and that the company’s relations were with an accounting firm to a client.

An associate of MWM visited the address listed on government records as Claymore’s principal place of business in Altona North, Victoria.

“It is in a large, remote industrial area,” was the report back from the Altona North office. “There is no sign or even a number on a door. I think it’s empty.”

Playing mum against dad

Tanya Molloy lives with Claymore’s secretary, the American-born Calum McEwan, in a suburban Melbourne townhouse.

When MWM asked Molloy who Claymore was working with, she was coy.

“Claymore Personnel is a recruitment agency only — we are not involved in the political, logistical, or operational aspects of any aid delivery. We supply skilled workers for overseas roles, and once placed, our involvement ends. We’re not affiliated with any government, military, or aid organisation.”

Due to the sensitivity of the work and the well-being of those on the ground, I won’t be commenting further.”

Further statements by Molloy deny any association with GHF.

If nothing else, Claymore’s footsteps follow the lead of GHF, which also lists its address as an abandoned warehouse in Delaware, USA.

Text messages leaked to MWM raise doubts about Molloy’s firm assertion that Claymore has no association with GHF.

“The company the candidates will be working for is JK International – jkiglobal.com”, Calum McEwan said, in a response to a concerned humanitarian last month.

When the recipient of the texts asked McEwan if JK International works for GHF, McEwan responded “I don’t have this information.”

Claymore’s ad says it is “the only Australian contact point for this operation”, after being “personally engaged by [an] international logistics group”.

JK International is a global logistics and shipping company based in Tennessee, USA. Its business partners include the USA’s Department of Homeland Security and Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, as well as Israel’s largest shipping company, Zim – a key player in the global weapons supply chain.

Supply and demand

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is wanted for arrest by the International Criminal Court for charges of war crimes, including ‘starvation of civilians as a method of warfare’.

Rather than heeding calls to obey international law, Israel has doubled down. Israel says it has no obligation to provide aid to Palestinians, given its allegations that Hamas steals aid at gunpoint and has infiltrated the United Nations.

Israel’s parliament passed sweeping restrictions on aid agencies working in Gaza. UNWRA and UNICEF were banned from delivering aid into the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in breach of orders issued by the International Court of Justice.

Any worker or organisation that has expressed the wrong political opinions will be refused entry by Israel. Background checks will ensure workers have never made statements that “delegitimise” Israel or question its identity as “a Jewish and democratic state” ($).

Each Palestinian who receives aid is also vetted to ensure they have no connections, according to Israel’s standards, to a Palestinian resistance group.

A government statement said these changes guarantee aid is distributed “in a manner aligned with Israel’s national interests”.

Funding criminal gangs in Gaza

Instead of trusted agencies, aid is increasingly provided by American private military contractors, as well as Israeli-backed gangs.

Earlier this month, Israeli opposition figure Avigdor Lieberman revealed that Mossad and the Ministry of Defence were arming and funding criminal gangs in Gaza. Further reports reveal security at GHF aid sites is provided by mercenaries from Safe Reach Solutions, a firm founded by former CIA officers.

These reforms weaponised aid to undermine Hamas on a grassroots level.

After reports that Israeli Forces massacred Palestinians at a GHF site in Rafah, Israel released footage that it claimed showed Hamas fighters were responsible. In fact, the footage depicted a different massacre, at a different GHF site, committed by Israeli-backed gangs as they stole aid.

Government declines to answer

Greens Senator Mehreen Faruqi called on the Albanese Government to “urgently clarify whether it has had any involvement in authorising or facilitating this project, and whether it has provided any diplomatic, logistical or intelligence support to Claymore Personnel or related actors.”

“DFAT has a clear responsibility to ensure any Australian-linked aid effort operates fully in line with international humanitarian law,” Faruqi said. “That includes not participating in a system where aid is used as a tool of control and oppression.”

Several international humanitarian law organisations cosigned a letter yesterday expressing concern about Gaza’s privatised “humanitarian” operators.

The letter issues a warning to all those involved with GHF — including states, companies, and contracted workers – of their potential liability for complicity in genocide.

MWM spoke to Lara Khider, acting executive director of the Australian Centre for International Justice, which was among the organisations that signed the letter.

“Any recruitment of civilians into areas of conflict or occupied territory must be approached with the utmost caution and transparency,” Khider said. “Particularly where international humanitarian law and the risk of complicity in grave breaches of international law may be engaged.”

“It is imperative that Australian nationals and entities exercise due diligence and avoid any involvement that could directly or indirectly support or legitimise unlawful conduct.”

Another government official told MWM that state funding is directed toward United Nations agencies, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent – but refused to answer if the government supported Claymore or its associates.

MWM asked the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) if it was aware of – and approved – Claymore’s aid project.

To say DFAT dodged the question is to compliment it unfairly for showing grace and dexterity.

“Any Australian travelling overseas for employment should ensure they are not in breach of Australian law and follow all travel advice on Smartraveller,” a department spokesperson said.

To DFAT’s credit, Smartraveller is clearer in its profile on Gaza and Israel: “Do not travel.”

Shayne Chester contributed to research.

Interviewed Israeli soldiers claimed their commanders ordered them to shoot civilians collecting aid at GHF sites. The Military Advocate-General then instructed the IDF to investigate these reported war crimes.

July 3, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

Time for Australia to sign non-nuclear treaty

Tilman Ruff says support for the “illegal and unwarranted” US military action in Iran has damaged Australia’s global reputation, and ratifying the treaty would help to repair its credibility.

The Australian co-founder of a Nobel Prize-winning advocacy group says it is time for Labor to honour its promise, while in opposition, to ratify the UN’s nuclear weapons ban treaty.

The Saturday Paper, By Kristina Kukolja, 28 June 25

Australia has long been at the forefront of global efforts towards the containment of nuclear threats. Now, in the wake of the American military strikes on Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency says the global nonproliferation system is on the brink of collapse. Australian campaigners are calling on the government to step up its advocacy for nuclear disarmament.

“It’s an alarmingly dangerous time – the nonproliferation regime is under severe threat,” says Dr Tilman Ruff, who is co-founder of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), a Nobel Prize-winning advocacy group founded in Australia.

He calls the United States attack on Iran a “frightening escalation” that dealt a “body blow to the peaceful nonproliferation regime … which was already in a parlous state”.

Ruff says Australia must urgently show it is serious about nuclear disarmament by signing and ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Now in its second term, the Labor government has yet to act on a commitment it made while in opposition to sign and ratify the treaty. Ruff is concerned the US is putting pressure on the Albanese government not to sign. He says ICAN has been told that ratification of the treaty hasn’t been raised in cabinet, and it must be. “The issue needs prime ministerial leadership,” Ruff says.

“The reasons for the delay are American pressure and the displeasure that the US would indicate when Australia does this.”

He says support for the “illegal and unwarranted” US military action in Iran has damaged Australia’s global reputation, and ratifying the treaty would help to repair its credibility.

“Australia joining the TPNW would be of global significance, especially if it became the first nuclear weapons supporting and assisting ally of a nuclear-armed state to do so. It would be the most effective way we could support peace and nuclear disarmament, prevent nuclear war and reinforce the rule of law.”

Australia has maintained a strong bipartisan nuclear nonproliferation stance for decades. The Whitlam Labor government established the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) more than 50 years ago. It was a Coalition foreign affairs minister, Alexander Downer, who took the test ban treaty to the United Nations General Assembly in 1996, and Australia now has the third-biggest network of stations monitoring for signs of nuclear testing in the world…………………………………………………………………….

Australia’s decision to join AUKUS has raised questions in the Pacific about its ability to meet its own obligations, as a signatory to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga.

“Pacific peoples feel a great sense of betrayal from what Australia did,” says Fiji-based Epeli Lesuma, a demilitarisation campaigner with the Pacific Network on Globalisation.

“Australia uses a term in Fiji called the ‘Vuvale’ partnership, which means ‘family’. ‘Vuvale’ and ‘Pacific family’ are thrown around by people in Canberra, but the sentiment behind it is hollow – particularly when you think about what Australia did with AUKUS.”

Lesuma says AUKUS is a danger to the Pacific because it will potentially bring nuclear-powered submarines into the region and has pushed island nations into the geopolitical competition between the US, China and Australia.

“The Australian government chose to betray all of us by exposing us to greater nuclear risk and nuclear violence, submarines cutting through the Pacific Ocean – creating a bigger target on our backs.”

“There is no trust,” agrees Samoan-born Maualaivao Maima Koro, a Pacific security expert at the University of Adelaide. She says Pacific nations are looking to Australia for leadership on nuclear issues, in a region that – decades on – is still living with the health and environmental harms of nuclear testing by France, Britain and the US.

“Pacific leaders have the view that Australia will step up because it is the country that can. It is the country with the means, alliances and exposure to do so,” says Koro.

“The idea of Australia’s responsibility to the Pacific Islands Forum is that you can advocate for the interest of the region – but it’s not happening. Pacific Island states want Australia to commit to the Rarotonga treaty and uphold it.” https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/defence/2025/06/28/time-australia-sign-non-nuclear-treaty

June 28, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment