Gareth Evans: AUKUS is terrible for Australian national interests – but we’re probably stuck with it
as Paul Keating continues to put it so articulately, that we need to find our security in Asia, not from Asia.
The Conversation, Gareth Evans, Distinguished Honorary Professor, Australian National University, August 16, 2024
This is an edited extract of a presentation by Gareth Evans, Distinguished Honorary Professor at ANU and former Australian foreign minister, to the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia Conference.
Politics played a significant part in the birth of AUKUS in Australia, and politics both here and in the United States will play a crucial role in determining whether it lives or dies. That is so at least for its core submarine component. The second pillar of the agreement, relating to technical cooperation on multiple new fronts, is both much less clear in its scope and less obviously politically fraught.
On the Australian side, partisan political opportunism was a factor in the initiation of the submarine deal, bipartisan political support was a condition of US agreement to it, and maintenance of that bipartisan support into the future presumably will be a precondition of its continuance, at least when it comes to highly sensitive elements like the handover of three Virginia class submarines.
On the American side, it was perception of US strategic advantage that drove Washington’s agreement to the deal, rather than any domestic political considerations. But strong cross-party support in Congress will remain necessary for its complete delivery. And, at the even more critical executive level, it cannot be assumed the deal is now Trump-proof.
It is only in the United Kingdom that we can reasonably regard domestic politics to be irrelevant to AUKUS’s future. The deal is so obviously a gift to the national Treasury, and has so little impact on national defence and security interests, that no one on any side of politics is ever likely to find it unpalatable.
In Australia, domestic politics have been a factor from the outset. While for the Morrison government the primary driver of the AUKUS decision was, no doubt, the ideological passion of senior Coalition ministers for all things American, it is hard to deny political opportunism came a close second.
Morrison was deeply conscious of the opportunity the deal presented to wedge the Labor opposition in the defence and security space, where the Labor Party has long been perceived, rightly or wrongly, as electorally vulnerable. That the nuclear dimension of the deal was bound to ruffle some feathers in Labor ranks was an added political attraction…………………………………………..
What I am now critical of, is that when Labor did come into office in May 2022, it is clear no such serious review of the whole AUKUS deal ever took place. Crucial questions were never seriously addressed; clearly articulated answers to them have never been given by the prime minister, defence minister or anyone else. The answers that are in fact emerging as further time passes are deeply troubling…………………………………..
……..there is zero certainty of the timely delivery of the eight AUKUS boats. We now know that both the US and UK have explicit opt-out rights. And even in the wholly unlikely event that everything falls smoothly into place in the whole vastly complex enterprise, we will be waiting 40 years for the last boat to arrive, posing real capability gap issues.
………………, the final fleet size – if its purpose really is the defence of Australia – appears hardly fit for that purpose. ………………..
…….the eye-watering cost of the AUKUS submarine program, up to $368 billion, will make it very difficult, short of a dramatic increase in the defence share of GDP, to acquire the other capabilities we will need if we are to have any kind of self-reliant capacity in meeting an invasion threat. Those capabilities include, in particular, state-of-the-art missiles, aircraft and drones, that are arguably even more critical than submarines for our defence in the event of such a crisis.
..the price now being demanded by the US for giving us access to its nuclear propulsion technology is extraordinarily high.
……… The notion that we will retain any kind of sovereign agency in determining how all these assets are used, should serious tensions erupt, is a joke in bad taste.
…….the purchase price we are now paying, for all its exorbitance, will never be enough to guarantee the absolute protective insurance that supporters of AUKUS think they are buying. ANZUS, it cannot be said too often, does not bind the US to defend us, even in the event of existential attack. And extended nuclear deterrence is as illusory for us as for ever other ally or partner believing itself to be sheltering under a US nuclear umbrella. The notion that the US would ever be prepared to run the risk of sacrificing Los Angeles for Tokyo or Seoul, let alone Perth, is and always has been nonsense.
We can rely on military support if the US sees it in its own national interest to offer it, but not otherwise.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………..as Paul Keating continues to put it so articulately, that we need to find our security in Asia, not from Asia.
Australia’s no-holds-barred embrace of AUKUS is more likely than not to prove one of the worst defence and foreign policy decisions our country has made, not only putting at profound risk our sovereign independence, but generating more risk than reward for the very national security it promises to protect. I cannot imagine this decision being made by any of the Hawke-Keating governments of which I was part. Times have changed. https://theconversation.com/gareth-evans-aukus-is-terrible-for-australian-national-interests-but-were-probably-stuck-with-it-236938
Forced Posture: has Australia already ceded military control to the US?
by Michelle Fahy Aug 13, 2024, https://michaelwest.com.au/forced-posture-has-australia-already-ceded-military-control-to-the-us/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_term=2024-08-15&utm_campaign=Michael+West+Media+Weekly+Update
The war of words between Defence Minister Richard Marles and Paul Keating belies how the US bid for military control of Australia has been underway for over a decade, supported by both the Coalition and Labor. Michelle Fahy and Elizabeth Minter explain the Force Posture Agreement.
The Albanese government has not explained the full picture in its rejection of Paul Keating’s concerns about Australia’s defence policy. The former Labor prime minister said on ABC’s 7:30 last Thursday that AUKUS was likely to turn Australia into the 51st state of the United States: “AUKUS is really about, in American terms, the military control of Australia.”
The next morning deputy prime minister Richard Marles claimed Keating’s remarks were “not a fair characterisation” and that Keating’s remarks were not news.
Unmentioned by either Keating or Marles was that America’s bid for military control of Australia has been under way for more than a decade, with the enthusiastic support of both Coalition and Labor governments. As we write this, the US is spending $630 million as part of an extensive militarisation of the Australian Top End to suit its purposes.
Furthermore, five days ago, after the annual Ausmin (Australia-US Ministerial Consultations) talks, it was announced that the US was planning more frequent deployments to Australia of long-range B-52 bombers, which can carry nuclear weapons.
When asked last year whether Australia would allow US aircraft operating out of Tindal air base in the Northern Territory to carry nuclear weapons, the response of Foreign Minister Penny Wong was simply: “We understand and respect the longstanding US policy of neither confirming or denying.”
Compare that stance with that of Malcolm Fraser’s government. As John Menadue explained in a recent podcast “The Americanisation of our public policy, media and national interest”, then prime minister Fraser stood up in Parliament and insisted that no US aircraft or ships carrying nuclear weapons could access Australian ports or operate over Australia without the permission of the Australian government.
As Menadue said: “This is our territory, this is our sovereignty, [yet today] we won’t even ask the Americans operating out of Tindal whether they’re carrying nuclear weapons.”
Unimpeded access for the US
A critical piece of evidence regarding Australia’s sellout is the little-known Force Posture Agreement (FPA) with the United States, which the Abbott Coalition government signed in 2014, building on agreements made with the US by the Gillard Labor government. Her government allowed up to 2,500 US marines to be stationed on a permanent rotation in Darwin, and increased the number of military aircraft that could fly in and out of the Top End and use Australia’s outback bombing ranges.
The FPA provides the legal basis for the extensive militarisation of Australia by the US. In short, it permits the US to prepare for, launch and control its own military operations from Australian territory: “United States Forces and United States Contractors shall have unimpeded access to and use of Agreed Facilities and Areas for activities undertaken in connection with this Agreement.”
Defence Minister Marles has been effusive in his support for the force posture agreement and the control the US has been given over Australian soil.
Just last week, he announced that: “American force posture now in Australia involves every domain: land, sea, air, cyber and space.” Yet the longstanding Outer Space Treaty, which each AUKUS ally has ratified, reserves outer space for purely peaceful purposes.
Two months after Labor won office in May 2022, Marles was in Washington DC announcing that Labor would “continue the ambitious trajectory of its force posture cooperation” with the US.
He added that Australia’s military engagement with the US military would “move beyond interoperability to interchangeability” and Australia would “ensure we have all the enablers in place to operate seamlessly together, at speed”.
While the FPA strongly supports America’s ability to wage war against China, politicians have not explained its significance to the Australian public. Moreover, public consultation on the FPA was virtually non-existent. The Northern Territory government was consulted, while other state and territory governments merely received advice about it.
Defence Minister Marles speaks of the “appreciation for the contribution that America is making to the stability and the peace of the Indo-Pacific region by its presence in Australia”, but numerous critics, including Sam Roggeveen, the director of the Lowy Institute’s international security program and a former Australian intelligence analyst, warn of the risks of bringing “US combat forces, and its military strategy to fight China, on to our shores”.
The FPA allows the following and much more:
- unimpeded access to our airfields and airport facilities for US combat aircraft and bombers;
- unimpeded access to our seaports for US naval vessels, including US nuclear submarines at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia;
- the construction of a US Air Force mission planning, intelligence and operations centre in Darwin as part of $630 million in American spending across the Top End over the next two years;
- the establishment, under US military control, of several storage facilities for aircraft fuel, spare parts and munitions, including 11 giant jet fuel storage tanks near Darwin’s main port, which “will allow the US to run large-scale exercises and operations from Northern Australia”.
AUKUS, in conjunction with the FPA, ensures that Australia’s navy, in particular, will be tightly integrated with the US navy for the purpose of fighting China, and that the two navies can operate as one from Australian ports and waters.
Handcuffed to the US
Australia’s high-tech major weapons systems also make us more reliant than ever on the United States. As respected veteran journalist Brian Toohey reported in 2020, “The US … denies Australia access to the computer source code essential to operate key electronic components in its ships, planes, missiles, sensors and so on.”
This includes the F-35 fighter jets, which both Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Defence Minister Marles have noted this year form the largest proportion of the Australian Air Force’s fast jet capacity.
The significant erosion of Australian sovereignty did not start with AUKUS. Australians were warned as far back as 2001 of the high costs of our dependence on the US by a Parliamentary Library research paper that stated: “It is almost literally true that Australia cannot go to war without the consent and support of the US.”
The paper also noted that the Australian Defence Force is critically dependent on US supply and support for the conduct of all its operations except those at the lowest level and of the shortest duration.
It is more than dependency though? Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles boasts that “American force posture now in Australia involves every domain: land, sea, air, cyber and space” yet the Albanese government denies that Australia is turning into the 51st state of America.
Resisting AUKUS: The Paul Keating Formula
The venomous icing on the cake – at least for AUKUS critics – comes in the form of an undisclosed “Understanding” that involves “additional related political commitments.”
The contents of Biden’s letter irked Keating less than the spectacular show of servility shown by Australia’s Defence Minister Richard Marles, and Foreign Minister Penny Wong on their visit to Annapolis for the latest AUSMIN talks. In what has become a pattern of increasing subordination of Australian interests to the US Imperium, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken played happy hosts and must have been delighted by what they heard.
August 13, 2024, : Dr Binoy Kampmark, https://theaimn.com/resisting-aukus-the-paul-keating-formula/
From his own redoubt of critical inquiry, the former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating has made fighting the imperialising leprosy of the AUKUS security pact between Australia, the UK and the United States a matter of solemn duty.
In March 15, 2023, he excoriated a Canberra press gallery seduced and tantalised by the prospect of nuclear-powered submarines, calling the Albanese government’s complicit arrangements with the US and UK to acquire such a capability “the worst international decision by an Australian Labor government since the former Labor leader, Billy Hughes, sought to introduce conscription to augment Australian forces in World War one.
His latest spray was launched in the aftermath of a touched-up AUKUS, much of it discussed in a letter by US President Joe Biden to the US House Speaker and President of the Senate. The revised agreement between the three powers for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion is intended to supersede the November 22, 2021 agreement between the three powers on the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (ENNPIA)
The new agreement permits “the continued communication and exchange of NNPI, including certain RD, and would also expand the cooperation between the governments by enabling the transfer of naval nuclear propulsion plants of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, including component parts and spare parts thereof, and other related equipment.” The new arrangements will also permit the sale of special nuclear material in the welded power units, along with other relevant “material as needed for such naval propulsion plants.”
The contents of Biden’s letter irked Keating less than the spectacular show of servility shown by Australia’s Defence Minister Richard Marles, and Foreign Minister Penny Wong on their visit to Annapolis for the latest AUSMIN talks. In what has become a pattern of increasing subordination of Australian interests to the US Imperium, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken played happy hosts and must have been delighted by what they heard.
The details that emerged from the conversations held between the four – details which rendered Keating passionately apoplectic – can only make those wishing for an independent Australian defence policy weep. Words such as “Enhanced Force Posture Cooperation” were used to describe the intrusion of the US armed forces into every sphere of Australian defence:the domains of land, maritime, air, and space.
Ongoing infrastructure investments at such Royal Australian Air Force Bases as Darwin and Tindal continue to take place, not to bolster Australian defence but fortify the country as a US forward defensive position. To these can be added, as the Pentagonfact sheet reveals, “site surveys for potential upgrades at RAAF Bases Curtin, Learmonth, and Scherger.”
The degree of subservience Canberra affords is guaranteed by increased numbers of US personnel to take place in rotational deployments. These will include “frequent rotations of bombers, fighter aircraft, and Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft.” Secret arrangements have also been made involving the disposal of nuclear propulsion plants that will feature in Australia’s nuclear powered submarine fleet, though it is unclear how broad that commitment is.
The venomous icing on the cake – at least for AUKUS critics – comes in the form of an undisclosed “Understanding” that involves “additional related political commitments.” The Australian Greens spokesperson on Defence, Senator David Shoebridge, rightly wonders “what has to be kept secret from the Australian public? There are real concerns the secret understanding includes commitments binding us to the US in the event they go to war with China in return for getting nuclear submarines.”
Marles has been stumblingly unforthcoming in that regard. When asked what such “additional political commitments” were, he coldly replied that the agreement was “as we’ve done it.” The rest was “misinformation” being spread by detractors of the alliance.
It is precisely the nature of these undertakings, and what was made public at Annapolis, that paved the way for Keating’s hefty salvo on ABC’s 7.30. The slavishness of the whole affair had made Keating “cringe”. “This government has sold out to the United States. They’ve fallen for the dinner on the White House lawn.”
He proved unsparing about Washington’s intentions. “What AUKUS is about in the American mind is turning [Australia into suckers], locking us up for 40 years with American bases all around … not Australian bases.” It meant, quite simply, “in American terms, the military control of Australia. I mean, what’s happened … is likely to turn Australia into the 51st state of the United States.”
Having the US as an ally was itself problematic, largely because of its belligerent intentions. “If we didn’t have an aggressive ally like the United States – aggressive to others in the region – there’d be nobody attacking Australia. We are better left alone than we are being ‘protected’ by an aggressive power like the United States.”
As for what Australian obligations to the US entailed, the former PM was in little doubt. “What this is all about is the Chinese laying claim to Taiwan, and the Americans are going to say ‘no, no, we’re going to keep these Taiwanese people protected’, even though they’re sitting on Chinese real estate.” Were Australia to intervene, the picture would rapidly change: an initial confrontation between Beijing and Washington over the island would eventually lead to the realisation that catastrophic loss would simply not be worth it, leaving Australia “the ones who have done all the offence.”
As for Australia’s own means of self-defence against any adversary or enemy, Keating uttered the fundamental heresy long stomped on by the country’s political and intelligence establishment: Canberra could, if needed, go it alone. “Australia is capable of defending itself. There’s no way another state can invade a country like Australia with an armada of ships without it all failing.” Australia did not “need to be basically a pair of shoes hanging out of Americans’ backside.” With Keating’s savage rhetoric, and the possibility that AUKUS may collapse before the implosions of US domestic politics, improbable peace may break out.
Revamped AUKUS document reveals how US and UK can walk away from nuclear submarine deal
ABC News, By defence correspondent Andrew Greene 14 Aug 24
In short:
A revamped AUKUS agreement has been tabled in federal parliament revealing the submarine project can be cancelled with a year’s notice.
Under the deal, Australia has also agreed to indemnify the US and UK against any loss or injury connected to nuclear materials transferred here.
What’s next?
The deal will last until December 2075, provided the ANZUS alliance continues and the US and UK remain in NATO.
Australia would foot the bill for any loss or injury caused by sensitive technology and radioactive materials transferred by the United States and United Kingdom for nuclear submarines, under a revamped version of the AUKUS agreement.
An updated document for the trilateral partnership reveals Australia would indemnify the United States and the United Kingdom against such an outcome.
It also reveals the US or the UK could pull out of the submarine deal with just a year’s notice if either nation decides the deal weakens their own nuclear submarine programs
Details of the “understanding” signed by all three AUKUS partners last week in Washington have now been tabled in federal parliament with the agreement to “remain in force until 31 December 2075”.
Article I specifies that the US and UK can transfer “material and equipment relating to conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines to Australia” providing this does not constitute an “unreasonable risk” to their own defence and security.
“This is a $368 billion gamble with taxpayers’ money from the Albanese government,” Greens senator David Shoebridge said following the tabling of the document on Monday.
“Article I of the new AUKUS agreement says that if at any point the United States thinks supplying material under the AUKUS agreement to Australia prejudices their defence, they can effectively terminate the agreement and pull out.
“What this agreement makes clear in black and white: If the United States at any point thinks they don’t have enough submarines for themselves, they can pull out of AUKUS 2.0 — why isn’t the Albanese government being honest about the size of the gamble?”
According to the document, “Australia shall be responsible for the management, disposition, storage, and disposal of any spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste resulting from the operation of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Plants”.
The Albanese government has also agreed to indemnify the US and UK against “any liability, loss, costs, damage or injury (including third-party claims) arising out of, related to, or resulting from Nuclear Risks” connected with the project……………….
The head of the AUKUS submarine program has refused to say whether an almost $5 billion government payment to the United States would be refunded if no nuclear-powered boats were delivered to Australia.
The agreement for “cooperation for naval nuclear propulsion” is also contingent on Australia and the US remaining in the ANZUS alliance, along with the US and UK staying as NATO members.
Defence Minister Richard Marles said the agreement “expressly rules out enriching uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel in Australia” and prevents AUKUS partners from any activity that would contravene international non-proliferation obligations.
“The Albanese government, alongside AUKUS partners, continues to re-affirm that Australia’s acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will set the highest non-proliferation standards through the AUKUS partnership.
“The agreement is unequivocal that, as a non-nuclear weapons state, Australia does not seek to acquire nuclear weapons,” Mr Marles stressed.
Last week, President Joe Biden revealed the existence of a new agreement in a letter to Congress in which he said the non-legally binding “understanding” had provided “additional related political commitments”. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-08-12/revamped-aukus-document-reveals-how-us-and-uk-can-walk-away/104214398
The AUKUS operations are stalled because Australia cannot meet the nuclear waste disposal requirements of the non-proliferation treaty regime
13 Aug 24
Despite the somewhat difficult or convoluted language in the Agreement it gives the power and agreed authority to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to demand a proper and safe means for the storage and disposal in accordance with the prescriptions of IAEA of all nuclear material including waste generated in or acquired by Australia by whatever means and for the continuing inspection and audit of that material by IAEA
This applies specifically to the nuclear waste generated by the rotational visits of the nuclear powered submarines of the United States and the United Kingdom with Australia being solely responsible for the management and disposal of that waste
Irrespective of the strength of AUKUS by the involvement of the United States and the United Kingdom the requirements of IAEA under the Agreement will be strongly demanded by the member states who are
signatories to the non-proliferation treaty regime
The international demands on this issue will be readily adopted since they go to the most basic principles of nuclear safety and both the United States and the United Kingdom are known to have serious problems with the management of their own nuclear waste
COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
From the latest available information the Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement as described below has still not been varied which means
that the AUKUS arrangements cannot be fully implemented for the
purposes of the non-proliferation treaty regime
The reason is that Australia cannot meet all the safety requirements of
IAEA by not having the proper means for the management and disposal
of all the nuclear waste generated by the AUKUS activities in
accordance with its prescriptions as outlined in the publication by IAEA
as to Disposal of Radioactive Waste No. SSR-5 and other
prescriptions.
There is the problem of the disposal of all the
nuclear waste generated initially by the rotational visits of nuclear submarines of the United States and the United Kingdom to Stirling in Western Australia.
Australia by its foreign minister has advised IAEA that it is seeking
appropriate sites on Defence land for a facility for the AUKUS
generated nuclear waste but this has been insufficient for the variation
of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and hence is delaying
the implementation of AUKUS
*********************************************
COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
The problem for Australia is that without a variation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement as it is commonly
called it will be difficult for Australia to implement the AUKUS
arrangements yet at the same time remain within the non –
proliferation treaty regime.
In order to achieve the variation Australia must show that it
has or is in the latter stages of planning a nuclear waste
facility for the permanent disposal of the nuclear waste to be
generated by the AUKUS operations.
COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
PROVISIONS
AGREEMENT BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968
and which entered into force on 5 March 1970
NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE
USED IN NON-PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES
Article 14
If Australia intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is
required to be safeguarded under this Agreement in a nuclear activity which
does not require the application of safeguards under this Agreement, the
following procedures shall apply:
(a) Australia shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear:
(i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military
activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking Australia may
have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the nuclear material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity;
and
(ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the
nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(b) Australia and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, only while
the nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in this
Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent
possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be
applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall
apply again as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful
nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and
composition of such unsafeguarded nuclear material in Australia and of any
export of such nuclear material; and
(c) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. Such
agreement shall be given as promptly as possible and shall relate only to
such matters as, inter alia, temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, and shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of
the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.
APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS
Article 2
The Agency shall have the right and the obligation to ensure that safeguards
will be applied, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source
or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the
territory of Australia, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control
anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not
diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
±±The relevant provision of INFCIRC/153 is paragraph 14
Paragraph 14 provides for the “non- application” of “the safeguards
provided for in the Agreement”, but only while the nuclear material is in
the non-proscribed military use. 15 Feb 2022
Australia is still finding out what it doesn’t know about its secretive AUKUS deal
7.30 / By Laura Tingle, Sat 10 Aug 2024
When US President Joe Biden announced he would not be standing for another term, Australia’s political leaders expressed their gratitude for his contribution to public life. But this week, Australian voters had something else for which to be grateful to Biden.
For it was only as a result of a letter the US president wrote to the US Congress, that we found that there had been an update to the AUKUS agreement which will allow naval nuclear propulsion plants, rather than just nuclear propulsion “information”, to be transferred to Australia.
But it is not this part of the letter that has raised eyebrows and hackles even if, as usual, we find out about such deals from the Americans before we find out about them from our own government. The formal part of the deal will be exposed when it is submitted to the Treaties committee of our own parliament.
It is a side agreement, between the US, the UK and Australia that is of considerable concern: a non-legally binding “understanding” that includes “additional related political commitments”.
What are these? Well, they are secret.
The AUKUS saga moves on without much scrutiny
Critics argue that the “understanding” and “additional related political commitments” could include how and where these vessels are used. That is, what conflicts Australia would be expected to show up for, and how.
Some speculate on the possibility that it involves Australia agreeing to accept nuclear waste from the US and the UK, something the government has denied.
The idea that any of these such undertakings may have been made, but we aren’t allowed to know, is simply outrageous.
A quick recap of the AUKUS deal reveals that we are still expecting to receive two second-hand US Virginia class submarines, before embarking on building an entirely new, and so far unseen, British submarine in Adelaide.
Of course, we get a bit of a say in the design and plans for that new sub, don’t we?
Well the UK announced in October 2023 that it had selected BAE Systems for the SSN-AUKUS submarine. That month, Greens senator David Shoebridge asked officials about what involvement Australia had in the selection of the company that would build both the UK and Australian submarines.
The Australian Submarine Agency’s Alexandra Kelton told the Senate that “we had, through our high commission, some notification that an announcement would be made and some context around that but not of the content in great detail”.
The AUKUS submarine saga moves on with not much scrutiny in Australia, let alone apparently much input from Australia, given its cost and its huge strategic investment in one particular idea.
The second-hand Virginia class subs and later the AUKUS-class subs to be built in Adelaide are supposedly “sovereign Australian assets operating under the complete control of the Australian government”.
The Greens’ Shoebridge is one critic who warns the secret undertakings could include commitments on how the subs are used.
And this is a position which seems to be backed in by the authoritative papers written for the US Congressional Research Service.
Voters likely to be the last to know
In its latest update on the Virginia-class submarines, dated August 5, the Service’s analysts once again outline the relative benefits costs and risks of an “alternative division-of-labor approach”.
That’s technical talk for an alternative plan in which “up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs would be procured and retained in US Navy service and operated out of Australia along with the US and UK SSNs that are already planned to be operated out of Australia … while Australia invested in military capabilities (such as, for example, long-range anti-ship missiles, drones, loitering munitions, B-21 long-range bombers, or other long-range strike aircraft)”.
That is, we don’t get any submarines, the Americans (and Brits) just run theirs out of here. Along with an expansion of bomber visits, personnel and troop rotations.
The “deterrence and warfighting cost-effectiveness” arguments for doing this “include [the fact that] Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles in March 2023 reportedly confirmed that in exchange for the Virginia-class boats, Australia’s government made no promises to the United States that Australia would support the United States in a future conflict over Taiwan.”
“Selling three to five Virginia-class SSNs to Australia would thus convert those SSNs from boats that would be available for use in a US-China crisis or conflict into boats that might not be available for use in a US-China crisis or conflict. This could weaken rather than strengthen deterrence and warfighting capability in connection with a US-China crisis or conflict.”
There’s a lot more like that.
Riled on Friday by the prime minister’s dismissal of his observations on AUKUS, Albanese’s predecessor Paul Keating warned that “the strength and scale of the United States’s basing in Australia will eclipse Australia’s own military capability such that Australia will be viewed in the United States as a continental extension of American power akin to that which it enjoys in Hawaii, Alaska and more limitedly in places like Guam”.
“Such an outcome is likely to turn the Australian government, in defence and security terms, into simply the national administrator of what would be broadly viewed in Asia as a US protectorate,” he said.
If that happens, voters are likely to be the last to know about it.
Laura Tingle is 7.30’s chief political correspondent
Buck-passing inside the murky arms trade
Australia bears responsibility for how Australian-made weapons are used in conflict zones around the world
Undue Influence, Michelle Fahy, Aug 10, 2024
‘It is almost literally true that Australia cannot go to war without the consent and support of the US.’
This statement, made in 2001, is key to understanding the deceit and denials by the Albanese government regarding weapons exports bound for Israel.
In his 2019 book Secret: The making of Australia’s security state, veteran journalist Brian Toohey quoted the 2001 research paper by the Australian parliamentary library.
Toohey explained that:
The US requires almost all countries that buy its weapons systems, including Australia, to send sensitive components back to the US for repairs, maintenance and replacements without the owners being allowed access to critical information, including source codes, needed to keep these systems operating.
To rephrase Toohey: Australia cannot use its advanced weapons platforms for any length of time without US support.
Two decades later, the F-35 fighter jet is one such advanced weapons platform.
Australia reliant on the US
Australia is now more embedded in and reliant on the US military than it was in 2001.
After nine months of denials, Defence Minister Richard Marles and Foreign Minister Penny Wong finally admitted in June that Australia is still exporting parts into the global F-35 supply chain, a point of contention because Israel is using its F-35s in its war in Gaza. Both senior ministers also noted at the same time that Australia’s F-35 fleet forms the heart of our air force’s “fast jet capability”.
Is Australia’s continuing supply of parts to the US somehow linked to the need to maintain our own F-35 capability?
The UN has stated only that supply to Israel of weapons, parts, components, ammunition and munitions should cease. It has not said all exports into global weapons supply chains that include Israel as a recipient nation should cease. Australia could continue supplying the US-led global F-35 supply chain and be compliant with UN requests provided the US has agreed that none of the Australian exports will be sent to Israel.
I asked the Defence Department whether it had sought assurances from the US and Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the F-35 fighter jet, that they would cease transferring Australian-made parts and components to Israel. The Department had not responded by deadline.
I also asked whether it was correct that Australia does not have access to the necessary source codes, or other critical information, needed to repair, maintain, upgrade or replace the sensitive components in our fleet of F-35s. Again, no response had been received at deadline.
As Toohey concluded in his 2019 book:
Although the ability to operate our major weapons systems independently is crucial to defending Australia, our leaders prefer to ignore this fundamental flaw and become more tightly integrated with US forces.
This may explain why the Albanese government has been intent on obscuring the extent of Australia’s involvement in the F-35 supply chain and unwilling to take decisive action to ensure that no Australian parts and components could end up in Israel.
Hot denials
“I am saying we’re not sending parts.”
That was Richard Marles, Australia’s deputy prime minister and defence minister, on ABC Radio Melbourne in June talking about Australia’s arms exports to Israel.
Marles then admitted, however, that Australia was continuing to supply parts into the F-35 global supply chain. But that was “worlds away” from claims that “we are directly supplying weapons to Israel” which, he said, “is just a falsehood”.
Marles insisted that claims by the Greens that Australia was supplying weapons to Israel were “absolutely false”, “a total lie”, “completely wrong”, and “utterly, utterly false”.
He repeated the government’s line that “there have been no weapons exported to Israel…for the past five years” and stated this to be “the absolute truth”. I have reported previously on this highly misleading statement.
Should Australia be taking stronger action?……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. more https://undueinfluence.substack.com/p/buck-passing-inside-the-murky-arms?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=297295&post_id=147548747&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
AUKUS Revamped: The Complete Militarisation of Australia
Marles, the persistently reliable spokesman for Australia’s wholesale capitulation to the US war machine, calls the document “the legal underpinning of our commitment to our international obligations so it’s a very significant step down the AUKUS path and again it’s another demonstration that we are making this happen.”
US military forces, in short, are to occupy every domain of Australia’s defence.
August 10, 2024, by: Dr Binoy Kampmark https://theaimn.com/aukus-revamped-the-complete-militarisation-of-australia/
There is much to loathe about the AUKUS security agreement between Canberra, Washington and London. Of the three conspirators against stability in the Indo and Asia Pacific, one stands out as the shouldering platform, the sustaining force, the political and military stuffing. But Australian propagandists and proselytisers of the US credo of power prefer to see it differently, repeatedly telling the good citizens down under that they are onto something truly special in being a military extension, the gargantuan annexe of another’s interests. Give them nuclear powered submarines, let them feel special, and a false sense of security will follow.
The August 2024 AUSMIN talks in Annapolis, Maryland, held between US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and their Australian counterparts, Richard Marles (Minister of Defence) and Penny Wong (Foreign Minister)provided yet another occasion for this grim pantomime. No one could be in doubt who the servitors were.
The factsheet from the US Department of Defense on the meeting is worth noting for Washington’s military capture – no other word describes it – and Australia’s sycophantic accommodation. As part of the “Enhanced Force Posture Cooperation,” the US and Australia are to advance “key priorities across an ambitious range of force posture cooperation efforts.” This is merely a clumsy way of describing the deeper incorporation of Australia’s own military requirements into the US military complex “across land, maritime, air, and space domains, as well as the Combined Logistics, Sustainment, and Maintenance Enterprise.” US military forces, in short, are to occupy every domain of Australia’s defence.
The greedy and speedy US garrisoning of Australia is evident through ongoing “infrastructure investments at key Australian bases in the norther, including RAAF Bases Darwin and Tindal” and “site surveys for potential upgrades at RAAF Bases Curtin, Learmonth, and Scherger.” Rotational deployments of US forces to Australia, “including frequent rotations of bombers, fighter aircraft, and Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft” are to increase in number. As any student of US-Australian relations knows, rotation is the disingenuous term used to mask the presence of a permanently stationed force – occupation by another name.
The public relations office has obviously been busy spiking the language with a sense of false equality: the finalising, for instance, by December 2024 of a Memorandum of Understanding on Co-Assembly for Guided Multiple Rocket Systems (GLMRS) – a “co-production”; finalising, by the same date, an MOU “on cooperative Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on Development of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM)”; and institutionalising of “US cooperation with Australia’s Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise.” Everywhere we look, a sense of artificial cooperation under the cover of Washington’s heavy-handed dominance, be it cooperative activities for Integrated Air and Missile Defence, or the hypersonic weapons program, can be found.
In this even more spectacular surrender of sovereignty and submission than previous undertakings, Canberra is promised second hand nuclear-powered toys in the form of Virginia Class submarines, something forever contingent on the wishes and whimsy of the US Congress. But even this contingent state of affairs is sufficient for Australia to bury itself deeper in what has been announced as a revised AUKUS agreement. More accurately, it constitutes a touch-up of the November 22, 2021 agreement between the three powers on the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (ENNPIA).
The ENNPIA allows the AUKUS parties the means to communicate and exchange relevant Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (NNPI), including officially Restricted Data (RD) as part of what is described as the “Optimal Pathway” for Australia’s needless acquisition of nuclear powered vessels.
In his letter to the US House Speaker and President of the Senate, President Joe Biden explains the nature of the revision. Less cumbersomely named than its predecessor, the new arrangements feature an Agreement between the three powers for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion. In superseding the ENNPIA, it “would permit the continued communication and exchange of NNPI, including certain RD, and would also expand the cooperation between the governments by enabling the transfer of naval nuclear propulsion plants of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, including component parts and spare parts thereof, and other related equipment.”
The Agreement further permits the sale of special nuclear material in the welded power units, and other relevant “material as needed for such naval propulsion plants.” Transferrable equipment would include that necessary for research, development, or design of naval propulsion plants. The logistics of manufacture, development, design, manufacture, operation, maintenance, regulation and disposal of the plants is also covered.
Tokenistic remarks about non-proliferation are then made in Biden’s letter. The powers, for instance, commit themselves to “setting the highest nonproliferation standard” while protecting US classified information and intellectual property. This standard is actually pitifully low: Australia has committed itself to proliferation not only by seeking to acquire submarine nuclear propulsion, but by subsidising the building of such submarines in US and UK shipyards.
Marles, the persistently reliable spokesman for Australia’s wholesale capitulation to the US war machine, calls the document “the legal underpinning of our commitment to our international obligations so it’s a very significant step down the AUKUS path and again it’s another demonstration that we are making this happen.”
Obligations is the operative word here, given that Australia is burdened by any number of undertakings, be it as a US military asset placed in harm’s way or becoming a radioactive storage dump for all the AUKUS submarine fleets. Marles insists that the only nuclear waste that will end up on Australian soil will be that generated by Australia. “That is the agreement that we reached with the UK and the US back in March of last year, and so all this is doing is providing for the legal underpinning of that.”
Given that Australia has no standalone, permanent site to store high-level nuclear waste, even that undertaking is spurious. Nor does the understanding prevent Australia from accepting the waste accruing from the fleets of all the navies. Given the cringing servitude of Canberra, and the admission by the Australian government that they have made undisclosed “political commitments”, such an outcome cannot be ruled out.
Always reliably waspish, former Australian Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating gavehis assessment about the latest revelations of the AUSMIN talks. “There’ll be an American force posture now in Australia, involving every domain.” The Albanese government had “fallen for the dinner on the White House lawn.” That, and much more besides.
For Australia, AUKUS and the planned nuclear submarines create more problems than solutions
Preposterous’: AUKUS creates more problems than solutions THE AUSTRALIAN,
The timelines for Australia’s transition from ageing Collins-class to its first nuclear-powered sub just don’t add up. There is hardly a single strategist in the country who believes it will happen. By CAMERON STEWART 10 Dec 21
Now that Australia has finally weathered the diplomatic fallout caused by the creation of the three-nation AUKUS pact, it is time to work out exactly what it means for the nation’s security.
The Morrison government faces a series of critical multi-billion dollar decisions in the coming year that will set the course of Australia’s maritime defence for the next half a century.
These will require Canberra to test the limits of its alliance with both the US and the UK to ensure they make good on their AUKUS promise to share their sensitive nuclear know-how to help Australia acquire a nuclear-powered submarine fleet.
………….But the not-so-good news is that AUKUS has delivered as many conundrums for Australia as it has solutions.
………. the AUKUS announcement and the related scrapping of the French submarine project offers far more problems than solutions.
The timelines for Australia’s transition from its ageing Collins-class submarines to its first nuclear-powered submarine just don’t add up. Put simply, unless something changes, Australia risks having either no submarine fleet or a grossly antiquated one in the late 2030s and early 2040s……..
The government has given itself up to 18 months from the AUKUS announcement in September to study its options, although it says it hopes to decide on a plan of action earlier.
………………… The trouble is that the government’s initial projection for the completion of the first of eight nuclear-powered submarines, which it claims will be built in Adelaide, is not until 2038, meaning it would not be brought into naval service for another two years after that, in 2040, with one new nuclear boat every three years after that. This timetable is hugely ambitious and there is hardly a single strategist in the country who believes this will happen. The lessons of naval shipbuilding in Australia is that a first-of-class boat is never completed on time, much less the building of a nuclear submarine – easily the most complex construction of its kind in the country’s history.
……….
The solutions that have been floated, in no particular order, are to shorten the process by building at least some of the nuclear submarines overseas rather than in Australia; lease nuclear submarines from the US or UK; build a new conventional submarine in Australia as an interim measure; or extend the life of the Collins for a second refit cycle, meaning they would be sailing into the 2050s.
Every one of these proposals is problematic.
………………….. if the government chooses not to build a new conventional submarine and it deems that the Collins can be extended only for a decade, rather than two decades, then the only option is to acquire nuclear submarines more quickly than the current 2040 guideline.
This is the option that Dutton is pursuing but it requires delicate diplomacy with Australia’s AUKUS partners. First, Dutton must decide whether to ditch the government’s intention to build the eight nuclear submarines in Adelaide. While building all boats here will maximise Australian defence industry content, it will almost certainly slow the project down compared to a decision which would allow at least the first few boats to be constructed in US or UK shipyards.
Second, Dutton must choose between acquiring the US Virginia-class or the UK’s Astute-class submarines. Neither the UK nor the US production lines have room to include Australian boats in the foreseeable future. Dutton would need to lean heavily on London or Washington to make room for Australian boats to be constructed in their own shipyards. In the US, it would probably require Australia to partly fund a third shipyard to build the Virginia-class boats because the current two shipyards are struggling to keep up with the orders of the US Navy.
Hellyer believes the choice between the two countries is simple. “With nuclear submarines, we are not just picking a boat we are picking a strategic partner and that can only be the US,” he says…….
However, ditching the British submarine option would require delicate diplomacy from Canberra given that Britain’s prime minister Boris Johnson promised that the AUKUS deal would create “hundreds” of highly skilled jobs across the UK and would reinforce Britain’s place “at the leading edge of science and technology”.
The Morrison government appears to have gone cold on the option of leasing nuclear submarines to get them into the navy earlier. On closer inspection, neither the UK or the US have submarines available to lease. And in any case, Australia does not have the crews or the skills to sail them.
It will take at least a decade and probably longer for Australia to be able to train enough crew to the high levels required to man a nuclear-powered boat. A vast amount of that training will need to be done in the US or UK while Australia builds up the nuclear infrastructure and knowledge that will be needed to crew, maintain and manage a nuclear fleet.
All of these options amount to multi-billion dollar decisions by the government. If the wrong option is chosen, it will not only hit taxpayers, but it could severely compromise the country’s defence for decades.
The stakes could not be higher as the government moves to turn AUKUS from rhetoric to reality. www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/aukus-gives-us-more-problems-than-solutions-and-our-safety-is-at-stake/news-story/fff5b011740957f5cc246eb641408894
A revised AUKUS agreement. Dunno what it means yet
#Breaking. The White House has just revealed #AUKUS Govts have settled a new agreement to supersede the original AUKUS treaty. Significantly there is also an “understanding” including “additional related political commitments”. No details yet. 1/2
Letter to the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate on the Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America, the Government of Australia, and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion
“………………………………………………….The Agreement, which would supersede the ENNPIA, would permit the continued communication and exchange of NNPI, including certain RD, and would also expand on the cooperation between the governments by enabling the transfer of naval nuclear propulsion plants of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, including component parts and spare parts thereof, and other related equipment. The Agreement also enables the sale of special nuclear material contained in complete, welded power units, and other material as needed for such naval nuclear propulsion plants. Equipment transferred in accordance with the Agreement could include equipment needed for the research, development, or design of naval nuclear propulsion plants, including their manufacture, operation, maintenance, regulation, and disposal, and could also include training, services, and program support associated with such equipment.
…………………………….The trilateral partners also concluded a non-legally binding Understanding Among the Government of the United States of America, the Government of Australia, and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Understanding), which reflects the governments’ intended approach to certain articles of the Agreement and provides additional related political commitments. The Understanding would become operative on the date on which the Agreement enters into force
…………………………………Accordingly, I have approved the Agreement, authorized its execution, and urge that the Congress give it favorable consideration.
Sincerely,
America’s war machine: Unless Australia acquires nuclear weapons, why acquire AUKUS subs?
By Percy Allan, 3 Aug 24, https://johnmenadue.com/americas-war-machine-unless-australia-acquires-nuclear-weapons-why-acquire-aukus-subs/
Nuclear-powered Virginia Class and AUKUS submarines are a useful deterrent only if they carry cruise missiles with nuclear warheads that can be launched from their unique vertical firing shaft.
Then if a distant enemy nuked Australia, we could launch an instant nuclear retaliation from such submarines lurking off their coast for months without needing refuelling.
That’s called MAD – mutually assured destruction – both sides know that neither side could nuke the other without risking oblivion.
Australia does not have nuclear weapons, nor does it plan to acquire them.
Australia’s quest to become part of America’s armed forces
Australia is fusing its navy, air force and army with America’s military forces. It’s called shifting from “interoperability” to “interchangeability”. One senior Australian defence officer has explained it as follows:
“…interoperability is two organisations able to work together, share information through technology and systems, and operate effectively as a joint or combined team. The higher standard of interchangeability includes all that plus the ability to seamlessly exchange individual people, equipment, doctrine, and/or systems between trusted nation groups.”
In essence under “interoperability” there are two separate national chains of command working jointly, whereas under “interchangeability” there is single chain of command. Under the latter it is doubtful the junior partner could break the chain of command and insist it call its own shots if the senior partner got into a skirmish not of Australia’s doing.
Without nuclear arms Australia should not be a party to confronting China
As such the Australian mainland could be the first casualty in an American war with China because we would be the weak link in America’s war machine without our own nuclear weapons.
Australian owned Virginia Class and AUKUS submarines carrying cruise missiles with conventional war heads would not provide a meaningful MAD deterrence.
And we have no guarantee from America that if a foreign power nuked Australia, America would nuke it in turn since that could cause a nuclear attack on America itself.
Worse still, unlike America we do not have an air defence system to intercept missile and drone attacks on our capital cities nor will we have such a protective shield in the foreseeable future.
Australia’s choice – get nuclear armed or stay conventionally armed?
In February 1970, Australia signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which commits us not to acquire nuclear weapons and to champion non-proliferation gobally. Since then, we have been one of the treaty’s strongest supporters.
Given that very long-range submarines like Virginia Class and AUKUS are best suited for nuclear armed powers (US, UK France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea), Australia needs to make a choice:
- Break the NPT and the join the club of nine nuclear armed nations and risk provoking our biggest neighbour Indonesia to do likewise, or
- Scrap nuclear-powered submarines for conventional ones better suited for defending our coastline than patrolling China’s foreshores
Canada recently decided to buy 12 modern electric-diesel powered submarines for an estimated US$44 billion (versus US$ 268-$368 billion for Australia’s 8 Virginia Class and AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines) since its focus is on patrolling its own vast coastline not that of distant nations.
Marles’ rationale for nuclear-powered subs does not stack up
Australia’s official rationale for obtaining submarines that can stay under water almost indefinitely is that they will defend our world shipping lanes and undersea communication cables. But that’s not credible.
Each year there are 26,000 ship port calls involving over 3,000 different ships at 70 Australian ports according to Shipping Australia.
China is Australia’s largest two-way trading partner in goods and services, accounting for one third of our trade with the world. It is not in China’s interests to disrupt it.
Marles should explain how three nuclear submarines by 2039 or eight by 2055 can defend each of these ships doing 26,000 round trips from being sunk by enemy submarines, destroyers, or bombers. Note that only one sub in three will be at sea at any time with the other two in port for maintenance or training purposes.
Marles probably thinks that our subs would be assisted by America’s 67 nuclear submarines (China has only 12 but is planning to have 21 by the early 2030s). But what assurance does he have that America would prioritise Australia’s trade routes and shipping movements over its own?
As for the nearly one million miles of telecommunication cables lying on the ocean floor, submarines can’t protect them. To safeguard these optical fibres, they are covered in silicone gel and wrapped in multiple layers of plastic, steel wires, copper sheathing, polyethylene insulator, and nylon yarn. In the deep sea, ocean inaccessibility largely protects cables, requiring only a thin polyethylene sheath. Hence the navy won’t have a role in patrolling their security.
AUKUS and the pride of politicians
By Nick Deane, Jul 24, 2024 https://johnmenadue.com/aukus-and-the-pride-of-politicians/
With AUKUS, the pride of politicians has become an obstacle to reaching the best solution to the ‘national security’ conundrum. In the end, it could be that ego-driven reluctance to shift from entrenched positions results in the Australian people being delivered a disaster.
For my own purposes, I have been keeping a record of articles I have read under the topic ‘AUKUS’. There are now some 300 such items on my spreadsheet – nearly all of them finding fault of one kind or another with this extraordinary project.
The criticisms deal with a wide variety of aspects (mainly focussed on the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines). To summarise a few, the AUKUS project:-
- Leads Australia in the direction of war;
- Has done damage to Australia’s international reputation;
- Destabilises Australia’s immediate region;
- Brings a nuclear industry with it;
- Introduces the intractable problem of nuclear waste disposal;
- Damages our relationship with our most important trading partner;
- Causes a significant loss of sovereignty;
- Is not good value for money;
- Diverts resources away from social programs;
- Will not be as effective as conventional submarines;
- Is aggressive and not defensive, and
- Will probably not come to fruition in any case.
Highly respected commentators, such as Hugh White, Paul Keating, Sam Roggeveen, Andrew Fowler, Rex Patrick and Clinton Fernandes, have all raised significant concerns. Meanwhile ‘civil society’ is also getting mobilised, with ‘anti-AUKUS’ groups springing up in all the major centres.
However, the proponents of AUKUS (and the mainstream media) appear content to ignore the valid, rational arguments being put forward against it. Indeed, industry-based conferences are going ahead as if there is nothing about to the project that needs to be questioned, and, no doubt, secret, military training programs are already well under way. Within the military-industrial establishment, the project is gathering momentum. Those in the military are excited by the prospect of controlling a new, highly lethal weapon, whilst those in the industry are attracted by the smell of the limitless funds being devoted to it.
It is disturbing to have to concede that rational argument appears to have little impact on AUKUS’s proponents. However there is an even more worrying aspect to add. That is the pride of politicians. For the longer the process continues, with all its secrecy and in the absence of meaningful debate at high levels, the harder it is for politicians to change course. Abandoning the project would already cause senior members of both major parties considerable ‘loss of face’. If it falls over (as some predict), or if opposition becomes a vote-winner at the next election, that ‘loss of face’ will be highly embarrassing. With AUKUS, the pride of politicians has thus become an obstacle to to reaching the best solution to the ‘national security’ conundrum. In the end, it could be that ego-driven reluctance to shift from entrenched positions results in the Australian people being delivered a disaster.
In an ideal, democratic society, voters and the politicians they elect appraise themselves of the ‘pros and cons’ of controversial matters and make decisions on a rational basis. If they do that in the case of AUKUS, it is surely doomed. Politicians beware!
Australia: Opposition’s nuclear power plans open the door for nuclear weapons
Barely mentioned is the potential of a nuclear power industry to provide a pathway for the development of nuclear weapons: first, by providing a large pool of nuclear scientists, engineers and technicians and, second, by creating the means to manufacture the fissionable material needed for a bomb. The latter would require further heavy investment in either a uranium enrichment plant or a plutonium reprocessing plant, or both.
Such a discussion has been underway largely behind closed doors in strategic and military circles for decades.
WSWS, Peter Symonds, 19 July 24
Federal opposition leader Peter Dutton’s announcement last month that the Liberal-National Coalition would build seven nuclear power plants seeks to overturn longstanding official opposition to nuclear energy, entrenched in state and federal law. Currently, Australia has just one nuclear reactor, operated by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) for research and the production of medical isotopes.
Dutton slammed Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s Labor government for its reliance on renewables, claiming that nuclear power would provide cheap, reliable, environmentally-friendly energy for households and businesses. He dismissed problematic issues of nuclear waste and safety by pointing out that the Albanese government had already ditched Labor’s nuclear-free policy by embracing the acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines under the AUKUS pact with the UK and US.
In the ensuing wave of commentary on the nuclear power proposal, critics derided Dutton’s lack of detail, including costings, and pointed out that nuclear reactors would not be operational for at least a decade. Advocates of the profitable renewable industries touted solar and wind power as the cheap, clean, safe alternatives to nuclear power.
Barely mentioned is the potential of a nuclear power industry to provide a pathway for the development of nuclear weapons: first, by providing a large pool of nuclear scientists, engineers and technicians and, second, by creating the means to manufacture the fissionable material needed for a bomb. The latter would require further heavy investment in either a uranium enrichment plant or a plutonium reprocessing plant, or both.
Such a discussion has been underway largely behind closed doors in strategic and military circles for decades. Plans for an Australian atomic bomb were seriously considered in the 1950s and 1960s, with the 1968‒71 Coalition government of Prime Minister John Gorton taking the first steps in building a nuclear power reactor that provided a route to manufacturing a nuclear weapon.
In the midst of the Cold War, however, Washington was determined to maintain the effective monopoly of its massive nuclear arsenal and thus its use as a menacing threat or in war itself against the Soviet Union or any other potential rival. Under the guise of disarmament, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) banned the manufacture of nuclear weapons except for the five countries with a known nuclear arsenal—the US, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China—and effectively stymied the Australian project as well as most similar plans by other countries. Australia signed the NPT in 1971 and ratified it in 1973.
The global geopolitical landscape, however, has dramatically changed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War. Far from bringing global peace and prosperity, US imperialism has been waging war for the past three decades in a desperate attempt to maintain its global hegemony. Conflicts in the Middle East and Central Asia are now rapidly metastasizing into great power conflicts and world war involving nuclear-armed powers. The US and its NATO allies are already waging war against Russia in Ukraine and, in league with its Asian allies, including Australia, preparing for war against China.
In this context, as the danger of nuclear war looms larger, debate has reemerged in military circles over the building of an Australian atomic bomb. In his book How to Defend Australia, published in 2019, prominent strategic analyst Hugh White devoted an entire chapter to the question: “Does Australia need its own nuclear weapons to preserve its strategic independence in the decades ahead?”
The way White posed the question points to the central argument of the book as a whole—the necessity of Australian imperialism forging a foreign and military policy that does not rely on America’s waning power.
………………………………. In the Indo-Pacific, the US has been preparing for war with China, which Washington regards as the chief threat to its global domination. Far from leaving Australia isolated, the US is integrating the Australian military directly into its war plans against China—the AUKUS pact being the most obvious expression. This places the Australian population on the front lines of such a war.
White speaks for a minority in the ruling class that doubts the wisdom of being drawn into a catastrophic military conflict with Australia’s biggest trade partner. He and others argue for Australian imperialism to adopt a stance of heavily-armed neutrality. While not explicitly calling for an Australian nuclear weapon, White’s book certainly implied its necessity. Grossly inflating the threat posed by China, he argued that without the protection of the US, the only realistic means of countering such a threat is for Australia to have its own nuclear armaments.
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………US imperialism is already, in reality, engaged in a war with nuclear-armed Russia in Ukraine and making advanced preparations for conflict with nuclear-armed China. The Australian military, including its bases, forms a vital component of the Pentagon’s strategy for fighting a nuclear war and, thus, a potential nuclear target. American nuclear submarines and nuclear-capable strategic bombers are being stationed in western and northern Australia. US spy and communications bases in Australia are indispensable to the US military’s global war plans. In other words, if US imperialism launches nuclear war, Australian imperialism is automatically involved……………………………………………………………………………………..more https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2024/07/20/qxon-j20.html—
Experts argue for an Australian ban on nuclear weapons ahead of UN Summit
University of Melbourne experts are urging Australia to sign and ratify the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) to commit most effectively to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
The argument was made in ‘Luck is not a strategy: it’s time to prohibit Nuclear Weapons’, the second paper in a series prepared by the University of Melbourne’s Initiative for Peacebuilding to stimulate discussion of key issues on the agenda at the upcoming UN Summit of the Future.
Associate Professor Tilman Ruff AO, co-founder of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which received the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize, ICAN Australia director Gem Romuld and Executive Director of ICAN Melissa Parke argue it is important Australia signs the Treaty before taking a seat on the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2025.
Almost half the world’s nations have already joined the TPNW, which contains the only comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons and the only internationally agreed framework to eliminate nuclear weapons in a time-bound, verified way.
The TPNW is also the first nuclear weapons agreement to address the harm done by nuclear weapons use and testing.
Associate Professor Ruff argues Australia’s involvement is particularly critical given the number of available deployed nuclear weapons is increasing for the first time in two decades, along with explicit nuclear threats, and two nuclear-armed states – Russia and Israel – are prosecuting war, risking nuclear escalation.
No disarmament negotiations are underway, while hard won treaties limiting nuclear weapons have been abolished.
“Additional signatories, such as Australia, will contribute to the universalisation of the ban treaty, and its effectiveness,” Associate Professor Ruff said.
“For as long as we remain outside the treaty, promoting a role for nuclear weapons and assisting in their possible use in our defence policies, we are contributing to the problem.”
The Summit of the Future will be held from 22–23 September 2024 in New York, gathering world leaders to forge a new international consensus on how we deliver a better present and safeguard the future.
The Initiative for Peacebuilding, which brings together multidisciplinary research, engagement, and education to advance peacebuilding and conflict prevention in the Indo-Pacific region, plans to release a series of five policy briefs ahead of the Summit.
Associate Professor Ruff called for Australian leaders to harness this moment of great danger to sign the TPNW and then work towards ratification, just as Australia has joined the treaties banning other inhumane and indiscriminate weapons, including chemical and biological weapons, landmines and cluster munitions.
“Nuclear weapons are abhorrent, immoral, and illegal under international law. They are the worst weapons of mass destruction, and have no place in a secure and healthy future. Australia needs to signal its firm agreement and expedite signature and ratification of the UN-TPNW,” he said.
Decoded: Defence Department’s deadly deceits
After nine months of denial and disinformation, the Australian government has been forced to confirm its deadly exports to Israel
Undue Influence MICHELLE FAHY, JUL 09, 2024
After spending nine months denying any weapons were going to Israel, senior Australian government ministers are now in damage control after a Defence Department official admitted for the first time since the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 that there are active export permits relating to Israel that cover the transfer of parts and components.
Labor MPs from Prime Minister Anthony Albanese down have spent months attacking political opponents on this issue.
This was Defence Minister Richard Marles just weeks ago on ABC Melbourne radio: ‘So, to be clear, what the Greens are alleging is that somehow we are supplying Israel with weapons which are being used in the conflict in Gaza. That is absolutely false, and that is a total lie.’
Following the revelations about active permits, senior government ministers have doubled down and introduced a perverse phrase – ‘non-lethal parts’ – to defend the continued export of key parts and components into the F-35 fighter jet supply chain.
The F-35 is being used by Israel over Gaza, and the global supply chain, of which Australia is a key part, services this combat aircraft. In June, the US agreed to sell 25 more F-35 fighter jets to Israel.
More than 70 Australian companies have been awarded over $4.13 billion in global production and sustainment contracts through the F-35 program so far.
Minister Marles and Foreign Minister Penny Wong both recently referred to Australia’s export of ‘non-lethal parts’, having spent eight months insisting: ‘Australia is not sending weapons to Israel and has not done so for the past five years.’
Israel is accused of committing genocide in Gaza in a case that is before the International Court of Justice. Israel is also accused of deliberately causing the starvation of Palestinians in Gaza, according to the International Criminal Court. Australia’s response to both cases has been muted, at best.
Non-lethal’ parts
The F-35 would not operate without all its parts and components. Australia remains the sole source of a number of them, as I reported for Declassified Australia in April.
The proposition that the Australian parts used in a lethal weapon system could be separately considered ‘non-lethal’ indicates a government intent on damage control.
‘Lethal’ is the first word that arms manufacturer Lockheed Martin uses to describe its F-35 fighter jet. It markets the aircraft as the most lethal fighter jet in the world.
In a testament to that, in March the F-35A version was operationally certified to carry a nuclear bomb – the first fighter jet or bomber to be granted nuclear-capable status since the 1990s
The UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) makes no mention of the lethality of the individual parts or components that comprise the weapons (“conventional arms”) it covers.
Two weeks ago, the UN published a damning report on Israel’s extensive use of heavy bombs with wide area effects in densely populated areas in Gaza since 7 October: ‘The scale of human death and destruction wrought by Israel’s bombing of Gaza…has been immense.’
High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said: ‘The requirement to select means and methods of warfare that avoid or at the very least minimise to every extent civilian harm appears to have been consistently violated in Israel’s bombing campaign.’
Last December, the head of the F-35 joint program office, Lieutenant General Michael Schmidt, gave evidence at a US Congressional hearing that confirmed Israel was using its F-35s in the bombing attacks.
Lt-Gen Schmidt said the F-35 program office had been moving ‘at a breakneck speed to support…Israel…by increasing spare part supply rates’.
Lockheed Martin has acknowledged that ‘every F-35 built contains some Australian parts and components’.
The government’s ‘non-lethal parts’ messaging is at odds with a significant UN statement issued on 20 June, which included and named multinational arms companies in its call to cease supplying Israel with arms, ‘even if [the arms transfers] are executed under existing export licenses’.
Under the headline ‘States and companies must end arms transfers to Israel immediately or risk responsibility for human rights violations’, the statement named 11 multinationals – including Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Rheinmetall and RTX/Raytheon – which all have significant operations in Australia.
These companies, by sending weapons, parts, components, and ammunition to Israeli forces, risk being complicit in serious violations of international human rights and international humanitarian laws,’ the statement said.
Government in damage control
The Albanese government was forced to employ new language following evidence given by a Defence Department official in a recent Senate Estimates hearing………………………………………………..
What is a ‘weapon’?
The senior ministers were forced to change tack because the favoured line of all Labor MPs since Israel launched its newest and deadliest war against Palestine has cracked under sustained scrutiny.
The carefully crafted statement that ‘Australia is not sending weapons to Israel and has not done so for the past five years’ contains two elements designed to mislead: ‘weapons’ and ‘to Israel’.
All Labor MPs, including the Prime Minister, use the word ‘weapons’ repeatedly without defining it, knowing the vast majority of Australians will assume it means ‘weapons’ in the usual broad sense.
However, the government is cynically relying on a narrow military definition.
The Defence Department’s Hugh Jeffrey, in a previous Senate hearing, said the Department’s chosen definition of ‘weapon’ was ‘derived from’ definitions in the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), ‘which classifies what weapons are’.
‘Under the UN definition, weapons are defined as whole systems, like armoured vehicles, tanks and combat helicopters,’ he said……………………………………………..
UN experts referred to the Geneva Conventions when warning countries that any transfer of weapons or ammunition to Israel that would be used in Gaza was likely to violate international humanitarian law:
‘States must accordingly refrain from transferring any weapon or ammunition – or parts for them – if it is expected…that they would be used to violate international law.
Such transfers are prohibited even if the exporting State does not intend the arms to be used in violation of the law…as long as there is a clear risk.’
This article was first published at Declassified Australia on 1 July 2024, https://undueinfluence.substack.com/p/decoded-defence-departments-deadly?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=297295&post_id=146424013&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
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