Submission re AUKUS. Undemocratic decision, strategically flawed, fiscal madness

Submission re AUKUS. Undemocratic decision, strategically flawed, fiscal madness – Anonymous

24. Anonymous

Submission to the AUKUS Public Inquiry

Executive Summary
This submission argues that the AUKUS agreement, announced in 2021 without
public consultation or a parliamentary vote, is a strategically flawed, fiscally
catastrophic, and democratically illegitimate proposal. The planned acquisition of
up to eight nuclear-powered submarines at an estimated cost of $368 billion over
30 years is not a defence strategy but an act of imperial subordination. It will not
secure Australia; it will make Australia a permanent forward target in a
great-power conflict that does not serve its people’s interests.

I call for an immediate moratorium, a reallocation of the vast majority of the
proposed funds towards genuine human and ecological security, and a complete
reorientation towards defensive, transparent, and regionally cooperative defence
postures.

The Democratic Deficit: A Backroom Pact Without a People’s Mandate. The most damning fact about AUKUS is not merely its cost or its nuclear risk, but
its origin. It was announced as a fait accompli—a secretive pact between three
heads of government, bypassing Parliament, the press, and the public. In what
functional democracy does a $368 billion commitment spanning three decades
occur without a single national debate?

I submit that the Inquiry must state plainly: the process itself is a failure of
sovereignty. A decision that binds every Australian, every First Nations person,
and every future generation must be subjected to a parliamentary vote and, given
the nuclear dimension, a national referendum. The absence of either is a stain on
Australian governance.

The Fiscal Madness: $368 Billion as a Monument to Misallocated Sacrifice

Let us be mathematically precise. $368 billion over 30 years is approximately
$12.3 billion per year. That is not a rounding error in the defence budget; it is the
annual equivalent of Australia’s entire higher education funding, or roughly double
the annual expenditure on the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), or the
full cost of transitioning the national electricity grid to 100 per cent renewable
energy with storage.

The advocates of AUKUS speak of “value for money”. But value for whom? The
primary beneficiaries are foreign corporations: General Dynamics Electric Boat
(United States), BAE Systems (United Kingdom), and Lockheed Martin (United
States). Australian taxpayers will pay, Australian workers will build
foreign-designed components, and Australian ports will host foreign-controlled
nuclear material. When cost overruns occur—and they will, as every major military
procurement programme in history has shown—the Australian Treasury will absorb
the blow while corporate profits remain protected.

I am told this is a matter of national security. Yet history teaches that the phrase
“national security” is often used to shield decisions that cannot survive public
scrutiny. Strategic decisions affecting the fate of millions should not be made in
secret by a handful of political leaders. The American and British leaders who
signed AUKUS knew that if they went to the Australian people and said, “We are
cancelling hospitals and housing to buy American-made submarines powered by
foreign-owned nuclear reactors”, the answer would have been a resounding no. So
they did not ask.

Consider the opportunity cost. With $12 billion annually, Australia could:
Build 50,000 units of public housing each year, eliminating homelessness within a
decade.
Fund free public university education for every Australian student.
Establish a Pacific Climate Resilience Fund that would make Australia the
undisputed leader in regional cooperation rather than a gunboat power.
Develop a world-class, land-based air and missile defence network using
conventional, unmanned, and distributed systems—far more survivable than eight
large nuclear submarines.

In my view, the AUKUS submarines are not a defence investment; they are a fiscal
black hole dressed in naval uniform.

The Nuclear Gambit: A Covenant with Catastrophe

Nuclear propulsion is not like diesel propulsion. It is a technology that carries a
half-life measured in millennia, and Australia has no civilian nuclear power
industry, no nuclear waste storage facility, no deep geological repository, and no
public consensus on hosting radioactive materials.

Where will the spent nuclear fuel be stored? The United States and United
Kingdom have explicitly refused to take back Australian waste under current
arrangements. That means high-level radioactive waste will remain on Australian
soil—probably near coastal bases, probably on or near Indigenous land, and
probably for a period longer than the entire history of European settlement on this
continent. The Northern Territory, South Australia, and Western Australia have all
fought against proposed facilities for low-level waste. Now Australians are expected to accept a permanent high-level waste stream without a single
community agreeing to host it.

And what of the operational risks? A nuclear submarine fire in dock—as occurred
on HMS Superb in 2011 and USS Miami in 2012—could release radioactive
particles over a major Australian city. A collision underwater, a grounding in the
Great Barrier Reef, or a reactor coolant leak in the Tasman Sea: each scenario
represents a potential environmental and humanitarian disaster. I submit that the
Inquiry must demand full liability disclosure. Who pays for a nuclear accident in
Sydney Harbour? At present, the answer is simple: nobody knows.

The non-proliferation argument is equally hollow. For decades, Australia has
lectured the world on the importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Now it is importing weapons-grade uranium, or highly enriched fuel, aboard
foreign warships operating from Australian ports. Our neighbours in the
Pacific—who still bear the scars of French, British, and American nuclear
testing—watch with alarm. In my view, AUKUS does not strengthen the
non-proliferation regime; it undermines Australia’s moral authority to speak
against nuclear proliferation elsewhere. it undermines Australia’s moral authority to speak
against nuclear proliferation elsewhere.

The Strategic Illusion: Buying Vulnerability, Not Security The strategic rationale for AUKUS rests on a single claim: that nuclear-powered submarines are essential to counter China’s growing naval power in the
Indo-Pacific. I believe this claim fails on three grounds: geography, doctrine, and
escalation.

Geography Australia’s strategic interest lies in its immediate neighbourhood—the archipelagos
of South-East Asia, the South Pacific, and the eastern Indian Ocean. Nuclear
submarines are blue-water platforms designed for global power projection, not
littoral defence. The chokepoints through which Australian submarines would need
to transit—the Lombok Strait, the Ombai Strait, and the Torres Strait—are readily
monitored by undersea sensors. In wartime, those chokepoints become killing
zones.

A cheaper, more survivable alternative exists: a fleet of smaller conventionally
powered submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP), combined
with distributed minefields, long-range land-based anti-ship missiles, and
unmanned underwater vehicles. These systems are available today, cost a fraction
of AUKUS, and do not require nuclear reactors.

Doctrine Who commands these submarines in a crisis? Under AUKUS, they will be built with
American combat systems, American weapons, and integrated into American
naval command structures. Australia is effectively purchasing a ticket to ride on
American strategic decision-making. Yet American strategic decisions are made in
Washington, not Canberra.

In a Taiwan Strait conflict, the United States may decide to use Australian
submarines as forward-deployed assets without Australian parliamentary approval.
In my view, the submarines become triggers for war, not deterrents against it.

Escalation. Nuclear submarines are high-value targets. An adversary confronting AUKUS
submarines will not simply ignore them. It will pre-position hunter-killer
submarines, deploy anti-submarine warfare aircraft, and, if necessary, target the
bases that host them, including HMAS Stirling in Western Australia.

In a major conflict, those bases become legitimate military targets. I believe that
the very act of acquiring these submarines makes Australian territory a target in a
war not of Australia’s making. This is not defence. It is a strategic dependency with
potentially catastrophic consequences.

The Human Cost: First Nations and Forgotten Communities

This submission would be incomplete without recognising the specific impact on
First Nations peoples. The AUKUS agreement was signed without the free, prior,
and informed consent of the Traditional Owners of the lands and waters where
bases will be expanded or constructed. HMAS Stirling on Garden Island (Western
Australia) is situated on Whadjuk Noongar land. The proposed east coast base
locations—potentially Port Kembla (Dharawal Country), Brisbane (Turrbal and
Jagera Country), or Newcastle (Awabakal and Worimi Country)—all lie on unceded
territories. or Newcastle (Awabakal and Worimi Country)—all lie on unceded
territories.

Where will nuclear waste be stored? The most geologically stable locations in Australia are often remote areas, many of which are subject to Native Title claims
or contain sites of cultural significance. The history of nuclear colonialism in
Australia is long. From Maralinga to the Monte Bello Islands, Indigenous communities have borne the burden of British and Australian nuclear testing.

In my view, AUKUS threatens to repeat that history. Radioactive waste, once
created, cannot be unmade. It will remain on or near Indigenous land for
thousands of years—a radioactive monument to a decision made in a foreign
capital without a single Indigenous voice in the room.

I submit that the Inquiry must demand a dedicated process of Indigenous consent,
not merely consultation. Consent includes the right to say no. Without that right, the process is a sham.

Recommendation 3: A New Defensive Naval Strategy

The Australian Defence Force should develop and fund a defensive, affordable, and
transparent naval strategy centred on:

Twelve conventionally powered, air-independent propulsion submarines built in
Australia with technology transfer from non-nuclear states.

A distributed network of land-based anti-ship missile batteries with a range
exceeding 500 kilometres, covering northern approaches.

Unmanned underwater and surface vessels for surveillance and mine warfare.

A legislated doctrine requiring a parliamentary declaration of war before Australian
forces may be deployed in offensive first-strike roles.

Recommendation 4: Indigenous Consent and Nuclear Waste Prohibition

No AUKUS-related facility should be built, expanded, or operated on land subject to
Native Title or Aboriginal Land Rights without the free, prior, and informed consent
of the relevant Traditional Owners, including a legally enforceable right of veto.

Furthermore, the storage of any high-level nuclear waste from AUKUS submarines
on Australian territory should be prohibited unless and until a standalone,
community-approved, multi-party national waste strategy is enacted. As of 2026,
no such strategy exists.

Recommendation 5: Regional Diplomatic Reorientation

The Australian Government should convene a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone
(SPNFZ) review in partnership with Pacific Islands Forum members to reaffirm and
strengthen regional opposition to nuclear propulsion, radioactive waste, and
nuclear weapons.

Any implementation of AUKUS should be subject to the approval of SPNFZ parties.

Conclusion

I recognise the necessity of defence, the brutality of war, and the importance of
industrial mobilisation in times of national crisis. History demonstrates that
societies are capable of extraordinary transformation when resources are directed
towards genuine national priorities. In my view, AUKUS does the opposite. Rather
than strengthening Australia’s sovereignty, it risks transforming Australia into a
forward operating base within a wider strategic rivalry dominated by larger
powers.

AUKUS is not a defence plan. It is a debt plan. It is a waste plan. It is a radioactive
legacy that will outlive every person in this room. It was signed in secret, sold as
security, and financed by borrowing against our children’s future. The submarines,
if built, will not necessarily deter war; they may instead ensure that Australia
becomes an early target in any major conflict.

The only thing more expensive than cancelling AUKUS is proceeding with it.
Cancellation costs political pride. Proceeding may cost far more.

I urge the Commissioners to recommend cancellation. Failing that, I urge them to
recommend a moratorium, a referendum, and a substantial reallocation of funds
towards housing, healthcare, climate resilience, and genuine human security
rather than the military ambitions of great powers.