Antinuclear

The biggest, riskiest diplomatic trip of his presidency—the summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un—is set to take place next month, and Donald Trump shows no signs of comprehending the issues or interests at stake.

Two statements from last week should have set off alarm bells that the president is not remotely ready for prime time.

The first came on Thursday, during a rambling, campaign rally–like speech in Ohio. At one point, Trump mentioned his recently reached trade deal with South Korea, saying, “I may hold it up until after a deal is made with North Korea. You know why? Because it’s a very strong card. And I want to make sure everyone is treated fairly.”

Within a few hours, aides to South Korean President Moon Jae-in were seeking clarification on the statement, working through various channels to understand Trump’s “true intentions.”Good luck on that.

I’ve sought some clarification myself, to no avail. The remark was either utterly incoherent or a terrible blunder. The former—yet another instance of Trump’s incoherence—is the likelier explanation. It’s not at all clear why Trump should hold up a trade deal with South Korea, pending the results of nuclear talks with North Korea. The two have little or nothing to do with each other.

But impolitic incompetence should never be dismissed as a source of confusion. Moon will be meeting with Kim—another historic first—on April 27 at Peace House, near the North-South border. It is expected that their meeting will tee up the issues, and to some degree set the agenda, for Kim’s meeting with Trump a few weeks later. Trump’s relations with Moon are rife with tensions. Trump has harshly criticized Seoul for fair-trade violations (and is said to see the new trade deal as an imperfect solution); he often grumbles that the South Koreans should pay more for their own defense and has threatened to withdraw U.S. forces from the region if they don’t—thus arousing fears, in South Korea and Japan, that Trump might do just that in exchange for a promise by North Korea to freeze or cut back its nuclear arsenal.

Trump’s remark in Ohio could be read as a threat to Moon: Push Kim hard on his nuclear weapons, maybe even get him to agree to dismantle them in advance of the U.S. summit—do the heavy lifting for us—or forget about the new trade deal. ……….

Does Trump have any idea what sorts of “phased, synchronized measures” he would like North Korea to take—and what sorts of measures he would permit the United States to take at the same time? For example, as a first step, North Korea could extend its freeze on nuclear testing and open up its production and test sites to international inspection—with the United States simultaneously removing some sanctions. What would be the second, third, and fourth synchronized measures, and what would be the ultimate goal—the finishing line of these steps? These are issues to be discussed by experts, debated in National Security Council meetings, and decided very carefully by the president and his top advisers. If officials at the State Department, the Pentagon, and the NSC aren’t already well into this project, they’re starting way too late.

It’s also worth noting that Trump’s incoming national security adviser, John Bolton, has spoken out against the whole concept of phased, synchronized measures, demanding that Kim dismantle his nuclear arsenal, all at once, and urging the United States to launch a first strike if he refuses. Will he offer Trump the same advice, now that he’s off Fox News and inside the White House? Will Trump listen? And who’s still around to offer countervailing advice?

Kim Jong-un will come to both negotiations—the one with Moon near the DMZ and the one with Trump at a location not yet determined—with a goal, an agenda, and a bag of bargaining tactics. He may also have sought and won consent for his approach (though there’s no way of knowing this) during his meeting in Beijing with Xi. Unless something dramatic happens in the next few weeks, Trump will arrive at the summit with no firm grip on a strategy or tactics—and wavering support from, and for, his allies. He may come instead with the cloak of an unearned self-confidence that he can prevail with a deal through his charisma and instincts. For this kind of deal, that won’t be enough. https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/04/does-trump-even-know-what-he-wants-from-kim-jong-un.html