Antinuclear

The majority of transitions between politics and the Australian defence sector pass unremarked, with only an occasional high profile name making media headlines. It is a career pathway which has been normalised. This despite the sensitive nature of defence and the astronomical size of the nation’s defence spending.

A recent example is the 21 February 2020 appointment to the Thales Australia board of one of the nation’s most senior intelligence chiefs, former ASIO boss Duncan Lewis, which barely rated a mention. Nine newspapers were an exception in noting the appointment, but there were no hard questions asked and no analysis by Nine as to the implications of this swift move into the private sector by such a powerful well-connected person: a move into an industry over which Lewis until recently had had oversight.

Upon his appointment to the Thales board, Lewis had only been out of ASIO for five months, having spent five years as its Director-General. ASIO was his final public sector role in a long career that also spanned the military, the departments of the prime minister and cabinet and defence, as well as diplomatic roles.

Thales is the world’s 10th largest weapons-making corporation; a French multinational that also encompasses cybersecurity and space projects. It also owns 35 per cent of Naval Group, the lead contractor of the $80 billion Future Submarines project. Thales Australia is a multi-billion-dollar contractor to the Australian government.

When respected senior leaders such as Lewis leave public service for the weapons industry, they take with them extensive contacts, deep institutional knowledge, and rare and privileged access to the highest levels of government. Their presence in the private sector serves to affirm and entrench the influence of the weapons industry on government decision-making. The public interest risks becoming conflated with corporate interests.

In addition to these issues, the well-trodden path from public service into such industry appointments raises the troubling possibility that some senior decision-makers on defence and national security matters, with an eye on possible future board appointments or consulting roles (whether consciously or not), might favour a certain proposal over another, or become hesitant to make decisions that could displease corporate interests. How would the public they serve ever know?

A notable example in this context is Christopher Pyne, who was found to have engaged in discussions with EY while still in office as defence minister and a member of the cabinet, and subsequently accepted a consulting role with EY Defence just nine days after leaving politics. ……. https://www.michaelwest.com.au/brothers-in-arms-the-high-rotation-revolving-door-between-the-australian-government-and-arms-merchants/