The tragedy of AUKUS
AUKUS is a grotesque demonstration of the singular inability of Australian governments to question the value of these arrangements or the wisdom of America’s strategic outlook, especially when it comes to the Asia-Pacific region. All this at a time when US hegemonic power is in visible decline, and when such compliance will carry ever greater risks and financial costs.
And not the slightest attempt to consult with the public, let alone initiate a genuine national conversation on Australia’s security options, in what is a period of far-reaching change that is transforming both the regional and global landscape.
Joseph Camilleri, June 19, 2026, https://pearlsandirritations.com/post/2026/06/the-tragedy-of-aukus/
In his submission to the AUKUS Public Inquiry, Joe Camilleri argues revoking AUKUS must be part of wider reassessment of Australia’s place in the world.
The decision to become a party to the AUKUS security agreement stands as one of the saddest decisions ever made by an Australian government.
It was a decision made for the wrong reasons, in the wrong way, with unfortunate outcomes in the last five years and dire consequences looming in the years ahead.
Will the submarines be delivered on time? Will they have the desired state-of-the-art capabilities? Will they deliver the desired number of jobs? These are no doubt relevant questions, but they hardly go to the heart of the matter.
What is it that makes the AUKUS pact such an ill-considered and harmful policy initiative?
The entire decision-making process from its birth to the present has been thoroughly undemocratic. The discussions that led to the agreement in September 2021 were conducted in complete secrecy. And since then, government has said or done little to take the Australian public into its confidence. The costs, be they economic, environmental, diplomatic or cultural have not been seriously addressed, nor have the alleged benefits, nor how the project will proceed in practice, nor indeed how future decisions will be made and by whom. All this has been justified by repeating the time-worn and utterly duplicitous mantra of national security.
The first statement announcing the establishment of AUKUS told us that the intention was ’to meet the challenges of the 21st century’, but with great care taken to leave the nature of these challenges unspecified. The partnership, it was claimed, would ‘deepen cooperation on a range of security and defence capabilities’, but little was said as to why enhanced defence cooperation was needed at this time, and even less as to what such cooperation would achieve in practice. Yet, within hours of being briefed the then leader of the opposition, Anthony Albanese affirmed Labor’s full support for AUKUS.
In the years that followed little has been said as to the function of the submarines, or the objectives to be served by trilateral defence cooperation. The concluding sentence of the Joint Leaders statement of March 2023 bears quoting in full:
We believe in a world that protects freedom and respects human rights, the rule of law, the independence of sovereign states and the rules-based international order. The steps we are announcing today will help us to advance these mutually beneficial objectives in the decades to come.
The question ‘how was this to be done?’ was left conveniently unaddressed.
The closest thing to an explanation of Australia’s underlying strategy was the reference by Defence Minister Richard Marles to the ‘complex strategic landscape’ that now prevailed in the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region and what he described as ’the biggest conventional military build-up that we have seen since the end of the Second World War’. In subsequent statements, Marles made it clear that the offender was China. As a trading island nation, Australia had no option but to enhance its capacity ’to project with impact’.
In the days that followed, countless words have been uttered inside and outside Parliament, but to this day the justification offered for the AUKUS partnership remains riddled with ambiguity, inconsistency and evasion. At no time has it been made clear:
- What are the specific strategic contingencies for which the submarines are intended?
- How does AUKUS fit within Australia’s broader security policies?
- What alternative security strategies were evaluated?
- What are the assumptions regarding China’s future behaviour that underpin the AUKUS decision?
And not the slightest attempt to consult with the public, let alone initiate a genuine national conversation on Australia’s security options, in what is a period of far-reaching change that is transforming both the regional and global landscape.
The democratic deficit becomes even more troubling, given the failure to consult the First Nations despite the fact that AUKUS implementation, including submarine operations, infrastructure, training, industrial production, weapons support and maritime transit, will affect a large part of Australian land and seas. The simple fact is that AUKUS carries far-reaching implications for:
- Native Title rights recognised under Australian law
- Land rights under legislation such as the Northern Territory’s Aboriginal Land Rights Act
- Indigenous interests in sea country and coastal waters
- Heritage protection relating to sacred sites and cultural landscapes
- Rights to consultation regarding the economic, environmental and cultural implications of land use and development projects.
As a consequence of the unfortunate experiences associated with earlier defence projects, Indigenous communities are especially concerned about the likely impact of AUKUS-related activities. These concerns cannot be adequately addressed piecemeal as individual facilities are about to be developed. An immediate and systematic assessment of Indigenous rights, needs and preferences with the full participation and oversight of Indigenous communities is the only viable approach. The consultation should extend to the very rationale of the AUKUS project, since it will impact so many spaces across Country, over which, let’s not forget, the First Nations have never ceded sovereignty. When dealing with the larger questions posed by the AUKUS adventure, a dose of Indigenous wisdom would not go astray.
The rationale for the AUKUS pact rests largely on the frequently insinuated assumption – never openly stated or adequately explained – that China poses a major threat to Australian security. This assessment rests on a questionable understanding of Chinese interests and intentions, and the methods by which China seeks to expand its influence regionally and globally.
Labor, it is true, has managed to stabilise somewhat the parlous state of relations with China, including the resumption of ministerial visits between the two countries, which eventually led to Albanese’s visit to Beijing in November 2023. Importantly, most Chinese trade sanctions imposed on Australian products in 2020–21 have been lifted.
However, after four years in office, the Albanese government still depicts China as a rising power whose aggressive posturing is matched by a much expanded capacity to flex military muscle.
China, it is true, has steadily increased its military spending, which rose from $286 billion in 2020 to an estimated $312 billion in 2025. Similarly, it has expanded its military presence both in the South China Sea and around Taiwan. None of this suggests that either its military spending or its ability to project military power regionally, let alone globally, are on a scale remotely comparable to that of the United States.
Successive US administrations have nevertheless used China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the heightened tensions in relation with Taiwan to justify an expanded US naval presence on China’s doorstep, a position Australian governments have seen fit to support. AUKUS is therefore best understood as an expression of US strategic priorities, and Australia’s participation in AUKUS as yet another demonstration of Australia’s longstanding alignment with the United States.
Simply put, Australian governments remain wedded to the view that Australia’s security ultimately depends on protection by the United States. AUKUS begins to make sense once it is seen to be part of an overarching strategic orientation that includes ever higher levels of interoperability with the US military, multifaceted defence cooperation greatly facilitated by the 2014 Defence posture agreement, intimate links with US intelligence operations, and heavy reliance on the acquisition of expensive US military hardware.
AUKUS is a grotesque demonstration of the singular inability of Australian governments to question the value of these arrangements or the wisdom of America’s strategic outlook, especially when it comes to the Asia-Pacific region. All this at a time when US hegemonic power is in visible decline, and when such compliance will carry ever greater risks and financial costs.
The root of the problem lies in the addiction to imperial power that holds sway in the minds of many among Australia’s political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence elites. They see themselves as having unique access to an exclusive and powerful club that confers not just safety, but status and privilege – once the British club, now the American club. They have reluctantly accepted the demise of the former, but are not reconciled to the slow but steady decline of the latter. They feel most comfortable when connected to the anglophone world and, at best uneasy, when dealing with the East. This is the meaning and tragedy of AUKUS.
Senior Labor ministers, with an eye on the next election, see no value in provoking the ire of the security establishment that includes influential voices in the armed forces and the various security and intelligence agencies but also powerful elements in the civil bureaucracy, the media, think tanks and an array of other pressure groups, not least the defence industry.
Ultimately, the greatest cost of AUKUS and associated entanglements is not the financial outlay, but the continued entanglement with an imperial power in decline. Technological sophistication, high levels of military spending, and the flexing of military muscle on a global scale do not readily translate into military victory or political control. The deadly and largely ineffectual war on terror, the disastrous war in Iraq, the protracted conflict and humiliating retreat in Afghanistan, the unholy mess in Libya and Syria, and the unfolding tragedy in the Middle East, not least the folly of the Iran war, all point to the fragility and limits of US power.
The AUKUS misadventure is a highly damaging distraction that prevents Australia from addressing the crucially important task of assessing and responding to the pressing regional and global threats ahead.
Revoking the AUKUS agreement is an urgent necessity. Such a step, however, must be part of wider reassessment of Australia’s place in the world. Australia as a nation needs to pause and consider the very meaning of security in the light of the profound geopolitical, environmental, economic, technological and cultural transformation currently under way. The militarisation of security discourse and practice poses new and unprecedented dangers.
The overemphasis on military threats needs to give way to notion of human security where the accent is on reconciling divergent histories, interests and grievances within and between countries, rather than on fuelling arms races between expanding and ever costlier military arsenals.
What Australia needs more than ever is to strive for a security policy framework founded on three key principles: common security (Australia cannot be or feel secure unless its Asian and Pacific neighbours also feel secure); cooperative security (security can be achieved only when countries act in concert, bringing to the table diverse energies, resources and insights); comprehensive security (there is more to security than protection from external military threats – security also includes economic, cultural and ecological security).
Crucial to this enterprise is finding a pathway to a substantive and durable Australia–China security and cultural dialogue – to be developed in close consultation and cooperation with Asian and Pacific neighbours.
Conveying this perspective and recommendations that flow from it to the Australian government and more generally to the Australian parliament may serve some useful purpose. But such an exercise is unlikely to achieve a great deal in the short-to-medium term. The more pressing need is to address this assessment of the road ahead to the nation as a whole, and to the diverse organisations that make up Australia’s civil society.
In the light of the AUKUS fiasco, the urgent challenge before us is to cultivate an informed, respectful and ongoing national conversation about Australia’s place in the world, and the contribution it can and should make to its own security in tandem with the security of its neighbours, the security of the entire human family, and, of course, the security of the planet.
Underestimating the potential impacts of attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities
| Tilman Ruff, Jun 24, 2026 |
I worked with Kristina Kukolja, a journalist who obtained (heavily redacted) FOI files about the Australian government’s assessment and responses to Israel/US attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2025 and 2026. Its clear the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency underestimated the possible resultant radiological releases. Australia was one of the first countries to support those attacks both in 2025 and 2026 on the basis that any measures to avoid Iran acquiring nuclear weapons were a good thing, despite criticising Russia’s attacks on nuclear facilities in Ukraine.
Close monitoring of developments and modelling of possible scenarios including worst-case scenarios from attacks on nuclear facilities is something one would expect any responsible government to undertake and to use as the basis for informing and protecting their staff and the public, particularly the substantial number of Australian citizens in the Middle East (at least 115,000).
An additional reason for Australia to thoroughly assess attacks by allies on nuclear power plants is that during 2025-6 Australia chairs the IAEA board of governors. In relation to both Ukraine and the Middle East, the IAEA Director General has been consistently calling out the severe radiological risks of military attacks on nuclear facilities and calling for such attacks, in violation of international law, to end. Australia’s position here was clearly divergent from the IAEA’s.
One wonders whether underestimating the potential risks and keeping the assessments secret might be connected with an incentive to downplay the risks for political reasons. See article in the last Saturday Paper (below)_ o you don’t get stuck behind a paywall.
A year ago the government began receiving modelling on radiation risks from the war in the
Middle East, which experts say understated the danger and should be made public.
Exclusive: DFAT’s secret nuclear briefings
By Kristina Kukolja, Jun 24, 2026
Documents obtained under freedom of information show that a year ago the
Australian government began secretly receiving detailed modelling of radiation risks
from the war in the Middle East and the protective action Australian citizens may
need to take, but did not share this with Australians in the region.
American and Israeli strikes on sites in Iran and Iran’s retaliation against US targets
prompted the Australian government agency responsible for nuclear safety to
produce numerous reports to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) –
at times, on a daily basis – detailing “credible worst-case scenarios” for possible
nuclear incidents in Iran, Israel and the United Arab Emirates.
The reports outline protective measures such as evacuation, sheltering and
restrictions of food and drinking water. Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear
Safety Agency (ARPANSA) experts also briefed the Inter-Departmental Emergency
Task Force (IDETF), convened to manage Australia’s response to the war, chaired by DFAT and attended by top government agencies including the Australian Defence
Force.
The Saturday Paper asked DFAT whether it had informed citizens about the
government’s monitoring and modelling for nuclear worst-case scenarios; whether
diplomatic staff were told to prepare food and water supplies; whether other
Australians, including military personnel, received the same advice; and whether
Australian embassies had secured supplies of potassium iodide tablets for
distribution.
DFAT declined to respond to these questions. A spokesperson said the department
“maintains internal contingency action plans at all Australian embassies and
consulates, intended to respond to crises and support Australians overseas.
Requests for technical advice, such as modelling, are part of prudent, scenario-
based planning and help inform our understanding of how an incident could affect
Australians in different locations.”
As the strikes escalated around nuclear facilities this year, an email to ARPANSA
staff from the emergency management project leader on March 9 said: “DFAT is
facing a major consular crisis, with many Australians unable to return home.
“It’s important to be supportive and respectful of their situation … We should also not
overwhelm DFAT or crowd their decision space unnecessarily.”
At the time of that update, there were about 115,000 Australians in the Middle East,
says DFAT – 24,000 in the UAE.
The results of ARPANSA’s modelling should be made “widely and promptly publicly
available … to inform Australians in making travel or evacuation decisions and be
better equipped to take timely protective measures”, says Dr Tilman Ruff, co-founder
of the Nobel Prize-winning International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
(ICAN), based in Australia.
The radiation assessment reports and electronic correspondence released under
freedom of information are heavily redacted, including on the grounds that disclosing
certain information could damage the Commonwealth’s defence or international
relations.
In a statement, ARPANSA says the reports were prepared “for a specific operational
purpose but shared more broadly across government, including through the IDETF”
and “informed public-facing messaging, including through Smartraveller”.
The Smartraveller website provides general advice on nuclear incidents. Despite the
Middle East war, Ukraine is still the only country where Australians have been
specifically warned about a nuclear risk, stating that Russian actions “pose a threat
to Ukraine’s nuclear power plants”.
ARPANSA’s reports to DFAT began in June 2025 after Israel attacked Iranian
nuclear sites and scientists, followed by US strikes the Trump administration
declared had obliterated Iran’s nuclear facilities. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese
said Australia, which had just taken over chairing the International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors, supported the attacks, on the grounds they were
designed to prevent Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon.
The assessments contain plume modelling – how far radiation could spread – and
exposure estimates for 48 hours after a possible incident at facilities such as the
targeted Natanz and Fordow fuel enrichment plants and Isfahan nuclear technology
centre. Projected plumes from Israel’s Dimona nuclear research facility and Iran’s
Bushehr nuclear power station – potentially causing the “greatest radiological
hazard” – reached neighbouring countries, including Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Qatar and the UAE.
“A military attack, even unintentional, could cause a catastrophic
nuclear accident such as Chernobyl or Fukushima.”
One simulation on June 20 last year showed radiation from a potential Bushehr
incident extending hundreds of kilometres into the Persian Gulf to Abu Dhabi and
Dubai, where Australian civilians and diplomatic staff are based, and the Al Minhad
Air Base, where Australian troops are stationed. While the report noted low
radiological risks for Australian “embassy locations in Kuwait City, Doha, Riyadh and
Bahrain”, the unredacted section did not address cities that would be affected by the
plume.
At the same time, IAEA director-general Rafael Grossi told the United Nations
Security Council an operating nuclear power plant hosts thousands of kilograms of
nuclear material, and a direct hit, or hits to electricity supply, could cause its reactor
core to melt, potentially causing “a very high release of radioactivity to the
environment”.
In the worst case, Grossi said, protective actions would be required: “evacuations and sheltering of the population or the need to take stable iodine, with the reach
extending to distances from a few to several hundred kilometres. Radiation
monitoring would need to cover distances of several hundred kilometres and food
restrictions may need to be implemented.”
“Are we getting this wrong?” asked ARPANSA’s emergency project leader in an
email to a redacted recipient on June 21 referencing DFAT concerns that Grossi’s
comments differed from earlier assessments.
ARPANSA’s subsequent report assured there was no conflict, citing findings of
“similar distances for urgent protective action”. Declassified text messages between
agency staff acknowledge that environmental damage “would be a big issue
following the event”.
The agency’s worst-case scenario for Bushehr involved a “station blackout due to
loss of power after damage to plant infrastructure and backup power supply”.
“Although it is not an ideal state for a nuclear reactor, the backup systems mean that
a core meltdown would not be an immediate concern,” the report stated.
Tilman Ruff says this assessment “unduly downplays the real risks, particularly when
the cause of loss of external power is a major aerial bombardment, which risks
widespread and uncontrolled damage to plant systems.”
Ruff says the reports show the “greatest radiological risks in Iran and Israel arise
from damage to the Bushehr power plant, with 3000 megawatts of thermal capacity,
much larger than the next largest facility between the two countries, the Dimona
nuclear site, with a reactor estimated at 150MWt. Yet in none of the scenarios is the
possibility of damage to reactor containment included for Bushehr, as it is for smaller
reactors at Soreq, Tehran and Dimona.”
He says the reports also fail to specify scenarios involving a core meltdown, reactor
explosion or fire, “or consideration of spent fuel pools, which often contain larger and
longer-lived amounts of radioactive materials than are present in reactor cores”.
Professor Tatsujiro Suzuki, former vice-chairman of Japan’s Atomic Energy
Commission, agrees spent fuel pools are “the most vulnerable part of the nuclear
power project”.
“A military attack, even unintentional, could cause a catastrophic nuclear accident
such as Chernobyl or Fukushima.”
Over time “the radiation consequences could reach India or Pakistan, potentially the
Mediterranean area or even northern Europe”.
When the US and Israel launched new attacks on Iran in February, ARPANSA’s
Radiation Emergency Coordination Centre (RECC) in Melbourne was placed “on
heightened readiness”.
New reports from the RECC warned a large release of radioactive material from
Bushehr or the UAE’s Barakah nuclear power plant could see “radioactive
contamination deposited on land used for food production and in water bodies” in the
region. In worst-case events, they say, embassy staff may need to take protective
actions including sheltering in place with doors and windows sealed and awaiting
further advice.
“Use of potassium iodide tablets may be directed. As a precautionary measure, and
if feasible, having a short-term stockpile of food and water (seven days) at the
Kuwait and Doha embassies may be prudent to avoid ingesting potentially
contaminated food and water … And to provide additional reassurance to embassy
staff as they are within several hundred kilometres of the reactor site.”
Throughout March and into April, the period covered by the 2026 documents, Iran
reported strikes on multiple nuclear sites to the IAEA, including the Bushehr power
plant. Missiles were also reported near Israel’s Dimona facility. No off-site radiation
was recorded, but Rafael Grossi repeatedly warned attacks on Bushehr threaten a
“major radiological accident affecting a large area in Iran and beyond”.
In late March, DFAT requested radiation projections for possible nuclear incidents in
Pakistan, Türkiye, Syria, Armenia and Iraq. The 2026 modelling generally indicated more severe off-site releases than the 2025 assessments, says Tilman Ruff.
“The maps also depict higher levels of radioactive fallout, with potential exposure
near multiple facilities, including the relatively small research reactors at Soreq and
Tehran reaching over 50 mSv [millisieverts]. The estimated exposures are
significantly greater for Isfahan, Natanz and Fordow enrichment sites.”
Kristina Kukolja is a Walkley Award-winning journalist and broadcaster.
AUKUS has a big waste issue – and not only money
The fundamental problem is that the AUKUS agreement was negotiated in secret in 2021 by the leaders of the three countries involved, Australia, Britain and the US.
Not one of those leaders is still in office. There has been no parliamentary scrutiny of the deal in Australia.
While they could operate away from base for longer periods and at greater depth than conventional submarines, their size would prevent them operating in the comparatively shallow waters around Australia’s northern coastline, making them less useful for defending our territory.
Hidden in the fine print of the AUKUS agreement is the need for Australia to manage the nuclear waste produced by new submarines, writes Ian Lowe.
The New Daily, Jun 22, 2026,
Many people are shocked by the price of the AUKUS agreement. The government has budgeted a staggering $368 billion, hundreds of times the cost of a new hospital.
But hidden in the fine print is a further huge cost. If the proposal goes ahead, we will have to manage the nuclear waste produced by the submarines.
Nobody knows what that will cost. The US and Britain have operated nuclear submarines for more than 50 years, but still have not worked out how to manage the intractable radioactive waste.
The decommissioned boats are sitting alongside docks, with British and American scientists trying to work out what to do.
We can get some idea of the possible extra cost from the work done 10 years ago by the South Australia Nuclear Royal Commission. I was a member of the expert advisory group for that inquiry.
It commissioned a study of what it would cost to build and operate a facility to store radioactive waste from nuclear power stations in Asian countries.
It came up with a figure of $145 billion, in 2016 values. Scaled up to 2026 dollars, it is equivalent to $190 billion – half as much again as the budget for the submarines.
That figure is almost certainly an underestimate because the royal commission was considering management of waste from nuclear power stations.
The proposed submarines use highly enriched uranium, weapons-grade material. The resulting waste is much nastier. It also poses serious security issues.
At the end of its life, the reactor in a Virginia class submarine still has enough enriched uranium for about 20 bombs. So the waste management facility will need military guarding to prevent misuse of the uranium.
It is also unclear how our government expects to find an acceptable site for waste storage.
There have been three attempts to find a place to store the comparatively benign low-level waste from nuclear medicine and industrial applications.
All have foundered because of opposition by the affected First Nations groups. They have not forgotten the harm done by British testing of nuclear weapons on their land.
The government has made vague suggestions about Defence property, but it is hard to see how it could obtain free prior informed consent from the Indigenous people whose land would be used.
There are also questions about whether acquiring nuclear submarines powered by highly-enriched weapons-grade uranium would be a breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Some Pacific Island leaders have expressed concern, arguing that it would certainly not be consistent with the spirit of our treaty obligations.
The fundamental problem is that the AUKUS agreement was negotiated in secret in 2021 by the leaders of the three countries involved, Australia, Britain and the US.
Not one of those leaders is still in office. There has been no parliamentary scrutiny of the deal in Australia.
It continues to be shrouded in secrecy, despite the high stakes and eye-watering projected cost. Retired major-general Michael Smith has described the arrangement as “the worst defence decision since we relied on Britain to defend us in World War II”.
A public inquiry into the agreement is being conducted under the auspices of the Australian Peace and Security forum.
It is considering the fundamental question – would AUKUS keep us safe? At what cost?
The inquiry is headed by five distinguished community leaders, headed by Peter Garrett, who was lead singer of Midnight Oil before becoming a Cabinet minister.
The critical question is whether owning and operating eight nuclear-powered submarines would actually enhance our security.
I participated in a one-day seminar run by the Submarine Institute of Australia well before the AUKUS agreement was negotiated. The submariners were clearly divided about the question of whether the next generation of submarines should be nuclear-powered.
While they could operate away from base for longer periods and at greater depth than conventional submarines, their size would prevent them operating in the comparatively shallow waters around Australia’s northern coastline, making them less useful for defending our territory.
That observation poses an obvious related question about sovereignty and independence.
Would the AUKUS arrangement move Australia away from being an independent middle-sized country like Japan or Indonesia, locking us into the US war machine and increasing the risk of being dragged into great-power conflict with China, our major trading partner?
Some observers fear that AUKUS could actually make Australia a nuclear target. Given that China is our major trading partner, it seems bizarre to imagine that we need to protect our ocean-going trade from the Chinese navy, but that has been proposed as a reason for acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.
All these questions are being considered by the public inquiry, which is receiving submissions from the community and holding a series of hearings in major cities.
Its October report should provide the basis for a serious re-examination of the AUKUS agreement.
Montebello nuclear test 70 years on: Australia still in the dark over UK mega-bomb
Aaron Bunch (AAP), June 22, 2026, https://nit.com.au/22-06-2026/24934/australia-still-in-dark-over-uk-mega-bomb-70-years-on
It’s been seven decades since Britain detonated the largest ever nuclear explosion on Australian soil, dwarfing the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in WW2.
Yet secrecy continues to shroud the exact force and fallout of the massive blast, triggered during the depths of the Cold War, on June 19, 1956.
It was in fact the final in a series of tests conducted on the remote Montebello Islands, 1400km north of Boorloo / Perth.
The UK government carried out a series of nuclear tests at various sites across Australia in the 1950s, often causing the permanent displacement and deaths of Indigenous people near the test sites due to exposure to radioactive material.
Recently declassified documents shed new light on the mystery of Operation Mosaic and G2 bomb but two reports remain under lock and key, controlled by the British Ministry of Defence.
“The British do keep their secrets,” according to James Cook University researcher Elizabeth Tynan.
“The Australian government did not know what the British were doing and still to this day does not really know what was done on our territory.”
Some estimates put the explosive strength of G2 as high as 98 kilotons or about six times that of the bomb that devastated Hiroshima in 1945.
It’s been seven decades since Britain detonated the largest ever nuclear explosion on Australian soil, dwarfing the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in WW2.
Yet secrecy continues to shroud the exact force and fallout of the massive blast, triggered during the depths of the Cold War, on June 19, 1956.
It was in fact the final in a series of tests conducted on the remote Montebello Islands, 1400km north of Boorloo / Perth.
The UK government carried out a series of nuclear tests at various sites across Australia in the 1950s, often causing the permanent displacement and deaths of Indigenous people near the test sites due to exposure to radioactive material.
Recently declassified documents shed new light on the mystery of Operation Mosaic and G2 bomb but two reports remain under lock and key, controlled by the British Ministry of Defence.
“The British do keep their secrets,” according to James Cook University researcher Elizabeth Tynan.
“The Australian government did not know what the British were doing and still to this day does not really know what was done on our territory.”
Some estimates put the explosive strength of G2 as high as 98 kilotons or about six times that of the bomb that devastated Hiroshima in 1945.
But the official yield figure is 60kT, just under the 62.5kT maximum Britain assured Australian authorities it would not exceed.
Three days after the blast, a top-secret message exchanged between British scientists working on the Mosaic project disclosed that G2’s explosive yield may have been as high as 120kT.
Notably, it’s estimated the cloud from the explosion rose to at least 14,000m rather than the predicted 11,000m. It eventually drifted inland and into the Arafura Sea, north of Darwin, almost 1500km away.
Documents also show the British never intended the G2 yield to be 62.5kT and were planning for about 80 or more but the actual figure can’t be confirmed until the data is released, Professor Tynan tells AAP.
Such was the expected size of the blast that the same document suggested flying be suspended within a distance of 600km for 10 hours.
“I don’t know why the British won’t come clean,” she says.
G2 erupted a decade after Britain departed the US-led Manhattan Project in the wake of WW2.
Forced to forge its own path in a bid to maintain its status as a major power, it was intent on showing the Americans and Soviets it had mastered nuclear technology and could defend itself.
The program started with crude atomic bombs using nuclear fission but the aim was to develop a much more powerful thermonuclear hydrogen bomb using fusion technology.
Mosaic was a stepping stone and also involved the earlier G1 detonation, similarly using boosted fission weapons.
It was triggered in May 1956 and had a yield of 15kT. G2 used the same technology a month later but was wrapped in uranium to enhance its force.
Both bombs were dead-end designs used to rule out the technology and clear the way for a British doomsday H-bomb measured in megatons, or one thousand times a kiloton, to be tested in the Pacific a year later.
Defence force personnel who witnessed the events described a blinding flash of light, intense heat and a powerful blast-wave before the mushroom cloud rose into the sky.
Milton Ward who was an electrical mechanic first class in the Royal Australian Navy was ordered on deck on HMAS Tobruk in his summer uniform of shorts and a short sleeved shirt.
“They told us we had to turn our back, shield our eyes and the next thing this heat went straight through your body,” he tells AAP.
“When it went off you were actually looking at an x-ray of your hands.”
He was also part of the clean up crew, picking up all the equipment to take it back to Leeuwin naval barracks in Fremantle.
“When I was on the Tobruk we didn’t know what was going on,” he says of the secrecy surrounding the testing.
Afterward, Mr Ward says, while on board HMAS Karangi, they had British scientists on board.
“We were catching trevally and eating them, they had a Geiger counter and they ran it over the fish we were eating.
“You should have heard it go off.”
Now 95, he carries scars over his face and neck, the result of numerous cancer removals.
“No-one ever told us how bad it would be or what the effects would be,” he says.
“We just weren’t told anything.”
Jettisoning radioactive fallout into the atmosphere, the explosion left the pristine archipelago and surrounding marine environment with a persistent toxic aftermath.
Metal signs near the blast zones on Trimouille and Alpha islands now warn adventure-seeking visitors to spend no more than one hour in the vicinity.
In recent years, scientists have found plutonium remains in local marine sediment at levels up to 4500 times higher than other areas of the WA coast.
According to Ash Nesbit who runs commercial charters around the 174 islands, his passengers generally come for the world-class fishing and diving but are also keen to see the nuclear test sites.
“They can’t believe the British actually did it,” he says.
Rotting concrete bunkers, roads, a derelict command post, cabling and rusty machinery litter the low-lying islands.
“There’s a huge crater in the water where they let one go off,” Mr Nesbit says.
“You sort of drive along in 10 metres of water and then it drops down to 25 metres. It’s really weird.
“I haven’t seen any two-headed coral trout, though.”
The 18km-long island chain, about 120km west of Dampier, is a maze of narrow channels between rocky outcrops covered in spinifex and scrub.
Its isolation, harsh climate and, of course, reputation mean just a few thousand hardy types annually dare explore its coves and coral reefs.
“It’s just raw beauty and the British decided to set off a bomb; it’s just ridiculous,” Mr Nesbit says.
Now a conservation and marine park, the Montebellos were also the site of the first of 12 British nuclear weapons tests, which then-prime minister Robert Menzies agreed to without consulting his cabinet.
Operation Hurricane in 1952 detonated a 25kT fission device in the hull of frigate HMS Plym, which disintegrated, leaving a saucer-shaped crater on the seabed in Main Bay a few kilometres from the G2 site.
The tests then moved to Emu Field in the South Australian desert in 1953 for Operation Totem, with two detonations less than 10kT.
After G2, the testing returned to SA at Maralinga, with operations Buffalo in 1956 and Antler in 1957 producing seven detonations, the most powerful 26.6kT.
A royal commission into the tests in 1984-85 was scathing of Britain, Australia’s compliance and the safety of the program.
It found fallout had spread across the nation, increasing cancer risks among the general population, and large tracts of land were contaminated.
Vulnerable Indigenous people near the test sites were displaced and many died due to exposure to radioactive material, if not the blasts.
Thousands of Australians, mostly defence personnel working on the tests, were also exposed.
Many wore no protective clothing and suffered higher cancer mortality rates and more cancers than the general population.
The inquiry also found the Montebello Islands were not an appropriate place for atomic tests due to the prevailing weather patterns.
The Mosaic tests were conducted in a hurry under marginal meteorological conditions, it said.
The commission accepted the G2 yield was 60kT.
Prof Tynan says Britain didn’t see Australia as an equal partner and lied to it.
“Australia was a useful idiot,” she says.
“They fed us lines … they gave soothing words to make the Australian government feel it was all okay and all safe, when it really wasn’t.”
Prof Tynan’s book Nuclear Archipelago: Secrets, power and the biggest atomic blast in Australia will be published in August.
Australian Associated Press
Australia’s coal and gas exports violate our human rights, group says in new UN case
Lana LamSydney, 23 June 26, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn8q5nx6jw6o
A group of Australians have accused the government of violating their human rights by continuing to export coal and gas and are asking the UN to take action.
The group say their lives have been harmed due to extreme weather in Australia – bushfires, floods, heatwaves, rising sea levels and toxic algal blooms – and the government’s support of fossil fuel companies is to blame.
It is the first legal claim taken to an international body or court since 2025’s ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that countries can be sued over climate change.
Any decision by the UN is not legally binding but Australia – one of the world’s largest coal and gas exporters – would be expected to respond.
The BBC has contacted Environment Minister Murray Watt for comment.
Dr Barry Traill, a wildlife ecologist and volunteer firefighter, is one of the ten litigants.
In 2009, several of his friends died during the devastating Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria, despite being prepared and experienced, he said.
“That deeply changed me,” Traill said, and “it became clear that the old rules around fires and survival no longer applied”.
In 2019, he was on the frontlines battling severe blazes in Queensland during the so-called Black Summer fires where he saw that climate change was not a future problem.
“It is already killing people and hurting lives, landscapes and communities across Australia,” he said.
“Continuing to allow coal and gas companies to increase pollution, while people face worsening disasters, is a profound failure of responsibility.”
Brendon Donohue has also joined the legal claim, describing how he was trapped in his home for 10 days in 2022 when floods in Brisbane damaged the power supply of his apartment block, meaning the lifts, intercom and exits were not accessible.
“Because I live with blindness and mobility challenges, climate impacts affect me differently and can make everyday life much harder to navigate safely,” he said.
Another case is that of Prof Anne Poelina, an Indigenous woman from the Kimberley region in Western Australia, who describes being displaced from the area around the Fitzroy River, one of the state’s most important waterways, because of catastrophic flooding.
“When the river is healthy, our people are healthy,” she said, and “when the river suffers, our people suffer.”
“What concerns me most is the intergenerational loss of cultural knowledge,” she added as “so much of our knowledge is not written down”, but passed on by being physically present on the land.
“They are asking the United Nations Human Rights Committee to declare that it’s unlawful for Australia to continue approving and subsidising coal and gas for export without a plan to protect people from dangerous climate change,” said Hannah White, senior lawyer with Environmental Justice Australia.
Last July, the ICJ – considered the world’s highest court with global jurisdiction – ruled that countries can sue each other for climate change, including over historic emissions of planet-warming gases.One of the lawyers helping the group with their claim said that “climate harm caused by Australia’s coal and gas doesn’t stop at a border, and neither does Australia’s responsibility for it”.
One “family”: weapons multinationals, Defence bureaucracy and the military top brass
Shoebridge:
When members of the public look at this and they see someone who has been …responsible for making decisions about multibillion-dollar contracts with Lockheed Martin, managing multibillion-dollar contracts with Lockheed Martin, and see someone step out of that from the uniform and in less than a week take a job with Lockheed Martin, that doesn’t just miss the pub test, that brings Defence into disrepute, the Public Service into disrepute. They see people leveraging their very recent experience to maximise corporate profits in this case for the world’s biggest weapons manufacturer. Don’t you see how this looks to the public and see how this kind of behaviour stinks…?
Senior military officers working in the upper echelon of the defence department’s arms buying group regularly pass through the revolving door into a post-military career in the weapons industry. The Australian arms industry revolving door database that I have been researching and compiling contains numerous examples, including Jeremy King and Chris Deeble.
Defence shelves 12-month cooling-off period for staff departing for weapons industry and adopts ‘bespoke’ conflict management strategies in a move likely to facilitate more rapid revolving door moves
Michelle Fahy, Undue Influence, Jun 20, 2026
The world’s largest weapons maker, Lockheed Martin, has poached its new Australian chief executive directly from the upper echelon of the federal government’s weapons buying group.
The high profile appointment, made in January, continued the US weapons giant’s long-standing practice of recruiting its local chief executives from the senior ranks of Australia’s military and defence officials.
Lockheed Martin told major general Jeremy King late last year that he was in line for its top Australian job, yet King continued to oversee the Defence Department’s multibillion-dollar helicopter contract with Lockheed.
Having accepted the job, mere weeks separated King’s departure from Defence’s Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) and his commencement at Lockheed Martin Australia.
Lockheed Martin’s global revenue in 2024 was US$65 billion ($91 billion), with 91 per cent of that coming from the sale of arms. Its Australian subsidiary has $4.6 billion in current contracts with the Australian Government (source: AusTender, 30.4.26).
As the head of aviation systems in CASG, major general King was responsible for managing Australia’s $2.8 billion contract with Lockheed Martin for the supply of 40 Black Hawk helicopters. Earlier, in 2023, King had played a critical role in Defence’s decision to replace its trouble-plagued Taipan helicopter fleet with the Black Hawks, but he was not the final decision-maker on the deal.
In October last year, King told his boss, Chris Deeble, head of CASG, that he was being considered by Lockheed for the chief executive role. According to the Canberra Times, he also told Deeble that he intended to work with Lockheed Martin’s offer.
However, it wasn’t until early November that King handed the required conflict of interest form to Deeble and was then removed from further involvement in Lockheed Martin’s contractual arrangements with Defence.
In his evidence to Senate Estimates in February, Deeble was vague as to exactly when in October King had advised him of Lockheed’s approach: “within the October time frame”.
In response to a direct question as to when King departed CASG, Deeble again lacked specificity: “at the end of last year”.
Chief of Army Simon Stuart was more forthcoming on the military side, stating that King had ceased his full-time service with the Australian Army on 5 January.
Having employed the well-worn delaying tactic of taking the question ‘on notice’ during a senate hearing, the Defence Department later revealed that King had departed CASG on 5 January as well.
The department did not respond to my questions as to precisely when in October King advised Deeble of Lockheed’s approach, nor when in November King submitted the required conflict of interest forms.
On 12 January, just one week after King had quit the public service, Lockheed Martin Australia announced that he was its next chief executive.
Senior military officers working in the upper echelon of the defence department’s arms buying group regularly pass through the revolving door into a post-military career in the weapons industry. The Australian arms industry revolving door database that I have been researching and compiling contains numerous examples, including Jeremy King and Chris Deeble.
……………………………………………..The Australian Public Service code of conduct is clear about the risks of public servants moving too rapidly into the private sector: they may use inside knowledge and contacts to benefit their new employer in influencing government, and they may use or reveal confidential or sensitive information that advantages their employer in dealing with government or the market generally.
The Defence Department had a longstanding rule requiring a 12-month gap between its officials leaving public service and joining the private sector in a related industry position (cooling-off period) to help mitigate such risks.
This timeframe was already insufficient for the risk-mitigation task – given that many defence procurement programs extend over many years and some of the largest can take a decade or more to finalise – yet no cooling off period at all was applied by Defence to buffer major general King’s transfer to Lockheed Martin.
Multiple objections to the lack of cooling-off period expressed by Greens’ senator David Shoebridge during Senate Estimates were swept aside, or ignored, by all officials present, from the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) Admiral David Johnston down. No-one answered Shoebridge’s repeated question as to whether anyone in Defence had formally approved King’s move to Lockheed. Nor did Army Chief Simon Stuart or the CDF answer Shoebridge’s repeated question as to whether a cooling-off period still applies to Defence revolving door moves more generally.
Indeed, the remarks from both military leaders made it plain that as long as Defence’s claimed “clear policies” on managing conflicts of interest are adhered to, there is no longer any impediment to a speedy transition into the arms industry for senior Defence officials.
Defence did not respond to questions as to whether, and if so when, the 12-month rule has been scrapped. Further investigation revealed that this longstanding rule has been scrapped by Defence.
…………….The weapons industry is recognised globally as a very high risk industry for corruption. When asked by Shoebridge during Senate Estimates how the Defence Department had ensured Lockheed Martin managed its side of the obvious conflicts of interest inherent in hiring King, a Defence probity official said the weapons giant had provided a letter of undertaking outlining what it intends to do.
What wasn’t explained, or even mentioned, was how Defence intends to ensure Lockheed adheres to its undertakings.
……………10 years on, nothing has changed
Just as the Defence hierarchy welcomed the departure to Lockheed Martin, 10 years ago, of its senior defence scientist Tony Lindsay – who joined Lockheed one day after he left his senior public service post – the Defence leadership today continues to see no reason for concern about the rapid-fire revolving door moves of its senior staff into leadership roles in the weapons industry.
In fact, CDF David Johnston welcomed major general King’s move, telling Senate Estimates that King’s expeditious move to the private sector was to Australia’s benefit.
Shoebridge:
When members of the public look at this and they see someone who has been …responsible for making decisions about multibillion-dollar contracts with Lockheed Martin, managing multibillion-dollar contracts with Lockheed Martin, and see someone step out of that from the uniform and in less than a week take a job with Lockheed Martin, that doesn’t just miss the pub test, that brings Defence into disrepute, the Public Service into disrepute. They see people leveraging their very recent experience to maximise corporate profits in this case for the world’s biggest weapons manufacturer. Don’t you see how this looks to the public and see how this kind of behaviour stinks…?
……..The man responsible for reviewing both of King’s conflict of interest declarations and Lockheed Martin’s undertakings regarding the management of those conflicts was Chris Deeble, himself no stranger to the revolving door.As part of his 37-year career with the Royal Australian Air Force, Deeble spent the last decade or so of his time in the military managing complex multibillion dollar procurement programs inside Defence’s weapons buying ………………………….
In 2019, Deeble was wooed by the world’s third largest weapons-maker, US-based Northrop Grumman. Deeble agreed to head its Australian subsidiary, a job he held for more than three years. Northrop Grumman is deeply involved in the US government’s nuclear weapons program, amongst many other defence programs, including the Triton drone and the nuclear-capable B-21 stealth bomber.agency
In mid-2022, Defence was looking for a new head of CASG. Deeble got the job. Inside a month of leaving Northrop Grumman, he was back inside Defence as the nation’s top arms buyer, appointed by the Albanese government in August 2022.
When asked by Senator Shoebridge whether anybody had to sign off on King’s plan of “literally going from gamekeeper to poacher in less than a week”, and whether Deeble himself had approved King’s move to Lockheed, Deeble did not answer either question……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Auditor general’s revolving door concerns
The nation’s auditor general has repeatedly warned of the corroding influence of the revolving door, which leads to cosy, familial relationships between the Defence hierarchy and the weapons multinationals.
In evidence to parliament’s audit committee in November 2024, deputy auditor general Rona Mellor warned of the importance of keeping an “appropriate distance in our relationships” with multinational weapons contractors.
“There’s a really big challenge ahead for Defence. The biggest challenge … is that there is a culture in these very long-term contracts… There’s a real risk that you get captured by the provider.”………………………………………………………………….
The mega-spend AUKUS era makes stopping the revolving door urgent
Australian governments have long been susceptible to the revolving door process in which politicians, the military, and public servants move effortlessly between government, lobbying firms, and the arms industry. The movement of King to Lockheed Martin is more of the same behaviour that’s been occurring for decades…………………………..
Australia’s limp attempts at managing the revolving door have been completely ineffective, particularly in the Defence/arms industry domain. The arrival of AUKUS requires this unregulated and unmonitored democracy-eroding phenomenon to be brought under control.https://undueinfluence.substack.com/p/one-family-weapons-multinationals?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=297295&post_id=202535704&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
Future certain for Olympic Dam but not Traditional Owners
From Robyn Wood, of FOE South Australia: Here’s an article in the National Indigenous Times about the Roxby Indenture act passing and ignoring Traditional Owners. They note that the Conservation Council did not appear at the hearing – that was due to illness.
They also note that no Traditional Owners were invited to the hearing – I think that’s outrageous, and exactly the time they should have invited the newly established Aboriginal Voice to Parliament to give evidence.
I was also outraged by Chair of the Select Committee Tom Koutsantonis ignoring all the submissions and calling them irrelevant – even the Flinders and Upper North Voice to Parliament one.
David Prestipino, National Indigenous Times June 17, 2026
A landmark update of a decades-old Indenture agreement guiding development at Olympic Dam and copper-rich Gawler Craton was ratified by the South Parliament on Tuesday despite serious concerns from affected Traditional Owner groups.
Key Points
• Three Traditional Owner groups left out of landmark deal
• Concerns at impact of 50 years of mining on Country
• New Indenture fast-tracks BHP’s Olympic Dam expansion plans
The agreement between the Malinauskas government and global miner BHP ensured long-term certainty for the region as a global copper powerhouse but left Traditional Owners concerned for their future and angry at the short time set for submissions over the deal.
Critics said the six-day window to respond to updated Indenture contradicted claims of due process, a fair hearing and proper public consultation by the SA government, after the agreement was mooted in May.
Native Title bodies told a government-chosen Select Committee they had serious concerns at ongoing impacts another 50 years of BHP mining operations would have on their Country.
‘Destruction’ of Country
Kokatha Aboriginal Corporation, whose Traditional lands include the Olympic Dam region, told the Committee the previous Indenture Act – in place for more than 40 years – was insufficient already.
“The original Indenture is viewed by the Kokatha People as the authorisation of destruction of our land and a mechanism to drive our people off Country, without the involvement or consent of Kokatha People,” KAC wrote in its submission earlier this month.
Dieri Aboriginal Corporation said a BHP well field on Dieri Country would continue to pressure the Great Artesian Basin.
“Water is very important to us as Dieri People and the impact of water taken from Wellfield B impacts the health of our Country,” the board wrote in its submission.
Arabana Aboriginal Corporation urged the Committee to make recommendations on important matters that affected Arabana People and their land, outlining them in its submission.
“The damage to our springs and land, the closure of Wellfield A, ongoing water abstraction from Wellfield B, the absence of consultation with the AAC,” it wrote.
“The continued displacement of the Aboriginal Heritage Act for the Stuart’s Shelf on Arabana Country and how development of the bill can be reconciled with the state’s own commitments to Aboriginal people.”
The Committee heard evidence from SA’s departments of Energy and Mining, Energy and Water, BHP, the SA Conservation Council and SA Chamber of Mines and Energy.
The Conservation Council chose not to attend the hearing, while no Traditional Owners were on the Committee.
Changes pave way for more mining…………………………………………………
The three Traditional Owner submissions as well as several environmental organisations had heavily criticised the limited time to make a submission, while also lamenting insufficient consultation and engagement from BHP and stakeholders………………………..https://nit.com.au/17-06-2026/24868/future-certain-for-olympic-dam-but-not-traditional-owners
Roxby Bill rides roughshod over environmental and Indigenous concerns
17 June 26 https://www.conservationsa.org.au/protect_mound_springs
Conservation Council SA expresses deep concern at the proposed Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of Indenture) Amendment Bill 2026 (‘Roxby Bill’) currently before the South Australian Parliament. If passed, the Bill has a potential to irreversibly damage or destroy the Mound Springs of the Great Artesian Basin (GAB). These unique springs are in the far north of our state and are a South Australia environmental and cultural treasure.
Conservation SA has long called for the Mound Springs of the GAB to be permanently protected for the local Indigenous and South Australian communities.
As noted by The Nature Conservancy:
“Up to three kilometres deep and lying beneath 23% of the Australian continent, the Great Artesian Basin is the largest and deepest artesian basin in the world. The water it contains is under high pressure and in places like Arabana Country, South Australia this forces water to rise to the surface as freshwater springs. Along with the rising warm water comes sediment which can pile up several metres high hence the name – mound springs.
In the hot dry landscape, the springs create an oasis for local wildlife and migratory birds. They’ve also been extremely important to Indigenous people for many thousands of years.”
In December 2025, Conservation Council SA CEO Kirsty Bevan wrote to the South Australian Premier seeking the long-term protection of the Mound Springs (extract below):
Protect the Mound Springs and End Unsustainable Water Extraction from the Great Artesian Basin
Mound Springs are globally significant cultural, ecological and geological features, and are a listed EPBC Act “Endangered Ecological Community”. These unique and fragile little gems support rare species, deep cultural heritage and landscapes central to the identity of Traditional Owners. Community concern has escalated regarding BHP’s use of Great Artesian Basin water for mining and the cumulative impact on Springs.
We call for:
-
- Recognition of the Mound Springs of the GAB as a high-value ecosystem requiring elevated protection.
- Closure as soon as possible of BHP Wellfield A water extraction operations that have directlyimpactedthe Springs.
- Transition of industrial scale BHP Wellfield B water extraction operations toward alternative water sources, such as desalination or recycled water, to protect the Basin.
- Transparenttimelyreporting of extraction volumes, groundwater pressures and spring health and monitoring information.
- Co-governance with Traditional Owners, with investment in cultural heritage protection and Indigenous Rangers on country.
Outcome Sought:
Long-term water security for communities, ecosystems of Great Artesian Basin—and a clear safeguard against irreversible damage.
The Bill is deeply problematic for several reasons. Firstly, given the complexity of the legislation and the lack of notice provided about the Bill has meant that interested parties have not been provided with a realistic opportunity to respond and raise the full suite of their concerns. Further, there are concerns that this rapid process may have been the deliberate intention of Government.
As noted by longtime campaigner Mr David Noonan in his submission to the Select Committee inquiry into the Bill, the key concern is that:
“…[the] Roxby Bill and new Indenture place an onus on the State to provide “commercial water” to BHP. If the State doesn’t deliver that water, the Roxby Bill and new Indenture provide for BHP Olympic Dam Wellfield / Borefield B to expand and extend operations for decades at an unacceptable environmental cost to the integrity of GAB water flows and the survival of the unique and fragile Mound Springs, little gems of our natural heritage and of ongoing fundamental cultural and spiritual importance to the Arabana People, the Native Title holders over the area. This is entirely unacceptable.”
The problems the Roxby Bill will create are further detailed in submissions to the short Select Committee into the legislation; attached below are the submissions to that Committee from Friends of Mound Springs and longtime campaigner, Mr David Noonan:
Wong and Marles were left waiting in the wings in London – it’s further proof Aukus was never anything more than a political stunt
Allan Behm, 16 June 26, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jun/16/uk-defence-minister-john-healey-resignation-wong-marles-aukus-exposed-political-stunt
All the flimflam and palaver amount to nothing in the face of domestic realities. Perhaps the UK’s John Healey has done us all a good turn.
The resignation of the UK defence minister John Healey, along with the armed forces minister Al Carns, has driven another nail into the coffin of Keir Starmer’s prime ministership. This was no inadvertent injury to the prime minister but a signal on Healey’s part that he’s a leadership candidate – or at least a deserving member of any new prime minister’s cabinet. It’s very calculated: Healey is too smart to do anything by accident.
No less inadvertent is the damage he has inflicted on the prospects of the increasingly ill-fated Aukus nuclear submarine proposal. By leaving the Australian defence minister, Richard Marles, and the foreign affairs minister, Penny Wong, waiting in the wings while he got on with the business of domestic politicking, he demonstrated once again what had been clear from the outset: Aukus was never anything more than a political stunt, expendable once it had served its political purpose.
Let’s unpack that.
Conceived in secret and launched by the then prime minister Scott Morrison with maximum political fanfare in September 2021, Aukus was a hurried attempt to meet the quite divergent political objectives of three very distant countries.
For Australia, it was about creating yet another security blanket to wrap us in the arms of great and powerful friends. It was a sad attempt to address the pathological insecurity of occupiers of a vast and distant continent. At the same time, it had the added political benefit of wedging Labor on the grounds that it was perceived as “weak” on national security. Labor met that challenge head-on by accepting the idea lock, stock and barrel – a curious example of the reverse wedge.
For Britain, it was about restoring some of its strategic credibility after its feckless Brexit decision, parading its imagined role as a European player with a global footprint. It was also about grabbing a flow of cash from gormless antipodeans to pay for the Band-Aids needed to treat the gaping holes in its national submarine construction capacity, now so disabled that it will take tens of billions to restore the UK’s submarine deterrence capability – if that’s even possible.
And for the hapless former US president Joe Biden it was about demonstrating America’s ability to lock its allies into strategic dependency while retaining both the UK and Australia as critical logistic and support partners in its efforts to maintain its ability to intervene militarily on a global scale. It was cynical and self-serving and for that reason alone easily survived the transition to the Trump administration.
So when two closely allied ministers are left cooling their heels in London wondering why on earth they’re there, the political fragility and the policy inadequacy of Aukus is exposed once again. When the retention of national political power in the face of Nigel Farage’s Reform UK party is at stake, flimsy international agreements are simply cast off. All the flimflam and palaver about shared values, enduring friendship and the international rules-based order amount to nothing in the face of hard domestic political realities. Just ask Donald Trump.
From the outset, the politics of Aukus have been totally unsupported by policy – an “emperor’s clothes” situation where a single event can expose the intrinsic flimsiness of the entire enterprise. Here we are, five years on, still waiting for the fundamental policy principles on which Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-propelled submarines might be justified. This is not to suggest that they can’t be justified: simply that they haven’t been.
Where are the answers to the basic questions? Why? What are the options? How? At what cost? Are there alternatives? Are there complementary actions? What are the downstream effects?
Australia has a long and dismal history of political initiatives that lacked robust policy structures to support them. Aukus is yet another symptom of a rush of blood to the head. We know that the US under secretary of war for policy, Elbridge Colby, entertains serious doubts about the policy viability of Aukus submarines. The Congressional Research Service clearly shares his concerns, noting as it does the inability of the US naval construction industry to meet the demands of the US Navy, not to mention the expansion needed to provide additional builds for the Royal Australian Navy. Fobbing Australia off with second-hand older Virginia-class submarines is hardly an advertisement for Marles’s vaunted “optimal pathway”.
So perhaps Healey has done us all a good turn by showing, once again, that Aukus is not about policy at all but just an act of large-scale political theatre. As all wise politicians know only too well, once the political purpose has disappeared, the show’s over.
Allan Behm advises on international and security affairs at the Australia Institute in Canberra
Concerns over Great Artesian Basin water impacts in new BHP agreement
By Kathryn Bermingham, By Thomas Kelsall, 17 June 26
In short:
The South Australian government has been accused of rushing through a new mining agreement with BHP that does not do enough to end water extraction from the Great Artesian Basin.
Mining Minister Tom Koutsantonis says the updated indenture imposes stricter environmental regulation.
What’s next?
The bill is expected to pass parliament this week, ahead of a decision on the Northern Water project in the second half of 2027.
Environmentalists and First Nations groups say a new agreement between the South Australian government and BHP, set to be passed by state parliament this week, does not do enough to end water extraction from the Great Artesian Basin.
They also say their concerns have not been taken seriously and that they have been shut out of the consultation process.
The government announced last month it would introduce a bill to “modernise” the Olympic Dam indenture — a legislated contract with BHP that governs mining operation
The updated indenture broadens BHP’s mining lease and removes caps on copper production, paving the way for a potential major expansion. (Supplied: BHP Billiton)
The updated indenture broadens BHP’s mining lease and removes caps on copper production, paving the way for a potential major expansion.
It also addresses water access, stipulating that BHP must stop drawing water from its Great Artesian Basin Wellfield A by 2036.
But it allows continued access to BHP’s other wellfield, despite the concerns of traditional owners and environmentalists that extraction is damaging the local mound springs.
The Arabana people say mound springs at the Great Artesian Basin are culturally significant. (ABC News: Lincoln Rothall)
BHP extracts more than 4 million litres of water a day from Wellfield A and 29 million litres a day from Wellfield B.
The second wellfield has less impact on the pressure of the mound springs, according to officials from the Department for Environment and Water and BHP.
Bill could be ‘locking in’ BHP’s extraction rights, environmentalist says
To reduce reliance on the basin in the future, the state government has proposed the $5 billion Northern Water project — a desalination plant on the Spencer Gulf that would connect to a pipeline stretching into the mining region
A concept map shows the Northern Water project pipeline from the desalination plant site near Mullaquana Station to Olympic Dam. (northernwater.sa.gov.au)
The project is currently subject to a $200 million feasibility study.
If it goes ahead, BHP says it will “significantly reduce” extraction from Wellfield B and instead use desalinated water for its mining operations.
If Northern Water is scrapped, Wellfield B can remain a water source for BHP, although the government says this would be under stricter environmental conditions and require the company to build in water efficiencies over time.
Environmentalist David Noonan said he was concerned by the long-term implications of the bill.
“It’s locking in rights to BHP to extract water from the Great Artesian Basin, that’s having impact on the unique and fragile mound springs,” he said.
“Wellfield A … it should be closed down as soon as possible, and the bill is allowing BHP to continue that water extraction for another decade.
“Even if South Australia does provide commercial water to BHP, BHP are still allowed to extract water from the far larger Wellfield B potentially for decades to come, and that would be locking in a long-term adverse impact on the survival of the springs.”
David Noonan says the bill could allow BHP to extract water from the Great Artesian Basin for a longer term. (ABC News: Daniel Taylor)
Arabana woman Janette Milera said she was concerned about the bill’s impact on the culturally significant mound springs.
“For us as Arabana people, they hold stories, they hold ancestors,”
she said.
“We are very concerned about what is happening with the water and country and where this [bill] might lead to with our mound springs.”
She said she was not against the bill but would like to see “a better consultation process about how they manage extraction from the Artesian Basin”.
Arabana woman Janette Milera is concerned about how the BHP agreement would impact the mound springs. (ABC News: Ashlin Blieschke)
Energy and Mining Minister Tom Koutsantonis said that under the new indenture, the Department for Environment and Water and the Environment Protection Authority would need to sign off on BHP’s water licence renewals.
“BHP will be subject to the environmental health of the wellsprings … that is a fundamental difference to what was in there previously,” he said.
Mr Koutsantonis also said closing Wellfield A by 2036 would lead to recovery of mound springs and, if Northern Water goes ahead, Wellfield B would only be a “backup” for BHP.
“I am very confident this is a good environmental outcome, not only for Indigenous groups but the basin itself,” he said.
BHP said it remained committed to “constructive engagement” with traditional owners and has provided regular updates on the indenture.
The company also highlighted that it was not seeking to renew Wellfield A, and said future growth at Olympic Dam will require additional water sources beyond the basin.
Committee process criticised
The bill was introduced to parliament last month and a committee of MPs was appointed to undertake an inquiry, but the process has drawn criticism from some individuals and groups who tried to voice their concerns.
Water is under pressure in the Great Artesian Basin
The Great Artesian Basin covers a fifth of Australia and contains water that has been there for millions of years. Now, decades of extraction are taking their toll and traditional owners are fighting a mining giant for compensation.
The committee, chaired by Mr Koutsantonis, allowed a 10-day window for public submissions and received more than 20.
Submitters included Mr Noonan and several environmental groups, as well as the First Nations Voice to Parliament and traditional owners of the Great Artesian Basin and Olympic Dam mine site.
Among the issues raised were the long-term impact of the new indenture, protection of the environment, native title concerns and consultation that was viewed as inadequate.
But none of the concerns were directly addressed in the committee’s final report, which was tabled in parliament the morning after the public deadline.
Melanie Selwood has criticised the committee process. (ABC News)
“I think this committee’s a bit of a sham to be honest,” said Greens MLC Melanie Selwood, who was not a member of the committee.
“People rushed to get submissions in the two-week period that was given to them, but they weren’t given time to come before the committee and really have their questions answered and have their concerns raised.”
Mr Koutsantonis said the submissions received by the committee were considered but not included in the final report because “they weren’t relevant”.
“We get to a point, in this saga of BHP, where there are some people who will not be satisfied until all mining ends,” he said.
“The concerns that they were making, for example, about native title and agreements for Indigenous groups, weren’t part of the indenture.
“Native title is assigned by the Commonwealth parliament, not by the state parliament.”
Tom Koutsantonis rejected the suggestion that the bill had been rushed through parliament. (ABC News: Ashlin Blieschke)
He said native title holders had already given their approval for expansion of the mining lease, and the government expects BHP to do a “full negotiation” with native title holders “before any further steps go forward under the indenture”.
BHP said many of the matters raised in the submissions were already being addressed, or would be addressed, through agreement-making processes.
Mr Koutsantonis rejected that the bill had been rushed through parliament but acknowledged the government had treated it with urgency.
“We’re heading into the winter [parliamentary] recess and we are in a contest for capital,” he said.
BHP has fast-tracked early works on an Argentinian copper project, while a decision on Olympic Dam — and consequently the Northern Water project — has been delayed until the second half of 2027.
Australia will now investigate Israel over Assault Claims | West Report Live
Streamed live on 16 Jun 2026 The West Report
This is the biggest story most Australians have not yet grasped.
Today, in Canberra, Australian survivors of physical, psychological and sexual abuse by Israeli authorities met with Foreign Minister Penny Wong, the Hon Dr Anne Aly MP, a Deputy Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, and a senior DFAT official.
As a result, the Australian Government has committed to an independent investigation into the assaults, sexual assaults and torture of the Gaza Flotilla humanitarians. Read that again. Not an internal Israeli review. Not a department preparing a briefing note. Not a politician expressing concern.
An area of sea ice as big as France is gone from Antarctica’s west coast, as temperatures rise
Bulletin, By Graham Readfearn || June 13, 2026
Antarctica’s west coast is missing an area of winter sea ice the size of France, sparking concerns for threatened penguins, other marine life, and global sea levels.
One expert said the loss of ice in the Bellingshausen Sea was “depressing” and the failure of ice to form could have intensified a heatwave over the continent’s peninsula last week that saw daytime temperatures peak at 15.4 degrees Celsius (about 59 degrees Fahrenheit) which is more than 20 degrees Celsius above average. (It is normally about 24 degrees Fahrenheit at this time of year.)
It’s winter in Antarctica, when sea ice expands rapidly around the continent peaking in September.
But satellite observations showed the Bellingshausen Sea—on the west side of the Antarctic peninsula and which by June would usually be covered by ice—was almost completely ice-free.
Scientists said the region was missing about 650,000 square kilometers (250,000 sq miles) of sea ice, compared with the average between 1991 and 2020. That is an area about the size of France, and almost 10 times the size of Tasmania.
“I’m concerned. It’s depressing,” said Will Hobbs, an Antarctic sea ice expert at the University of Tasmania with the Australian Antarctic Program Partnership. “It is remarkable that we are in June and there is no sea ice there.”
He said this was the third time in four years that sea ice had been very low in the region. “I don’t think we will see sea ice there any more. It’s done,” Hobbs said. The loss of sea ice was likely linked to changes in the ocean and scientists were trying to understand if global heating was a factor.
Hobbs said the region was important for krill—a critical part of the food web for species in the region. Krill would usually be hiding from predators under the ice in winter, where they graze on algae.
On June 10, there was about 11.4 million square kilometers of sea ice around the entire continent compared to a long-term average for that date of 12.6 million square kilometers.
Phil Reid, who monitors Antarctic conditions at Australia’s Bureau of Meteorology, said the Bellingshausen Sea had seen “incredible coastal exposure” in winter and summer in recent years.
Reid said just to the area’s west were the Pine Island and Thwaites glaciers—the continent’s major contributors to ice loss and sea level rise.
Floating ice shelves in front of the glaciers could break up faster if protective sea ice is absent for longer periods, he said, and this could then speed up the loss of ice from the glaciers, pushing up global sea levels in the future………………………………………………………………………….https://thebulletin.org/2026/06/an-area-of-sea-ice-as-big-as-france-is-gone-from-antarcticas-west-coast-as-temperatures-rise/?utm_source=ActiveCampaign&utm_medium=email&utm_content=Climate%20Change%3A%20New%20Data%2C%20New%20Debate&utm_campaign=20260611%20Thursday%20Newsletter%20%28Copy%29
How Zionist Lobbying Has Reshaped Global Politics
Australia has its own history of Zionist lobbying and political interference – a history that remains largely unexamined in mainstream discourse.
The Australian example is particularly instructive because it reveals how the machinery of influence operates even in a country geographically distant from the Middle East, with no historical responsibility for the conflict, and no strategic interest that would justify the degree of alignment with Israeli policy.
The mechanisms are similar: campaign donations, community lobbying, and the weaponisation of antisemitism accusations to silence critics. Australian politicians who question Israeli policy face organised opposition from Zionist organisations. The media environment is shaped by the same dynamics of donor pressure and editorial alignment.
13 June 2026 Dr Andrew Klein, PhD, Australian Independent Media
The Branch That Reaches Across Oceans – How Zionist Lobbying Has Reshaped Global Politics
“The branch is not the tree. The tree is still standing. And the tree – the tree is justice.”
The Branch That Reaches Across Oceans
The “Greater Israel” project is not a secret. It is not a fringe fantasy. It is being marketed in London, in Montreal, in New York – real estate roadshows advertising properties in illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank. The UN Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices warned in November 2025 that “Israel continues to expand its presence and control of territory in Palestine, Syria and Southern Lebanon,” and that Israel’s “constant claims to a borderless ‘Land of Israel’ are incompatible with a just and lasting peace.”
This is not merely a Middle Eastern conflict. It is a global project – one that relies not only on military force, but on an extensive apparatus of lobbying, financial influence, and the suppression of dissent in Western capitals.
The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman warned that the “Greater Israel” project poses dangers not only to neighbouring countries but also to Europeans: “Even the Europeans are not safe, because the Zionist regime does not hesitate to openly declare its colonial and racist ambitions in forms such as ‘greater Israel’.” Whether one accepts the Iranian framing, the fact that the project is cited by adversaries as a casus belli indicates that it is not a secret.
The scale of political interference is not unique in spirit – it is an extension of historically brutal colonial behaviours, morphed into a new scale in line with modern communication systems. The Roman Empire bribed Germanic chieftains. The British Empire divided and ruled India. But the contemporary Zionist project operates within a rules‑based international order that was supposed to prevent exactly this kind of extraction.
And it operates with the active complicity of Western governments – not because they are powerless, but because their political systems have been captured.
The Machinery of Influence: AIPAC and the American Political System
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is the most visible node in a vast network of lobbying organisations that influence US Middle East policy. A 2024 academic study published in the Hasanuddin Journal of Strategic and International Studies found that “the AIPAC lobby is deeply rooted in US policymaking structures, ranging from vice‑president, and higher‑echelon staff, to parliament members.” The study noted that since 2021, AIPAC has expanded its activities to include direct participation in political campaign contributions, effectively buying access to the highest levels of American government.
The study’s conclusion is stark: “Such overly foreign influence on national policymaking has the potential to harm America’s long‑term relationships and interests in the Middle East if the US can’t make the barrier for foreign interference toward its national interests.”
This is not a fringe argument. Ilan Pappé’s comprehensive study, Lobbying for Zionism on Both Sides of the Atlantic, documents how “over a century of aggressive lobbying changed the map of the Middle East.” Pappé details how pro‑Israel lobbies convinced British and American policymakers “to condone Israel’s flagrant breaches of international law, grant Israel unprecedented military aid and deny Palestinians rights.” Anyone who questioned unconditional support for Israel, “even in the mildest terms, became the target of relentless smear campaigns.”
The mechanism is not subtle. It is the same mechanism that has always operated in systems where political survival depends on campaign contributions. The donor class – in this case, a network of Zionist organisations and aligned right‑wing groups – buys influence. Politicians who comply receive funding, electoral support, and protection from primary challenges. Those who dissent are targeted, smeared, and often defeated.
This is not a conspiracy. It is a system.
The Silencing of Dissent: Academic Freedom Under Attack
The suppression of criticism extends beyond electoral politics into the realm of ideas. A 2024 academic paper in the journal Milel ve Nihal examines how “political lobbying, financial influence, and allegations of antisemitism are strategically employed to establish a cultural hegemony that determines what discourse is acceptable” in US universities.
The paper, titled “Zionism and Academic Hegemony: The Intersection of Power, Knowledge, and Suppression in the United States Universities,” draws on Michel Foucault’s theory of power‑knowledge and Antonio Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony to analyse how “Zionist organisations influence higher education frameworks, research priorities, and public discourse.” This manipulation, the paper argues, “serves to marginalize, silence, or delegitimize critical perspectives that oppose or challenge Israeli policies and actions, especially those related to the occupation of Palestinian territories and human rights violations.”
The paper provides specific examples, including the rescinded job offer to Professor Steven Salaita at the University of Illinois following his criticism of Israel’s genocide in Gaza on social media. The case is not isolated. The paper documents “additional examples including the suppression of pro‑Palestinian viewpoints and the punishment of students and faculty who advocate for Palestinian rights at various prominent U.S. institutions.”
The paper concludes that “Zionism’s influence is not limited to isolated cases but creates a widespread atmosphere where academic freedom is restricted.” Universities, “meant to be pillars of free thought and critical inquiry, increasingly become arenas where dissent is suppressed and ideological conformity is imposed.”
The weaponisation of antisemitism accusations is central to this strategy. Criticism of Israeli government policy is routinely conflated with hatred of Jews. The effect is to chill debate, to intimidate critics, and to protect the settlement enterprise from scrutiny. As one reviewer of Pappé’s book noted, the strategy involves “cracked down on dissent in the Labour Party, and relentlessly smeared critics.”
The Australian Connection
The pattern is not confined to the United States and the United Kingdom. Australia has its own history of Zionist lobbying and political interference – a history that remains largely unexamined in mainstream discourse.
The Australian example is particularly instructive because it reveals how the machinery of influence operates even in a country geographically distant from the Middle East, with no historical responsibility for the conflict, and no strategic interest that would justify the degree of alignment with Israeli policy.
The mechanisms are similar: campaign donations, community lobbying, and the weaponisation of antisemitism accusations to silence critics. Australian politicians who question Israeli policy face organised opposition from Zionist organisations. The media environment is shaped by the same dynamics of donor pressure and editorial alignment.
The result is a foreign policy that is not in Australia’s national interest – AUKUS, the uncritical support for US Middle East policy, the silence on Israeli atrocities – but is dictated by a donor class whose primary loyalty is not to Australia.
This is not a fringe observation. It is the conclusion of the same structural analysis that applies to the United States and the United Kingdom. The only difference is scale.
The Geographic Safety Nets
The “Greater Israel” project is not merely ideological. It is infrastructural. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… https://theaimn.net/how-zionist-lobbying-has-reshaped-global-politics/
Roxby Bill impacting Aboriginal rights is rushed to a Vote on Tues 16 June
Alert: a bad Roxby Downs Bill and draconian new Indenture, impacting Aboriginal rights and interests, is being rushed to a Vote in SA Parliament expected on Tues 16 June to pass into Law by at least the end of the week. The SA State Labor Government has a lot to answer for.
see “BHP seek 50-year mining rights to expand Olympic Dam, as SA Labor Ministers indulge a farcical process and ignore public input”
Opinion by David Noonan B.Sc., M.Env.St., Independent Environment Campaigner (2-p attached)
Inexplicably, Deputy Premier the Hon Kyam Maher MLC spoke glowingly to the Bill in a Legislative Council 2nd Reading Speech on 3rd June.
BHP seek 50-year mining rights to expand Olympic Dam, as SA Labor Ministers indulge a farcical process and ignore public input
By David Noonan, 15 June 26, https://au.spiritofeureka.org/2026/06/15/bhp-seek-50-year-mining-rights-to-expand-olympic-dam-sa-labor-ministers-indulge-a-farcical-process-and-ignore-public-input/
BHP and the State Government have agreed on a Roxby Downs Bill and new Indenture to govern
Olympic Dam and associated mining expansions for the next 50 years. This is a re-run of
precedence to big mining vested interests that has typified SA from back in 1982 and sets in
train up to a tripling of BHP demand for water in the dryest State.
State Labor decided to drop the highly complex Bill and new Indenture into Parliament without
prior notice, with the Minister for Mining Hon Tom Koutsantonis MP saying he wants the Bill
passed ‘unchanged and without delay’.
A short Select Committee was started up and “Parliamentary News” announced a six-working
day public consultation period – apologies to many interested parties if they didn’t get this news
in a timely way from such a well-read source.
For independent scrutiny, the proponent of the Bill the Minister for Mining was made the
Committee Chairperson and two non-public Hearings were held: first with the Department for
Mining and then with BHP and the Chamber of Mines as supportive compliant Witnesses.
To epitomise what a farce this process is, the Select Committee was set up to Report the day
after public input was to close at COB on Monday 1st June, and that is what they did. The ‘Report’
was Tabled and the Chairperson and Members of Committee all gave uncritical Speeches on
the Bill on the 2nd of June – the very morning after public input had closed.
This farce contradicts any claim by our SA State Labor Government to due process, to a fair
hearing and to integrity in public consultation.
The Report and Speeches inexplicably failed to discuss any of the important content of public
input across 22 Submissions received – they had left no time to even consider it properly. The
‘Report’ has a couple of pages on the non-public Hearings but provides no discussion or even a
summary of the public input. The public Submissions were not released until after the
Speeches and Parliamentary week had concluded.
People have a right to be heard in SA. Aboriginal Native title representative bodies and
individuals have sought to be heard on the Roxby Bill – including to give evidence in public
Hearings, as the Bill affects their rights and interests and their country and culture. However,
they have so far been denied that right and respect.
To be fair, the Department for Environment and Water was a Witness at second non-public
Hearing: with the CEO stating that closure of BHP Olympic Dam Wellfield A “will produce
significant benefits” to the unique and fragile Mound Springs that are dependent on natural
flows of Great Artesian Basin (GAB) ground water. However, the Bill intends to keep Wellfield A
operating for a further decade till 2036.
Asked about the benefits of replacing BHP’s far larger scale Wellfield B extraction of GAB water
for mining with an alternative desalinated marine water supply, the CEO said: “Yes definitely,
both the environment and cultural values”. However, the Bill grants rights to BHP to keep
pumping water from Wellfield B for decades.
A ‘Key Ask’ to the Premier by the State peak body Conservation SA (19 Dec) was conveyed to the
Roxby Committee in David Noonan and Friends of Mound Springs (see FOMS) public input:
Protect the Mound Springs and End Unsustainable Water Extraction from the Great
Artesian Basin
Mound Springs are globally significant cultural, ecological and geological features, and
are a listed EPBC Act “Endangered Ecological Community”. These unique and fragile
little gems support rare species, deep cultural heritage and landscapes central to the
identity of Traditional Owners. Community concern has escalated regarding BHP’s use
of Great Artesian Basin water for mining and the cumulative impact on Springs.
We call for:
a. Recognition of the Mound Springs of the GAB as a high-value ecosystem requiring
elevated protection.
b. Closure as soon as possible of BHP Wellfield A water extraction operations that have
directly impacted the Springs.
c. Transition of industrial scale BHP Wellfield B water extraction operations toward
alternative water sources, such as desalination or recycled water, to protect the Basin.
d. Transparent timely reporting of extraction volumes, groundwater pressures and
spring health and monitoring information.
e. Co-governance with Traditional Owners, with investment in cultural heritage
protection and Indigenous Rangers on country
Conservation SA has sought “a clear safeguard against irreversible damage” in needed closure
of Wellfield A and a phase out Wellfield B, but this Bill fails to do so.
Deputy Premier the Hon Kyam Maher MLC spoke glowingly to the Bill in a Legislative Council 2nd
Reading Speech on 3rd June. Surely, he would have first read the public input from Aboriginal
Native Title bodies, objections from the State Local Voice, and others calling to be heard on the
Bill. As Min for Aboriginal Affairs Mr Maher must hold this Bill off and respect and deliver on the
right to be heard in Public Hearings (e-mail at AttorneyGeneral@sa.gov.au Ph: (08) 7322 7050).
As Treasurer the Hon Tom Koutsantonis MP has finally put monies in the SA Budget for ‘Truth-
Telling’ – this bad Roxby Bill and draconian new Indenture means there is a lot more truth to tell.
Integrity in public office depends a lot on what the State Labor does next on the Roxby Downs
Bill and new Indenture. This bad Bill must not be rushed unchanged through Parliament by the
end of this June sitting. Public Hearings are necessary so people can be heard and respected in
our society and precious water and Springs must now be protected in this the dryest State.
Further info, see “Roxby Bill rides roughshod over environmental and Indigenous concerns”
at https://www.conservationsa.org.au/protect_mound_springs
Public Submissions to the Roxby Downs Select Committee were belatedly released, see at:
parliament.sa.gov.au/en/Committees/Committees -Detail and scroll to:
Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of Ratification) Amendment Bill SELECT
1 This month.
20 September –National Day of Action in Melbourne on the International Day of Peace
Help Aunty Sue Protect Her Land and Sacred Sites From Destructive Rocket Testing.
.
Australians deserve the truth
about
AUKUS – https://aukuspublicinquiry.com/
PETITION – To: Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and the Australian Labor Government
of the week – Australians for War Powers Reform (AWPR)
To see nuclear-related stories in greater depth and intensity
Antinuclear 