Antinuclear

Too Quick to Support Force, Too Slow to Grow Peace

By Tara Gutman, ICAN Australia, Mar 03, 2026, https://icanaustralia.substack.com/p/too-quick-to-support-force-too-slow?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=6291617&post_id=189729809&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

The US and Israeli strikes on Iran on the weekend present Australia with a difficult but necessary question: what does it mean to defend an “international rules-based order” if that defence is applied selectively?

Moments like this test whether our commitment to international law is principled or contingent.

Australia’s Foreign Minister moved swiftly to express support for the strikes. Yet their illegality was immediately apparent to leading legal experts worldwide, including clarion calls from Australia’s own Professor Ben Saul and Donald Rothwell. The unanimous verdict of the legal community is that the strikes were again, as was the case in June 2025, manifestly illegal under the UN Charter.

The prohibition on the use of force is a cornerstone of international law. Kick at it repeatedly, dislodge it enough, and the foundations begin to give way. Don’t for a moment let the flurry of legal opinions suggest that this is a rhetorical disagreement; it is a serious legal dispute about the limits of military power.

When powerful states stretch those limits, the consequences ripple outward. International law depends not only on formal enforcement, but on perception, consistency and restraint. If some states vest in themselves the authority to determine when force is justified, others will inevitably take note.

For a middle power like Australia, which relies on stable legal frameworks rather than strategic dominance, that erosion carries real cost. If Australia is serious about international law, it must apply the rules consistently to everyone, everywhere, at all times, including to its closest partners.

Then there is the deeper nuclear dimension.

Both the United States and Israel are nuclear-armed states. When nuclear-armed governments conduct strikes framed as counter-proliferation measures, it reinforces perceptions of hierarchy and hypocrisy in the global non-proliferation regime, centred on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The NPT rests on a two-part bargain dating back to 1968: non-nuclear-weapon states agreed to forgo nuclear weapons while the five permanent members of the Security Council, who are nuclear-armed, promised that they would pursue disarmament “in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race…and a treaty on general and complete disarmament“. Progress by the nuclear-armed states on that second pillar stalled, while reliance on nuclear deterrence has become more deeply embedded in strategic doctrine, and four additional states have developed their own nuclear weapons.

This credibility gap is precisely why the citizen-led coalition, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), created in Melbourne in 2007, worked with humanitarians worldwide, in particular the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, to develop a treaty that makes nuclear weapons illegal and sets the stage for their elimination.

This treaty-led approach to banning inhumane weapons has already been achieved for all other weapons of mass destruction. ICAN is now led from Geneva by former ALP Federal Member for Fremantle, Melissa Parke, and has over 700 partner organisations who continue to advocate for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the only legally binding global instrument that comprehensively prohibits nuclear weapons and establishes a pathway toward their elimination. Ninety-nine countries have joined this treaty.

Australia is not one of them.

Given our historical good standing on arms control, I’m often asked why this is, including by state and federal parliamentarians. The straight answer is that our government is fearful to confront our powerful ally, even on this topic on which the safety of life on earth rests, in fact, particularly on this topic.

Australia occupies an unusual position in the nuclear debate. We are not a nuclear-armed state. We do not host our own nuclear weapons. Yet we are deepening defence integration with nuclear-armed AUKUS allies, expanding force posture initiatives, hosting joint facilities, and embedding ourselves more tightly within extended deterrence arrangements. Alliance cooperation, we are told, brings clear benefits. It also brings exposure.

Retaliatory strikes on US facilities across the Gulf illustrate a basic reality: infrastructure associated with military operations become targets. As Australia expands access and interoperability, it is prudent, not disloyal, to assess how that affects our own vulnerability in a crisis. This is not an argument for abandoning alliances. It is an argument for clarity about trade-offs.

If Australia is prepared to criticise breaches of international law by adversaries, it must also be prepared to express principled concern when allies test those same rules. Selective application weakens the normative architecture we claim to uphold.

Military strikes can delay technical capabilities, but they don’t resolve the political drivers of proliferation. Durable non-proliferation outcomes have historically depended on negotiated constraints, verification and reciprocal commitments, not cycles of force and retaliation.

Security built on nuclear brinkmanship is brittle security.

The Australian government is not living up to the image of our nation as a principled, multilateral middle power that Prime Minister Albanese painted at the UN General Assembly last year when he said:

“If we give people reason to doubt the value of co-operation, then the risk of conflict becoming the default option grows. If we allow any nation to imagine itself outside the rules, or above them, then the sovereignty of every nation is eroded.”

Australia should walk the talk and swiftly reposition itself to buttress confidence in international law. The government should begin by publicly and repeatedly reaffirming that international law consistently, to allies and adversaries alike.

Next, it has a responsibility to clarify for itself and inform the public whether any joint facilities based in Australia played a role in supporting the strikes and take measures to ensure that Australian territory is not used to facilitate unlawful military action. Not to satisfy a journalist’s curiosity, but because it’s an obligation under international law.

Lastly, the government should demonstrate its commitment to diplomacy and, without further delay, join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as part of a credible strategy to reduce nuclear risk. Numerous cities, councils and state and territory parliamentarians have signed a pledge in support of taking this action. So have a majority of federal Parliamentarians.

Australians want a world in which law constrains power. Our government must be prepared to defend that principle confidently and consistently, even and especially among allies.

At present, Australia risks being too quick to support force, and too slow to grow peace.

About the author

Tara Gutman is a lawyer and strategist specialised in international law at Lexbridge Lawyers. Tara is also Co-Chair of ICAN Australia.

March 6, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

Nuclear Weapons in Australia – Time to End the Secrecy 

March 1, 2026, Australians for War Powers Reform (AWPR) , https://warpowersreform.org.au/nuclear-weapons-in-australia-time-to-end-the-secrecy/

 Under secretly-concluded arrangements with our allies, Australia is now on track to have US nuclear weapons on Australian soil for lengthy periods, starting very soon.

A new report released today details this dangerous development and exposes how the Australian community is being kept in the dark about it.

The report by civil society group Australians for War Powers Reform (AWPR) examines efforts by the Albanese government to facilitate the increasing presence of nuclear weapons capable aircraft and submarines.

“Many Australians are completely unaware that under current agreements with the US Australian airfields and port facilities will be hosting US aircraft and subs that could be carrying nuclear weapons. And those visits will increase dramatically, possibly in breach of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,” said AWPR spokesperson Peter Murphy.

“A massive 1.6 billion dollars is currently being spent to upgrade the Tindal RAAF base in the Northern Territory and media reports describe six B-52, long-range, nuclear-capable bombers being “housed” there. But so far there’s been no proper public debate about Australia’s increasing involvement in the US nuclear weapons system.”

The Albanese government currently has a “we don’t ask” policy when it comes to whether US aircraft and ships are carrying nuclear weapons while in Australia. At the same time the US has a “neither confirm nor deny” policy on nuclear weapons. These policies are unwarranted and unacceptable.

“It’s time to end the secrecy on nuclear weapons and let the public have an informed debate. Do we really want these weapons of mass destruction in Australia? Shouldn’t the parliament discuss and vote on these matters?”

Australians have consistently rejected any role for nuclear weapons in our defence policies. A national poll last year revealed that two-thirds of Australians want the government to sign and ratify the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

“In this new report we are also urging the government to initiate a full independent inquiry into the AUKUS pact, as repeatedly called for by civil society and former prime ministers and foreign ministers. It should include a comprehensive review of Australia’s policies on nuclear weapons,” Peter Murphy said.

The full report “Australia and US Nuclear Weapons: Time to End the Secrecy” is available here

March 5, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

The Ghost in the Kill-Chain: The Invisible Cost of “Surgical” War

Today, to hold a principled anti-war stance is often derided as “un-Australian” or weaponised through accusations of anti-Semitism, all while a new cycle of state-sanctioned Islamophobia plays out under the guise of national security. We are witnessing the return of “One Nation” rhetoric: a toxic mix of division and rabid ignorance.

Australia is not a bystander. Firms like Palantir and Anduril have successfully blurred the lines between civilian and military data. In February 2026, the Labor government quietly awarded Palantir a fresh $7.6 million contract for Defence’s Cyber Warfare Division. Meanwhile, Canberra has committed $1.7 billion to Anduril’s “Ghost Shark” program—autonomous undersea vehicles designed for strike operations.

28 February 2026 David Tyler, https://theaimn.net/the-ghost-in-the-kill-chain-the-invisible-cost-of-surgical-war/

The Hidden Human Cost of Algorithmic Warfare

Fresh from their “snuff-movie” hit incinerating Venezuelan fishermen, Team Trump moves yet another carrier strike group into the Persian Gulf. Suddenly, our infotainment airwaves are full of experts spruiking “clean, surgical strikes,” while our media eagerly repeats the Pentagon’s propaganda. An old fat sea-cow, the USS Abraham Lincoln, and her tattooed bouncers are framed as instruments of precision and humane restraint, hovering just over the horizon of Iran’s ruggedly spectacular coast.

“Surgical strikes?” Pentagon experts now propose to kill and maim Iranians in an illegal blitzkrieg or perhaps three months of “boots on the ground” – the messages are as garbled as a Trump rally speech. But what is clearly being sold is the old lie that war is glorious, noble, and heroic. The US is supposedly ready to “send a message” without another Iraq-style quagmire because, this time, war will be data-driven, algorithmically optimised, and somehow morally minimised.

Modern warfare has never been more complex, nor more bloodthirsty. Today, to hold a principled anti-war stance is often derided as “un-Australian” or weaponised through accusations of anti-Semitism, all while a new cycle of state-sanctioned Islamophobia plays out under the guise of national security. We are witnessing the return of “One Nation” rhetoric: a toxic mix of division and rabid ignorance. From the White House, the lies arrive with such velocity that they overwhelm the public’s ability to process them. Above all, we are sold an antiseptic fantasy: that the next war will be a clean victory won by Artificial Intelligence, where autonomous drones and “algorithmic warfare” replace the messy reality of human slaughter.

We are rarely told who taught the machines to kill. And at what human cost.

The reality of 2026 is that the “intelligence” in AI remains deeply, painfully, and inexorably human. AI-enabled targeting, surveillance, and logistics systems require billions of data points to be labelled, sorted, and refined before a single model can be deployed. Every box drawn around a body in a blurry image, every classification of rubble, every tag of “weapon” versus “non-combatant” has been performed by a human being. Not by Silicon Valley engineers, but by a vast, hidden army of pieceworkers scattered across the Global South.

In refugee camps in East Africa, in cramped internet cafés in South Asia, and in crowded apartments in Latin America, workers are paid the equivalent of a few dollars an hour to sit at flickering screens and trace rectangles around human silhouettes. Behold the invisible pedagogues of the war machine, providing the labelled examples that allow military AI to distinguish “target” from “background,” “combatant” from “crowd.”

The irony is dark and palpable. Many of these workers live in regions already wrecked by Western interventions. Some fled earlier conflicts in Iraq, Syria, or Afghanistan; others live under permanent austerity. Men and women now find themselves training systems that may one day patrol their own skies. It is a grim circularity: the global poor – the “wretched of the earth,” as Frantz Fanon termed them – are pressed into teaching the next generation of weapons how to see.

This is the new “Digital Taylorism.” Just as 20th-century manufacturers broke down manual labour into minute, repetitive tasks, 21st-century AI firms have fragmented intellectual labour into atomised micro-gestures. For those training military models, the work is often traumatic. Investigations into data-labelling hubs in Kenya, India, and Colombia document the harm: workers are forced to view thousands of hours of violent, graphic content—war footage, torture, and the aftermath of bombings—to “fine-tune” the algorithm’s recognition.

Unlike the soldiers who will eventually operate these systems, these digital labourers have no veteran status, no medals, and no guaranteed access to mental health care. When their performance drops due to the trauma, the solution is simple: deactivate their account and hire another worker from the endless queue.

Australia is not a bystander. Firms like Palantir and Anduril have successfully blurred the lines between civilian and military data. In February 2026, the Labor government quietly awarded Palantir a fresh $7.6 million contract for Defence’s Cyber Warfare Division. Meanwhile, Canberra has committed $1.7 billion to Anduril’s “Ghost Shark” program—autonomous undersea vehicles designed for strike operations.

When these systems are woven into civilian infrastructure, the war machine becomes an everyday reality. The same optimisation logic used to squeeze more deliveries out of a warehouse worker is repurposed to accelerate the “sensor-to-shooter” loop. In Australia, we saw a prototype of this in Robodebt: the weaponisation of data against the poorest, treating them as problems to be hunted by algorithms long before any human looks at the facts.

This is not a glitch. It is how capital has integrated AI into the security state. A data labeller in Nairobi might make less in a day than a single second of flight time for a carrier-based fighter jet. The system depends on the invisibility of the connection between the micro-task on a screen and the missile in the sky.

We must refuse the comforting illusion that the coming war will be “clean” because it is “smart.” If our automated future is built on a foundation of traumatised, underpaid labour, then it is not a technological triumph. It is a moral failure disguised as innovation. The cost of the next war will not only be counted in missiles fired and lives lost in Tehran or the Strait of Hormuz. It is already being paid, quietly, in the human dignity we have sacrificed to train the machines that will fight it.

Coda: The Sycophant’s Algorithm

And so, we find ourselves back in the familiar, fawning posture of the Australian security establishment – a collection of strategic wallflowers so desperate for an invitation to the dance that they have handed the keys to the kingdom to a band of Silicon Valley carpetbaggers. We are told that by tethering our national interest to the likes of Palantir and Anduril, we are buying “security.”

In reality, we are buying a front-row seat to our own irrelevance.

We have become the regional branch managers for a war machine we neither control nor understand. To watch a Labor government – the party that once spoke of “national sovereignty” – quietly outsource our military intelligence to foreign algorithms trained by the global dispossessed is more than a policy failure; it is a spiritual surrender. It is the triumph of the technocrat over the citizen, the dashboard over the diplomat. We are being marched into a conflict in the Middle East not by the force of reason, but by the relentless, unthinking click of a mouse in a Nairobi sweatshop. It is a spectacle of profound hollowness, orchestrated by people who wouldn’t know a national interest if it bit them on the leg in the middle of a Canberra cocktail party.

This article was originally published on URBAN WRONSKI WRITES

March 3, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

Australia backs strikes on Iran – but do Australians?

1 March 2026 AIMN Editorial. By Peter Brown, https://theaimn.net/australia-backs-strikes-on-iran-but-do-australians/

When the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes on Iran, the immediate international reaction ranged from firm endorsement to urgent calls for restraint.

In Canberra, the response was swift and clear. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced Australia’s support for the action, framing it within longstanding concerns about Iran’s regional conduct and nuclear ambitions. Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Defence Minister Richard Marles reinforced the government’s position, while travel advisories were updated and contingency arrangements activated for Australians in the region.

Diplomatically, the decision reflects a familiar pattern. Australia has historically aligned with its principal security partner in moments of escalation. Alliance credibility, non-proliferation principles and strategic continuity remain central pillars of Canberra’s foreign policy.

The domestic response, however, is less predictable.

For many Australians – particularly those who prioritise national security and alliance stability – support for the strikes follows a straightforward logic. Iran’s nuclear program has long been a source of international tension. Its involvement in regional proxy conflicts is widely documented. From this perspective, action aimed at preventing further escalation or nuclear capability can be seen as a deterrent measure rather than a provocation.

There is also the matter of alliance expectations. Australia’s security architecture is deeply interwoven with that of the United States. Moments of crisis test not only military capability but diplomatic reliability. Governments in Canberra, of both major parties, have historically erred on the side of solidarity.

At the same time, military action in the Middle East carries a long and complicated legacy. Public memory of Iraq and Afghanistan informs contemporary debate. For some Australians, the threshold for supporting overseas strikes is higher than it once was.

That caution has precedent. In the years following the 2003 Iraq invasion, polling consistently showed a majority of Australians believed Australia should not have participated – a reminder that public sentiment can shift sharply once the long-term consequences of intervention become clear.

Concerns now being raised focus less on defending Iran’s government and more on the risks inherent in escalation: retaliation across the region, disruption to global energy markets, and the possibility of a broader conflict drawing in additional powers.

Within parts of Labor’s traditional base – already engaged in debates over AUKUS and Australia’s expanding strategic footprint – questions about proportionality and long-term consequences have already surfaced. Peace organisations and some crossbench figures have signalled the need for restraint and renewed diplomatic channels.

Reasonable observers can hold two positions simultaneously: that Iran’s regime presents genuine strategic challenges, and that military escalation carries unpredictable consequences.

The Political Test Ahead

At this early stage, comprehensive polling on the current strikes is limited. Historically, Australian public opinion on international conflicts has tended toward caution. Support for allies often coexists with reluctance for deeper involvement.

What may ultimately shape domestic opinion is not the initial decision, but what follows. If the strikes remain contained and diplomatic efforts regain momentum, public reaction may remain measured. If escalation broadens – affecting global markets, regional stability, or Australian nationals abroad – scrutiny of Canberra’s stance will intensify.

For the Albanese government, the immediate decision aligns with longstanding strategic settings. The longer-term test will be flexibility: whether Australia can both maintain alliance solidarity and adapt its position as events evolve.

Foreign policy decisions made in the opening hours of a crisis often appear decisive. Their durability depends on what unfolds next.

In moments like this, governments act quickly. Public opinion tends to move more gradually – but it is rarely indifferent to outcomes.

March 2, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

Australia invests $310m to fast-track parts for first AUKUS nuclear submarines

24 Feb 26, https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/world/europe/australia-invests-310m-to-fasttrack-parts-for-first-aukus-nuclear-submarines/news-story/e2bb519ee8e7bb24858e227bae48812a

Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy has announced an increased investment into the AUKUS program to bolster the nation’s military capabilities during talks in London

Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy has announced an increased investment of $310m into the AUKUS program to bolster the nation’s military capabilities during a meeting with British counterparts.

Minister Conroy met with the UK’s Defence Minister Luke Pollard in London this week — the first meeting for the Australia-United Kingdom Defence Industry Dialogue (AUKDID) since 2018 — and he said there will be further investment in the AUKUS program’s Pillar One including the construction of the very first parts to go into the nuclear reactors.

“I’m announcing that we have invested $310m in long-lead items for the reactors for the first two SSN-AUKUS boats,” Minister Conroy said.

“We just spent $310m acquiring the very first parts that will go into the reactors for the first two submarines that we will construct in Adelaide beginning later this decade.

“This project will create 20,000 high-skilled secure jobs making the most advanced submarines in the world, equipping the Royal Australian Navy with the capabilities it needs to deter conflict in our region”.

Mr Conroy will this week visit Rolls Royce Derby, northwest of London, to inspect reactors and also visit BAE Systems at Barrow-in-Furness in Cumbria to discuss the progress of the SSN-AUKUS program.

“The defence relationship between Australia and the United Kingdom is going from strength to strength,” he said.

“Today’s announcements demonstrate further integration … to grow our industrial bases to give our respected forces the equipment they need to make both our countries safer in an increasingly uncertain world”.

Minister Conroy said the AUKUS timeline remains “on track” and the government was “hitting all major milestones” including the arrival of HMAS Anson.

It arrived at WA’s HMAS Stirling on Sunday to undergo its first maintenance of a UK nuclear-powered submarine in Australia.

Minister Conroy said the latest meetings between the two governments was a sign “relationship is the strongest that it’s been for a long, long time, we are the best of friends”.

He said the discussions also included: “Deepening co-operation on advanced radar technology including exploring the use of Australian radar technologies on UK projects”.

“We also flagged greater work on resilience supply chains and critical minerals and we’ve also flagged an increase on a number of Australian embeds at the BA submarine construction yard at Barrow,” he said.

“We are also supporting UK weapons testing of systems destined for Ukraine”.

February 27, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

Possibility of US ever selling Australia nuclear submarines is increasingly remote, Aukus critics say.

“The Aukus deal is a very attractive one for the Americans because they get a submarine base and dockyard at Australia’s expense in Western Australia, and they do not have any obligation to sell any Virginia-class submarines to us unless their navy can spare them.

“If the US say ‘there are no subs for you Australia’, it is not reneging on the deal: that is the deal, that is what Australia signed up to. That’s why it’s always been a bad deal for Australia.”

“The Australian government seems to be engaged in an exercise of denial: whenever these figures come out they have apologists who say ‘everything’s fine, there’s nothing see here’.

Malcolm Turnbull says government is ‘engaged in an exercise of denial’, as defence minister insists $368bn deal is ‘full steam ahead’

Ben Doherty, 6 Feb 26, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/05/aukus-nuclear-submarine-deal-us-australia

Australia’s submarine agency insists the Aukus agreement is progressing “at pace and on schedule”, but sceptics of the $368bn deal argue the chances of the US ever selling promised Virginia-class submarines to Australia are increasingly remote.

The former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull has said the Australian government is engaged “in an exercise of denial” about the parlous state of Aukus’s progress, while the Greens senator David Shoebridge said the deal was a “pantomime”, hopelessly one-sided in the US’s favour.

A new United States congressional report has openly contemplated the US navy not selling any nuclear submarines to Australia – as promised under Aukus – because the US wants to retain control of the submarines for a potential conflict with China over Taiwan.

The US fleet currently has only three-quarters of the submarines it needs (49 boats of a force-level goal of 66). Shipyards need to build Virginia-class submarines at a rate of two a year to meet the US’s own needs, and to lift that to 2.33 boats a year in order to be able to supply submarines to Australia.

Legislation passed by the US Congress prohibits the sale of any submarine to Australia if the US needs it for its own fleet. The US commander in chief – the president of the day – must certify that the US relinquishing a submarine “will not degrade the United States undersea capabilities”.

Turnbull said US shipbuilding rates had “remained stubbornly set at that low level for a long time, despite many billions of dollars of extra investment”, and that expecting build rates to almost double within a couple of years in order to supply Australia with vessels was unrealistic.

“The Australian government seems to be engaged in an exercise of denial: whenever these figures come out they have apologists who say ‘everything’s fine, there’s nothing see here’.”

The January report by the US Congressional Research Service, Congress’s policy research arm, posits an alternative “military division of labour” under which the submarines earmarked for sale to Australia are instead retained under US command to be sailed out of Australian bases.

The report argues both for and against the US selling three Virginia-class submarines to Australia, beginning in 2032. But it makes the case that, in the event of a “conflict or crisis” with China over Taiwan, submarines under Australian command could not be ordered into operation, whereas US-commanded vessels, operated out of Australian bases, could be immediately deployed. Australia has consistently maintained it could offer no guarantees of supporting the US in a conflict with China.

“This could weaken rather than strengthen deterrence and warfighting capability in connection with a US-China crisis or conflict,” the report says.

The defence minister, Richard Marles, dismissed the report as “commentary” when asked on Thursday, insisting Aukus was “full steam ahead”.

“You’re going to hear a whole lot of commentary at the end of the day from the US Congress,” Marles said.

“We’ve heard the US president make clear the position of the United States in respect of this question, and he has said that we are full steam ahead in respect of this, and it includes the transfer of the Virginias.”

A spokesperson for the Australian Submarine Agency told the Guardian that Aukus remained firmly in the strategic interests of its three partners – Australia, the US and the UK – and that “Australia’s commitment to the Aukus partnership is unwavering”.

“All three Aukus partners are investing significantly in our respective industrial bases to ensure the success of Aukus, to meet respective requirements and timelines, including the delivery of three Virginia-class submarines to Australia by the US.”

The spokesperson said Aukus was progressing “at pace and on schedule”.

“The optimal pathway has been designed to ensure a methodical, safe and secure transition from Australian conventional submarines, drawing on more than 70 years’ experience and expertise of our Aukus partners in the safe and effective operation of naval nuclear propulsion.”

Turnbull: ‘It’s always been a bad deal for Australia’

Politically, in the US the Aukus agreement won approval from a Pentagon review last year, which supported the deal continuing. President Donald Trump – who won’t be the president to decide whether or not to sell US submarines to Australia – told reporters the deal was “full steam ahead”.

But Turnbull, the prime minister whose deal to buy submarines from the French group Naval was torn up by Scott Morrison in favour of Aukus, has long argued the Aukus agreement has always been irretrievably lop-sided in the US’s favour.

“The Aukus deal is a very attractive one for the Americans because they get a submarine base and dockyard at Australia’s expense in Western Australia, and they do not have any obligation to sell any Virginia-class submarines to us unless their navy can spare them.

“If the US say ‘there are no subs for you Australia’, it is not reneging on the deal: that is the deal, that is what Australia signed up to. That’s why it’s always been a bad deal for Australia.”

The congressional research report highlighted, again, the lagging rates of US shipbuilding.

For the past 15 years, the US navy has ordered Virginia-class submarines at a rate of two a year, but its shipyards have never met that build rate “and since 2022 has been limited to about 1.1 to 1.2 boats per year, resulting in a growing backlog of boats procured but not yet built”.

Senator David Shoebridge, the Greens’ defence and foreign affairs spokesperson, said the US’s division of labour proposal exposed the “pantomime” that the Aukus agreement was concerned with Australia’s defence.

“No matter what flag is painted on the side of any nuclear submarines Australia gets, they will be US-controlled and US-directed.

“Critics of Aukus have always assumed that the US will not hand over any nuclear submarines unless Australia guarantees they will use them in a US war with China. This report now confirms this is the dominant view in Washington.”

Shoebridge said the Aukus deal was dangerously compromising Australian sovereignty to US interests, at the cost of billions in public funds.

“The fact that Trump, with his ‘America first’ approach to squeezing and humiliating US allies, is willing to press on with Aukus tells you all you need to know about the one-sided deal. If Trump wants it, we should resist it.”

February 9, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

UK to deploy nuclear-powered submarine to Australia

27 January 2026 | By Andrew McLaughlin, https://psnews.com.au/uk-to-deploy-nuclear-powered-submarine-to-australia/172179/

The UK’s Royal Navy will soon deploy a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) to Australia for six months as part of its commitment to the AUKUS construct and to its presence in the wider Indo-Pacific region.

The Astute-class submarine HMS Anson arrived in Gibraltar earlier this month after it departed its home base of Faslane in Scotland on 10 January.

The boat is expected to patrol the Indian and western Pacific oceans during its deployment, and will be the UK’s first commitment to the Submarine Rotational Force–West (SRF-West) that was established under Pillar 1 of AUKUS in 2022.

The respected independent online news site Navy Lookout says, of the five Astute-class SSNs to enter RN service to date, HMS Anson is currently the only boat capable of being deployed. The class has suffered from build delays and poor availability since the lead boat, HMS Astute was commissioned in August 2010, and the remaining four boats are laid up at Faslane undergoing various stages of maintenance.

Two more Astute-class SSN boats are planned, with one currently undergoing sea trials, and the seventh boat scheduled to enter service in late 2028. After this, development of the planned SSN-AUKUS class boats – for which Australia will be a partner – is expected to gain pace.

The UK’s Defence Minister Luke Pollard told the British Parliament in December that an Astute-class boat would join SRF-West as “a core planning assumption for the RN under AUKUS”. Despite very low availability of the Astute-class in recent months, Mr Pollard said the government judges the commitment to be “both realistic and manageable within existing force planning”.

SRF-West is based at HMAS Stirling south of Fremantle in WA, and the Australian Government has committed billions of dollars to upgrade the base and the adjacent Henderson shipyard to support not only UK and US nuclear-powered submarine deployments, but also those of Australia from the mid-2030s, and to boost Australia’s shipbuilding capabilities.

SRF-West has taken its first few tentative steps forward, with a US Navy Virginia class SSN USS Vermont having completed a Submarine Maintenance Period at Stirling in November using a mixed US Navy and Australian maintenance workforce.

Other US Navy SSNs have conducted port visits to Stirling in recent years and these visits are expected to increase as the base and its infrastructure become more capable of supporting these vessels.

January 29, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

Paul Keating’s words ring true

The crazy irony of the whole project (AUKUS) has always been that it commits Australia to spending eye-watering amounts to build a capability supposed to defend us from military threats which are in fact most likely to arise simply because we have that capability and are using it to support the US in some conflict not in our interests to engage,

Australian Independent Media 23 January 2026 John Lord

As I’ve grown older, I’ve seen that in tough times, the United States often puts its own interests before its promises to allies or countries with shared goals. For instance, the Nixon Doctrine of 1971 (also known as the Guam Doctrine) suggested that the U.S. would reduce its military involvement in Asia, leaving allies to fend for themselves more. Similarly, the 2013 Syria “red line” incident highlighted a significant deviation when the U.S. decided against military intervention, despite previously asserting that chemical weapons use would provoke a response. In 2016, former Prime Minister Paul Keating told Lee Sales that after Donald Trump’s election, Australia should “cut the tag” from American foreign policy and focus more on building ties within Asia.

I remember a particular day in my childhood when I sat in my classroom, gazing at a poster of Superman next to a map of the world. Our teacher spoke of the United States as a beacon of hope, a nation that would stand up and help when others were in need, embodying the ideals of justice and freedom. As I grew older, my once clear-cut view was challenged by global events. Reality hit as I realised that America’s priorities shifted with its interests, and my hero, once steadfast in my young eyes, began to seem fallible.

Recently, two former Foreign Ministers, Bob Carr and Gareth Evans, have expressed views similar to those of Paul Keating. Both have distinguished themselves in international affairs. Carr suggested that:

“Our US ally is fiercely unpredictable and dedicated ruthlessly to American national interests, without any pretence of being committed to universal values or a global, rules-based order.”

“This is a big challenge for Australia and its security leaders. Our government needs to make it clear to Trump that Australians do not support his self-focused politics.”

Prime Minister Albanese should make this clear and stand firm.

Trump’s administration now poses a real threat to Australia’s interests and the safety of its people. He could use tariffs to pressure other countries and shows little ethical restraint. For instance, economic analysts suggest that U.S. tariffs could reduce Australia’s GDP, posing significant risks to sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing. This quantifiable threat underscores the need to solidify Australia’s international alliances, rather than relying solely on the U.S.

Trump’s administration once claimed that the United States sought to acquire Greenland, an approach marked by aggressive language and a lack of diplomacy. This startling ambition underscored the need for allies to support each other rather than resort to tactics reminiscent of territorial ambitions.

Greenland has made it clear that it would rather remain part of the Kingdom of Denmark than join the United States. That is their democratic right.

Australia should reconsider its role as the United States’ deputy sheriff. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese could use the nearly four hundred billion dollars set aside for old submarines to build drone defenses, address climate change, and help solve the housing crisis by creating hundreds of thousands of homes. To effectively transition this budget into actionable governance, a dedicated budget reallocation committee should be established to oversee the strategic deployment of funds. Inter-state accords can be formed to ensure cooperation and optimise resource distribution across regions. Such steps would provide a structured approach to transforming these alternative spending ideas into tangible outcomes, thereby enhancing Australia’s national resilience and improving the quality of life for its citizens.

Gareth Evans says America’s recent actions “put beyond doubt that America has zero respect for international law, morality, and the interests of its allies and partners.”

The crazy irony of the whole project (AUKUS) has always been that it commits Australia to spending eye-watering amounts to build a capability supposed to defend us from military threats which are in fact most likely to arise simply because we have that capability and are using it to support the US in some conflict not in our interests to engage, without any guarantee of support in return should we ever need it. In democracies like Australia, this considerable expenditure necessitates rigorous oversight to ensure accountability. Establishing strong parliamentary scrutiny and oversight committees could be an effective way to prevent strategic overreach and ensure that such commitments align with national interests. This level of democratic oversight could safeguard against unnecessary or misguided defense spending, illustrating how systems of accountability can help navigate complex international alliances.

Trump’s recent actions and words show he is now in a very dark and dangerous mindset, where anything could happen, even a third world war. Why aren’t we saying this openly?

He now thinks he can do whatever he wants. Reports have surfaced alleging that he ordered the kidnapping of Venezuela, intending for American companies to take over the country’s substantial oil reserves.

A letter from Trump to the prime minister of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre, has emerged, to complain that he has not received a Nobel Peace Prize……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….https://theaimn.net/paul-keatings-words-ring-true/

January 25, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

The incoherent mix in Australian defence policy

Defence policy should be about defending Australia, and nothing else

John Quiggin’s Blogstack, 19 Dec 25

Discussions of defence policy in Australia typically start from two underlying presumptions. The first is that the protection of our freedom and sovereignty from foreign conquest is too fundamental to be subject to the kind of cost- benefit analysis that is, or ought to be, normally applied to public expenditure. The second is that defence policy can be used to promote a wide variety of goals, such as projecting power and influence through peacekeeping and disaster relief.

Unfortunately, these presumptions are mutually inconsistent, and lead to incoherent policy responses. This is most evident in the case of AUKUS, the largest single defence purchase in Australian history, and a major change in policy with the shift to nuclear-powered submarines. There has been no explanation of the strategic rationale for AUKUS, let alone any attempt to weigh costs and benefits. Yet there has been extensive discussion of the potential for increased employment of skilled trades workers. Given the expenditure involved and the relatively modest numbers of workers required, this ought to be a third-order consideration, yet it appears to have had a significant influence on the design of the program.

As the case of AUKUS suggests, the interaction between defence and industry policy is a tangled one. In particular, the strong political demand from South Australia for manufacturing industries to replace motor vehicle building has weighed heavily on policy choices, effectively ruling out “off-the-shelf” purchases of submarines, and placing a high premium on including some Australian contribution to production of such high-cost items.

A Future Made in Australia ?

Given that the stated aim of policy is “A Future Made in Australia” , a more rational policy approach would provide direct subsidies to manufacturing of all kinds, while leaving open the option of off-the-shelf purchases of defence equipment. Paying higher costs to encourage a domestic armaments industry entails the opportunity cost of forgoing assistance that might be provide to other industries with greater social and economic benefits.

There is a defence rationale for maintaining a capacity to produce some armaments. In the event of a long conventional war, Australia might be unable to import crucial supplies. Hence, it would make sense to seek some degree of self- reliance in this respect.

However, the goals of industry policy and defence self- reliance are often poorly aligned. Large-scale procurement projects such as AUKUS and the F-35 program often involve some element of local production and assembly, but the resulting capacity would not necessarily be of value in the event of a conflict in which Australia was isolated from allied support

……………………………. the claimed industrial benefits of AUKUS involve integration into United Kingdom and United States supply chains. This is consistent with an industry policy goal of increasing exports of elaborately transformed manufactures. But it is directly contrary to the defence goal of enhancing our independent capacity to protect ourselves in an emergency. In the event of a conflict that cut off international supply chains, we would be unable to secure parts and repair services except for the subset that happened to be allocated to Australia.In many cases, the appropriate response to the possibility of supply disruptions will be a combination of stockpiles and (for items with civilian use, such as fuel) rationing, rather than the maintenance of high-cost production capacity.

The Grey Zone

Lying between policies designed for national defence and those aimed at delivering non-defence benefits is the aptly named “grey zone” . As the name implies, this term is poorly defined and covers a wide range of hostile actions by other nation states and non-state actors, ranging from aggressive disputes over maritime boundaries to cyber-attacks and election disinformation. Crucially, the term is used almost entirely in the context of defence policy, and to support the implication that a military response of some kind is appropriate.

In general, however, the capabilities required to address grey zone problems will bear little relationship to those required to defend Australia against invasion. For example, the resolution of maritime disputes might involve the deployment of patrol boats and coast guard vessels. But, despite a long history of such disputes, dating back to the “Cod Wars” between the UK and Iceland, serious armed conflict remains vanishingly rare. Moreover, the possession of more powerful naval forces is of little value, as the failure of the Royal Navy in three successive “wars” over fishing rights indicates.

An incoherent mix of objectives

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. As political scientist Daniel Drezner has observed, if everything is a national security issue, nothing is. Rather than expanding the role of the defence forces, while exempting defence expenditure from normal assessments of costs and benefits, we should begin by building a force capable of protecting Australia against any plausibly possible threat of attack or invasion (bearing in mind, the impossibility of protecting ourselves against nuclear missiles). Having done that, any expansion of the mission should be tested both for cost-effectiveness and for consistency with our broader policy objectives. https://johnquigginblog.substack.com/p/the-incoherent-mix-in-australian?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=806934&post_id=182047815&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

December 20, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment

Israel Apologists Hasten To Use Bondi Shooting To Attack Anti-Genocide Activists

Caitlin Johnstone, Dec 15, 2025, https://www.caitlinjohnst.one/p/israel-apologists-hasten-to-use-bondi?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=82124&post_id=181641440&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

Two shooters attacked a Jewish Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach on Sunday, killing fifteen people and injuring dozens of others. Police report that the shooters were a father and his son; the father was killed by police, and the son was captured.

The shooters appear to have been Muslim, but, much to the inconvenience of those who would like to use this incident to fan the flames of western Islamophobic hysteria, the man who selflessly risked his life to disarm one of them was also a Muslim father of two named Ahmed al-Ahmed.

As usual we’re seeing a lot of speculation about false flags and psyops regarding this incident, but I prefer to hang back from such commentary until I’ve seen some solid evidence.

I do have some thoughts about the public discourse we are seeing about the shooting right now, though.

Point 1: Obviously it is evil to massacre civilians for being Jewish.

Point 2: Obviously Israel’s massacring of civilians must continue to be opposed, and will continue to be opposed.

Today the worst people in the world are trying to pretend Point 1 and Point 2 are contradictory.

It’s so gross watching the tail-wagging excitement of Israel supporters in response to this shooting. They’re so happy they have another rhetorical weapon with which to bludgeon pro-Palestine voices into silence. They can barely contain their glee.

Benjamin Netanyahu immediately scrambled to hold a press conference proclaiming that the attack was the result of Australia taking some steps toward the recognition of a Palestinian state.

New York Times warmonger Bret Stephens penned an article titled “Bondi Beach Is What ‘Globalize the Intifada’ Looks Like,” arguing that the shooters “were taking to heart slogans like ‘resistance is justified,’ and ‘by any means necessary,’ which have become ubiquitous at anti-Israel rallies the world over.”

Iraq-raping war propagandist David Frum wrote a similar article for The Atlantic titled “The Intifada Comes to Bondi Beach,” saying the beach “has been repeatedly targeted by pro-Palestinian demonstrators” and denouncing the fact that “Many in the western world have interpreted post-October 7 anti-Israel actions within the framework of free speech.”

The virulently Islamophobic Australian senator Pauline Hanson swiftly slapped together a statement claiming that “the weekly anti-semitic protests across our nation” and “our obnoxious universities” were “warning signs” that such an attack was coming.

Sky News hastened to give a platform to Israeli Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sharren Haskel in an interview where she declared that “this is what it means” to allow protesters to chant “globalize the intifada”, saying that “if you let that continue and run in your streets” you are inviting further terrorist attacks. Haskel has previously called pro-Palestine protesters in Australia “useful idiots” for Hamas.

Political dynasty princeling Chris Cuomo took to Twitter to assert that people who’ve been accusing Israel of genocide helped “fuel the hatred on bondi beach.”

The Jewish Chronicle’s Stephen Pollard tweeted a video of pro-Palestine protesters in Birmingham with the caption “It you deny the connection between this and what happened at Bondi Beach you are part of the problem.”

A viral tweet from Australian right wing social media personality Kobie Thatcher features a video of a pro-Palestine protest with the caption “This was Sydney, Australia just 6 months ago. These scenes should have been an urgent warning.”

Opposition Leader Sussan Ley has used the attack to demand that Prime Minister Albanese shove through the authoritarian speech suppression plan put forward by Australia’s “antisemitism envoy” Jillian Segal earlier this year, arguing that “We have seen public landmarks turned into symbols of antisemitic hate. We have seen campuses occupied and Jewish students made to feel afraid.”

From the earliest moments after this attack Israel apologists have taken it as a given that it was an act of terrorism in response to Israel’s genocidal atrocities in Gaza, but then framing the people peacefully protesting those atrocities as the problem.

They’re openly acknowledging that the genocide is violently radicalizing people, but instead of coming to the obvious conclusion that Israel should therefore not commit genocide, they’re citing it as evidence that people should stop protesting the genocide.

December 16, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | Leave a comment