Anthony Albanese has signalled Labor still plans to sign an international treaty on nuclear weapons amid concerns about the AUKUS deal.
Catie McLeod, news.com.au 23 Mar 23
Anthony Albanese has signalled Labor still plans to sign a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons amid concerns the AUKUS submarine deal will breach Australia’s international obligations on the issue.
Under the trilateral security agreement with the United States and the UK, Australia will become the first non-nuclear weapon state to acquire nuclear-powered submarines by seeking an exemption from the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The government has said the submarines will only use nuclear propulsion and would not have nuclear weapons.
Despite this iron-clad assurance, some countries in the Indo-Pacific have raised concerns the submarine deal is a breach of Australia’s existing nuclear non-proliferation treaty obligations, and that it might stop it from ratifying an additional treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons.
Australia made a binding commitment to never acquire nuclear weapons when it ratified the international treaty on non-proliferation 50 years ago but it is yet to sign or ratify a newer treaty created in 2017 that binds member countries to outlawing nuclear weapons all together.
Labor first committed to signing and ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons at its National Conference in 2018 and reaffirmed that commitment in 2022.
Speaking in parliament on Wednesday, the Prime Minister said Labor would stick with the commitment and said Australia’s clear position was that a world without nuclear weapons “would be a very good thing”.
“We don’t acquire them ourselves, we wish that they weren’t there,” Mr Albanese said after independent Goldstein MP Zoe Daniel asked him if Labor would sign the nuclear prohibition treaty.
The Productivity Commission noted that for many years, the defence sector had received effective subsidy rates for domestic production of up to 300 per cent, compared to zero for most other parts of the economy.
It said that given the large sums of money involved in defence, more scrutiny from outside the sector was needed.
The Productivity Commission has cast doubt over the federal government’s decision to build nuclear-powered submarines in Australia, using its major report into the nation’s economy to argue for a complete re-appraisal of how the country meets its defence needs.
The commission’s report, Advancing Prosperity, made 71 recommendations across more than 1000 pages of analysis. It follows a long-term decline in Australia’s productivity growth rate, which over the past decade has slipped to its lowest level since the 1950s.
Part of the report focused on government infrastructure spending and procurement, particularly around defence, which it noted had for years suffered from “imperfect processes” and huge cost overruns.
It found there were problems in defence spending due to the complexity of much of the equipment, the need for a high-skilled workforce and the costs associated with integrating new technologies with old. This meant in almost all cases, Australia should avoid building its own defence equipment.
“Depending on the context, buying an already proven technology from overseas and not quickly, if ever, developing a domestic production capability is likely to be optimal in many contexts,” it found.
“A sophisticated domestic capability to use, store and maintain equipment would still be required regardless of where it was sourced from but would involve lower costs than domestic production and assembly.”
Under the AUKUS deal, Australia will obtain three Virginia-class submarines from the United States – to arrive in 2033, 2036 and 2039.
In the 2040s, Australia will build a new type of submarine, the SSN AUKUS, based on an updated version of the current British Astute-class submarine and featuring American parts.
The Productivity Commission noted that for many years, the defence sector had received effective subsidy rates for domestic production of up to 300 per cent, compared to zero for most other parts of the economy.
There was also less transparency around projects as governments cited national security grounds. But the commission said these reasons did not justify “the present level of opacity”.
On Sunday, Defence Minister Richard Marles refused to be drawn on the individual cost of the submarines to be supplied under the AUKUS agreement.
Since announcing the project, the government has been at pains to talk up its benefits to the Australian economy, particularly in South Australia and Western Australia.
Last Friday, Albanese said the submarines would create 20,000 jobs directly in Australia and “many tens of thousands” more through the broader economic impact of the project.
“What this will do is highly sophisticated manufacturing will lead to a renaissance of high-value manufacturing in Australia. That money, that economic activity stays right here,” he told ABC radio.
The Productivity Commission said the focus on local industry needs had added to the cost problems around many defence projects. It said that given the large sums of money involved in defence, more scrutiny from outside the sector was needed.
“Defence procurement is ripe for deep and disinterested scrutiny of its processes. There are strong grounds for re-thinking defence procurement, drawing on advice from those outside Defence,” it found.
“The productivity and efficiency benefits of better practices are large given the $270 billion of anticipated defence spending over the next decade.”
Apart from an outside examination of defence spending, the commission also argued all government spending needed closer inspection. It backed the public release of cost-benefit analyses of public projects.
The Grattan Institute’s transport and cities program director, Marion Terrill, said the growth in the number of “mega-projects” demanded more scrutiny.
She said two-thirds of the current major infrastructure projects under way across Australia are worth more than $5 billion, which meant the potential for cost blow-outs was increasing.
The $100 billion cost range for the submarine project meant it faced the same problems as a major infrastructure project.
“The larger the projects, the bigger the contracts, the greater the chance of a cost overrun and the size of that cost overrun being larger. We’ve got to the point where a $100 million project is little more than a rounding error,” she said.
Terrill said she backed the commission’s call for more transparency around public projects.
“We need to look at these projects in terms of taxpayers being shareholders, so it’s only fair that they understand why a decision has been made on their behalf but also the underlying assumptions around the costs and benefits.”
“The answer to that is, of course not. Of course not. And nor was one sought. I’ve listened to that conjecture from a number of commentators. It is plain wrong,” he said.
“What Australia would do or not in respect of any future conflict will be a matter to be considered at that time by the government of the day.”
Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine deal with the US and the UK will rapidly become “too big to fail”, the deputy prime minister has said.
Richard Marles made the comment in an interview with Guardian Australia’s politics podcast, pushing back at the idea the multidecade Aukus plan could be vulnerable to political changes in both the US and the UK.
He also predicted that broader diplomatic efforts to stabilise the relationship between Australia and China would “continue largely unaffected by what has been announced during the course of this week”.
As the minister for defence, Marles has been at the centre of the Aukus planning. He said he had felt the “gravity” and “responsibility” of this week’s announcement of sweeping, staged plans that involve Australian spending of up to $368bn by the mid-2050s.
One point of contention has been the Australian promise to provide $3bn in funding over the next four years to subsidise the submarine production base in the other two countries, mostly the US, and what guarantees there were that the US would actually proceed with selling three to five Virginia-class submarines to Australia in the 2030s.
Asked what contracts or agreements sat underneath the high-level political commitment announced in San Diego this week, Marles said the project was “a shared endeavour of the three countries”.
“There is going to be a legal underpinning to this … and there is going to need to be a treaty-level document between our three countries, so there is a whole lot of legality which will be worked through,” Marles said.
“But in so many ways this transcends that [given] the sheer size of the decision to share this capability with Australia. And having taken the step of doing that, which we’ve done, puts all three countries in a position where it’s too big for it to fail on the part of any of those countries.”
Marles said all three countries were “deeply committed to each other’s success in this project” and that was what gave him “a sense of assurance that this is going to play out in the way that we want it to play out”.
“This must work for the US, this must work for the UK, as much as it must work for Australia,” he said……………….
Marles also addressed questions about whether the submarines could become obsolete, given that an Australian National University report, Transparent Oceans?, found that scientific and technological advancements predicted oceans were “likely” or “very likely” to become transparent by the 2050s.
“Just as there is a lot of effort going into illuminating the seas, there is a lot of effort going into creating more stealth around a submarine,” Marles said……………………..
The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons said this week that the best way for Australia to reassure the region about the submarine plan would be to sign and ratify the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
It is Labor party policy to do so, but only “after taking account” of several factors, including the need for an effective verification and enforcement architecture and work to achieve universal support from other nations. The nuclear weapons states including the US have opposed the treaty, arguing it is out of step with the current security environment.
“Will Australian air warfare destroyers serve simply as a transport means and launch platform for the United States, receiving targeting data only with their agreement? Or will we have full targeting control over our Tomahawks?
Who will control the Tomahawk Missiles? News that Australia will purchase up to 220 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles might seem like just another Defence purchase, but there’s a hidden sovereignty issue that needs to be examined. And that’s what Rex Patrick is here to do.
The United States Congress has just approved the sale of as many as 20 Block IV Tomahawks and 200 Block V Tomahawks for $1.3 billion dollars. The US will provide support consisting of unscheduled missile maintenance, spares; procurement, training, in-service support, software, hardware, communication equipment, operational flight test, engineering, and technical expertise.
Tomahawk missiles are a long range, all weather, subsonic cruise missile used to attack land targets. The intention is for these proven and highly effective missiles to be fitted to our navy’s three Air Warfare Destroyers. But while these missiles will be fitted to our ships and be under Australian command, the ability to target them properly may be constrained by the US.
The purchase raises a sovereignty issue which must be bought out in the open and discussed.
We’re going to war tomorrow
I was in the United States in October 2001, just after 9/11. America was in shock. On the evening of October 5th, I was in a US Defence establishment working back late, hoping to be able to complete the task I was there to do so that I could return home to Australia.
My American host, sitting in front of his classified computer system, looked up at me and said, “America’s going to attack someone this weekend.”
I looked back at him and asked, ”You’ve got a classified email message telling you that?”
“No,” he replied, pointing out the window, “See that building over there. That’s where they program the Tomahawk missiles. It’s 6pm on a Friday night, and the car park’s full.”
Less than 48 hours later, the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom with a series of, amongst other things, Tomahawk missile strikes.
Guidance required
Tomahawks are used to attack land targets to incapacitate enemy command & control facilities, strategic air defences, intelligence systems, infrastructure, key production facilities and military forces.
They are normally fired as part of a joint operation with targeting information provided by strategic commanders onshore and coordinated in time and space to produce a synergistic attack.
The missiles use GPS and terrain contour matching to navigate to the target, and a ‘Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation’ to improve navigation in the terminal stages leading to accuracies of the order of ten metres.
Two stages of planning are conducted for the Tomahawk. Planning for the maritime cruise (overwater) phase is normally carried out by the launch platform, our air warfare destroyers’ crew, cognisant of the current surface and air picture.
Programming of the land cruise (overland) phase and target selection is normally carried out by a ‘Theatre Mission Planning Centre’ (TMPC) ashore (like the one my US colleague and I were looking through the window at) or a shipboard Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System (TTWCS). Australia is receiving both from the US.
The onshore centre and shipboard TTWCS also provide for post launch control of the weapons.
The US TMPC has a worldwide geospatial database that allows for them to plan strikes. Whether Australia has unfettered and unblockable access to this, or an indigenous alternative, is not known.
Whether we do or don’t is the answer to whether we will have full sovereign control over targeting.
“Will Australian air warfare destroyers serve simply as a transport means and launch platform for the United States, receiving targeting data only with their agreement? Or will we have full targeting control over our Tomahawks?
Sovereign capability
The first priority of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is defence of Australia. Every capability we acquire should come with the keys to allow ADF commanders to use capabilities in their possession as they see fit.
Questions of sovereignty are swirling around the entire AUKUS program; submarines, and now missiles. I hope my former colleagues in the Senate will ask the right questions.
Australia has made a very poor deal with its great power ally and has once again demonstrated that the framing of its Defence policy has little to do with national security and everything to do with burnishing Australia’s faithfulness to the US and the ANZUS alliance.
In this instance, the US has schooled Australia in the conduct of foreign policy – states advance their own interests, even at the expense of their friends. Well done, President Biden!
Australia has made a very poor deal with its great power ally and has once again demonstrated that the framing of its Defence policy has little to do with national security and everything to do with burnishing Australia’s faithfulness to the US and the ANZUS alliance.
The Saturday Paper, Albert Palazzo Adjunct professor at UNSW Canberra. He was a former director of war studies for the Australian Army. 18 Mar 23,
The deal is done. On Monday morning in San Diego, the leaders of the United States, Australia and Britain jointly revealed the key details of Australia’s road to becoming a nuclear power – of sorts. President Joe Biden announced that the US will sell Australia three to five used Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines sometime in the 2030s. The three countries will also design a future boat, the tri-flavour SSN-AUKUS class, which will enter service from some time in the 2040s and extend into the 2050s. Australia will receive about five AUKUS boats by about 2055.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese thanked President Biden for his administration’s willingness to share its nuclear propulsion technology, before – perhaps inevitably – spruiking the jobs that the program will create across the nation. Both leaders stressed that Australia’s submarines will be nuclear-powered, not nuclear-armed. The cost is an estimated $368 billion for an uncertain number of warships whose final arrival may be as long as four decades away.
What Albanese neglected to mention is that the deal effectively makes a massive shift to the foundation of Australia’s long-established Defence policy. …………………………
in this instance the submarine pact creates risks that, when combined, will actually make Australia less safe.
The government has been very clear that the target of the submarine acquisition is an increasingly assertive China. However, China is also Australia’s largest economic partner and responsible for much of the nation’s present wealth. In acquiring these weapons, Australia has sent an unmistakable message to its biggest customer. One risk Australia has accepted is that the submarine deal creates enough jobs in the shipbuilding sector to offset possible losses in mining, agriculture, education and tourism if China decides to spend elsewhere.
“Monday’s announcement brings an end to 70 years of a highly effective Defence policy, without any discussion with the Australian public or seemingly any awareness within the government … The submarine pact creates risks that, when combined, will actually make Australia less safe.”
Further, the pact is unlikely to result in greater physical security for Australia. Several more Australian communities, in addition to those in Pine Gap, Exmouth and Darwin, will find themselves on a Chinese target list. The government is yet to announce the home of these submarines, but wherever that is will become a legitimate target, as will support facilities.
Of greater significance to Australia’s security is the false claim that these submarines will enable us to deter China from taking actions that are not in our interest. Unfortunately, capability does not equate to deterrence. Rather it is perception of deterrence by the adversary that matters most. If at some point in the early 2040s Australia has all five of its Virginia-class boats within striking distance of Chinese targets, combined they will be able to launch – at most – 60 Tomahawk missiles. Australia may succeed in blowing up some Chinese missile launchers, cratering a runway or two, or even collapsing a few bridges or power plants, but this is a country with thousands of targets and plenty of physical redundancy. Psychologically, the Chinese people are strong: they endured the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution without cracking. For China, 60 missiles will barely be felt. These submarines may awe Australia’s leaders and national security commentators but they are not a credible deterrent against a power as large as China.
And though the missiles may not be felt, they will unfortunately be noticed. China will respond to Australia’s piffling attempt at deterrence with a larger number of missiles against our much smaller number of critical targets. We’ll feel it, alright.
In their glee to get these weapons, commentators seem to skate over the immensity of the nuclear submarine project’s cost. Admittedly, they are highly capable and powerful weapons, but $368 billion, even spread over decades, will reverberate through the Defence budget and beyond. The government will either have to massively increase expenditure from the present $48 billion (in this financial year), reduce expenditure on other projects or eliminate them entirely. The result will be that the ADF will remain a boutique force, but one now dominated by the nuclear-powered submarine niche, while the land and air forces will see reductions.
The acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines poses a risk to Australia’s sovereignty, too. ………………..
To succeed, Australia will need to rely on the US and Britain to assist in developing a usable and safe capability. Instead of increasing self-reliance, these ships will actually magnify dependence on Australia’s allies. ….
If this decision were to result in a larger allied submarine fleet, then the change in Defence policy and the taking of so many risks might be worthwhile. But it won’t. When Australia buys its three to five Virginias, it will simply reduce the US inventory. There is no fleet increase. It is simply a change-of-flag deal in which a highly experienced operator of nuclear submarines sells a part of its fleet to an L-plater. ………..
…….. Australia will also contribute $3 billion to improvements at US shipyards – again, increasing its commitment to the alliance.
……….Australia has made a very poor deal with its great power ally and has once again demonstrated that the framing of its Defence policy has little to do with national security and everything to do with burnishing Australia’s faithfulness to the US and the ANZUS alliance.
The submarine deal is more than just a function of Australia’s need to be seen to support the alliance, however. It is also because the US visualises security challenges only in military terms. Both the US and Australia are bypassing other levers of government power, such as trade and diplomacy, in the rush to solve a problem by force of arms alone. Until both governments broaden their definitions of national security strategy to include more than military affairs, this will no doubt continue.
Australia’s journey to nuclear-powered submarines will take a risk-filled route that will reshape our traditional Defence policy into one that increases alliance commitments yet offers less security. In this instance, the US has schooled Australia in the conduct of foreign policy – states advance their own interests, even at the expense of their friends. Well done, President Biden! https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/opinion/topic/2023/03/18/what-the-nuclear-powered-subs-deal-really-means
Authors: Roger Bradbury, Scott Bainbridge, Katherine Daniell, Anne-Marie Grisogono, Ehsan Nabavi, Andrew Stuchbery, Thomas Vacca, Scott Vella and Elizabeth Williams.
This report considers the problem of disruptive changes in the technologies for detection of SSBNs and how they intersect with the growing or continued reliance on submarines for retaliatory nuclear capability. In simple terms, this report answers the question: Will future science and technology make the oceans transparent? It takes a scientific perspective and considers the science and technology issues bearing on ocean sensing and the detection of submarines as anomalies in the water column. This report utilises a time horizon spanning to the 2050s, as the next generation of nuclear-armed submarines will be deployed through the 2030s and beyond. Its analysis identified broad areas of future science and technology – rather than specific ‘hot’ areas of the moment – that might have an impact on submarine detection as well as on counter-detection.
This report makes two strong findings:
Favourable geographies that the West took advantage of in the Atlantic during the Cold War, and more recently in the Pacific in its strategic rivalry with China, will not have the same salience in the 2050s as during the Cold War.
The evolution of counter-detection technologies will not have the same salience in the 2050s as it did in earlier times. As a result, by the 2050s, this assessment shows, progress in counter-detection will only reduce the probability of detection from very likely to likely.
Do you have what it takes to operate a nuclear submarine?
With nuclear reactors on board there is twice the amount of maintenance compared to diesel-powered submarines and a distinctly different knowledge base.
Deep in the dark, silent waters of the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans, veteran US nuclear submariners Nirav Patel, Joshua Besser and Brent Sadler have endured what no Australian has yet but soon will – months on end under the sea.
Patel spent four months without surfacing, while Besser and Sadler spent three months. They were in one of the ultra-quiet nuclear submarines operated by the US Navy, which can create its own oxygen and desalinated water, only resurfacing for food.
That ability to spend months under the ocean is one of the biggest advantages of nuclear submarines compared to Australia’s fleet of diesel submarines, which need to resurface frequently to replenish oxygen and battery power.
But living for months under the sea takes its toll. “There is only a finite amount of happiness on board,” Patel says.
“It’s an office without windows, constantly. So if you can stay occupied, you don’t think about it,” he says, noting that daily fire, flooding, weapons and nuclear reactor drills help with focus………………………..
For Joshua Besser, who spent a decade on board nuclear-powered submarines and is now a senior director of nitrogen supply chains at explosives company Dyno Nobel, submarines are for young people.
“It’s definitely a young sailor’s game. The operational tempo is gruelling and deployments are long and arduous,” he says.
………………… A typical operational cycle consists of a six month “work up” where everyone becomes proficient in all watch stations and each department becomes certified in the mission parameters. This is followed by a six months or more deployment to achieve the intended mission. Finally, there is a six-month recovery, repair and maintenance period, he says.
Through all this, chemical amines, used to control the atmosphere, fill the fibres of the submariners’ uniforms worn throughout shifts and while eating their 30-minute meals.
They are only free from them when they take their two-minute showers, their six hours of sleep every two days, or during the extremely rare event of an ocean swim.
“Underway – you can’t tell the smell. When you come home and get off the ship, you can smell the hydraulic fluid, amine and other chemicals impregnated in your clothing and skin.”
Besser says that the level of danger on submarines with nuclear power poses far greater levels of risk than on a conventional submarine. “There are drills on every aspect that could go wrong”, and that creates a much tighter culture with the crew.
…………………. “For nuclear submarines versus diesel conventional subs – there is no comparison regarding sustained speed, electrical power and for advanced sonar systems,” Patel says pointing out yet another difference.
The Monthly, By Rachel Withers 15 Mar 23, As is often the case in politics, the ABC comedy Utopiaskewered the situation years ago. In an episode in which the government decided to spend a mind-boggling amount on defence, the gathered strategists would not specify why, and agreed only to nod along when Tony deduced that China was the target, our trade routes were what needed protecting, and that China was our largest trading partner.
“So under this scenario, we’re spending close to $30 billion a year to protect our trade with China… from China,” Tony surmised. In the case of the AUKUS deal, it’s quite clear that China is who we are looking to counter. But it’s still not entirely clear why we are sinking $368 billion into submarines that will, as The Betoota Advocatequips, “halt China’s invasion by 14 hours”. Is it really in Australia’s strategic interests to be poking the dragon, permanently aligning ourselves with the US against a power we could never actually defend ourselves against? Is China really enough of a threat to us that we need to spend $368 billion? Are these wildly expensive nuclear subs necessary, or prudent? Shouldn’t we, I dunno, talk about this a little more before signing away our collective future?
Doubts are continuing to swirl around AUKUS, not least because, as the ABC’s Matt Bevan observes, Australia is “buying stuff to protect us from China, using essentially all the money we get from exporting stuff to China” (“to protect ourselves from missiles made from our raw materials,” added Alan Kohler)……………………………..
Turnbull wasn’t the only former PM refusing to be swept up in the excitement. Former Labor leader and major AUKUS critic Paul Keating did not hold back at the National Press Club today, labelling it the “worst international decision” by his party since Billy Hughes tried to introduce conscription, with several kicks at Penny Wong and Richard Marles, and some vicious comments about the UK and US leaders for good measure.
………………………….. Other experts, meanwhile, have blasted the fact that the AUKUS deal directly benefits the US and the UK governments while Australia takes the main strategic risk; others reckon that our massive subs outlay would be better spent closer to home. “A more sensible approach might be for the AUKUS partners to negotiate with China on an arms control agreement to cap the number of regional nuclear submarines and avoid a hugely expensive arms race for all concerned,” wrote Clive Williams, a former military intelligence officer in the army and a visiting fellow at the ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. It’s not that far off The Shovel’s suggestion, which is that we “just pay China $300 billion not to invade”, saving $68 billion.
A $200billion nuclear submarine deal could cost the average Australian taxpayer about $13,000. This is effectively the equivalent of every Australian buying a new small car – an astonishing outlay on just a handful of boats. But experts say the deal – despite the extraordinary price tag – could be worth every cent.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has just committed Australia to spending $368 billion on somewhere between three and five second-hand US Virginia Class submarines, and a follow on build of eight next generation British AUKUS nuclear submarines. It’s a strategic blunder, writes former submariner Rex Patrick, and it’s not even going to happen the way the PM has suggested.
I just want a Ferrari. All my mates tell me they’re great cars. Never mind that, financially, I’m already struggling to keep up with the house repayments and, over time, the wife and kids are going to have to miss out on some of life’s niceties and even essentials; no orthodontic treatment to straighten my daughter’s teeth, no tutor to assist my son through extension maths and the wife won’t be able to afford to go back to uni to get her masters.
But I’ll look good cruising down Jetty Road at Glenelg in my shiny red machine. Now, just between you and me, the Ferrari’s not so good for going off-road or towing the family caravan, but hey, otherwise it is a great car.
Nuclear capability
Coming back from my Ferrari dream, it’s true that nuclear submarines are good. I know, because I’ve spent time at sea on them.
There’s nothing like taking the submarine down to 200 metres and turning up the power on the reactor to get to 30 knots, and then staying there, knowing you have almost unlimited power. It allows you to deploy great distances, arriving quickly. That’s important for the power projecting nations that sit as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; China, France, Russia, the UK and the US all have nuclear submarines.
Our first priority is supposed to be defence of Australia, and our Defence Force should be configured for that, first and foremost. Even those who think we must automatically join the US in a war against China need to understand US strategy and what Australia’s role would likely be.
China depends on imports for 72% of its oil consumption, and the overwhelming majority of China’s oil imports must pass through maritime chokepoints over which the United States has significant influence. China’s dependency is complicated by the fact an overwhelming portion of its energy imports come from its west. 43% of its oil is sourced in the Persian Gulf, 25% from the Gulf of Aden and Africa and 9% from the Americas, with the overwhelming majority of that passing through the Malacca Straits. Security of supply would be a significant weak point in any conflict China finds itself involved in with the US.
In time of conflict the United States Navy, perhaps in conjunction with European or other regional coalition partners, could secure the Straits of Hormuz. India, part of the Quad, could assist with operations from the Persian Gulf through to the Andaman Seas.
Indonesia, Malaysia and, particularly, Singapore would exercise control over the Malacca Straits with Indonesia and Australia jointly responsible for shutting down Chinese oil carriage through Sunda and Lombok (and up through Makassar Straits). With these routes controlled, the only remaining option for China would be to re-direct shipping around Southern Australia.
Australian submarines are not needed in the South China Sea. The US will rely on Japan’s 20 submarines, South Korea’s 23, and Vietnam’s six, and Malaysia’s two and Singapore’s six. Our submarines have a role to play in shutting down the Sunda and Lombok Straits, or Chinese ships passing through Australian waters. This is a role that can be carried out by far less expensive conventional submarines.
The pros and cons of going nuclear
Of course, it’s true to say that it’s handy to have a reactor when you are detected by enemy anti-submarine forces. Speed can be a very useful asset.
The flip side is that smaller conventional submarines are better performers in littoral waters where they can silently lie in wait, lay mines or covertly deploy Special Forces.
Unsustainable price
The purported cost of this program is “up to” $368 billion dollars. That’s an incredible amount of money to spend, and particularly on a single capability.
Australia has $970 billion dollars in gross debt. It will rise to a trillion dollars next financial year. Albanese says that out Defence budget will increase to 2.5% of GDP. That’s an extra $10 billion per annum, on top of a structural deficit of $50 billion a year, already rising to $70 billion.
With Stage 3 tax cuts set to kick in next year, and revenue from coal and gas exports likely to decrease, it hard to work out how AUKUS will be paid for, other than by spending cuts.
Nation building spin
The Government has started to offset concerns about the spend and placate the punter by saying that this is a nation building project. But this is just spin.
Yes, shipbuilding creates trade jobs which can be utilised in a range of different industries other than defence. The same is true for the electronic engineers and software engineers that work on submarine combat systems.
But as for where a lot of workforce investment will take place, it will be in nuclear technology. This investment will not translate into benefits for the Australian economy, because there are no plans for us to have a civil nuclear industry. Even if Australia were to take a decision to go there, the US will not grant the nuclear technology release or transfer approval.
Any investment in a nuclear workforce will be a sunk Defence cost.
Dismantling of our sovereign submarine build capability
We will see an Australian flagged submarine in our waters in the early 2030’s. At that time we will start decommissioning Collins Class submarines and the workforce in Adelaide, who carry out full cycle dockings and life of type extension. That activity will stop, and 700 jobs will go.
The Government tells us that we will start building next generation SSN AUKUS submarines in 2040. But they are wrong. Once the Adelaide workforce is disbanded, we won’t rebuild a submarine build workforce. We will just buy an AUKUS submarine from the UK, or perhaps more US Virginia class boats instead.
Opportunity cost
There is a real tension building to our north. We need to have a Defence Force that can deter and, if that fails, fight.
This multi-billion dollar program will come at a great opportunity cost. What significant other capabilities do we miss out on as we fund this program? In that respect there is tragedy in the way we are moving forward.
Will it happen?
We’ve seen our future submarine go from an Australian “Son of Collins” under Rudd, to a Japanese submarine under Abbot, to a French submarine under Turnbull, to a US and UK submarine under Morrison and Albanese. The reality is that as Governments change moving forward, and that includes in the US and UK, the program will change again. And that’s not to mention significant changes that could take place in our geo-strategic circumstances.
In 2040, when we are purportedly going to start building an AUKUS submarine here in Australia, Anthony Albanese will be 77. You and I will be reading the second edition of his political memoirs, picked up from the discount bin at the front of the local bookstore. There’ll be a different program underway.
I’d love a new Ferrari, but I’d have to pay for it, so it just won’t happen. Unconstrained by the need to pay for it themselves, the Prime Minister, supported by a few Admirals, just wants nuclear submarines.
From producing reports and analysis for U.S. policy-makers, to enlisting representatives to write op-eds in corporate media, to providing talking heads for corporate media to interview and give quotes, think tanks play a fundamental role in shaping both U.S. foreign policy and public perception around that foreign policy. Leaders at top think tanks like the Atlantic Council and Hudson Institute have even been called upon to set focus priorities for the House Intelligence Committee. However, one look at the funding sources of the most influential think tanks reveals whose interests they really serve: that of the U.S. military and its defense contractors.
This ecosystem of overlapping networks of government institutions, think tanks, and defense contractors is where U.S. foreign policy is derived, and a revolving door exists among these three sectors. For example, before Biden-appointed head of the Pentagon Lloyd Austin took his current position, he sat on the Board of Directors at Raytheon. Before Austin’s appointment, current defense policy advisor Michèle Flournoy was also in the running for the position. Flournoy sat on the board of Booz Allen Hamilton, another major Pentagon defense contractor. These same defense contractors also work together with think tanks like the Center for Strategic and International Studies to organize conferences attended by national security officials.
On top of all this, since the end of the Cold War, intelligence analysis by the CIA and NSA has increasingly been contracted out to these same defense companies like BAE Systems and Lockheed Martin, among others — a major conflict of interest. In other words, these corporations are in the position to produce intelligence reports which raise the alarm on U.S. “enemy” nations so they can sell more military equipment!
And of course these are the same defense companies that donate hundreds of thousands of dollars each year to think tanks. Given all this, is it any wonder the U.S. government is simultaneously flooding billions of dollars of weaponry into an unwinnable proxy war in Ukraine while escalating a Cold War into a potential military confrontation with China?
The funding to these policy institutes steers the U.S. foreign policy agenda. To give you a scope of how these contributions determine national security priorities, listed below are six of some of the most influential foreign policy think tanks, along with how much in contributions they’ve received from “defense” companies in the last year.
All funding information for these policy institutes was gathered from the most recent annual report that was available online. Also note that this list is compiled from those that make this information publicly available — many think tanks, such as the hawkish American Enterprise Institute, do not release donation sources publicly.
1 – Center for Strategic and International Studies According to their 2020 annual report
$500,000+: Northrop Grumman Corporation
$200,000-$499,999: General Atomics (energy and defense corporation that manufactures Predator drones for the CIA), Lockheed Martin, SAIC (provides information technology services to U.S. military)
$100,000-$199,999: Bechtel, Boeing, Cummins (provides engines and generators for military equipment), General Dynamics, Hitachi (provides defense technology), Hanwha Group (South Korean aerospace and defense company), Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. (largest military shipbuilding company in the United States), Mitsubishi Corporation, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (provides intelligence and information technology services to U.S. military), Qualcomm, Inc. (semiconductor company that produces microchips for the U.S. military), Raytheon, Samsung (provides security technology to the U.S. military), SK Group (defense technology company)
$65,000-$99,999: Hyundai Motor (produces weapons systems), Oracle
$100,000-$249,000: Huntington Ingalls Industries, Neal Blue (Chairman and CEO of General Atomics), Qualcomm, Inc., Raytheon, Boeing.
$50,000-$99,000: BAE Systems, Booz Allen Hamilton, Intel Corporation (provides aerospace and defense technology), Elbit Systems of America (aerospace and defense company), General Dynamics, Palantir Technologies
Australia’s nuclear submarine program will cost up to $368 billion over the next three decades, with confirmation that the federal government will buy at least three American-manufactured nuclear submarines and contribute “significant additional resources” to US shipyards.
Key points:
The AUKUS class submarines will be operated by both the UK and Australia, using American combat systems.
One submarine will be built every two years from the early 2040s through to the late 2050s
From as early as 2027, four US submarines and one from the UK will start rotating through Western Australia
The Australian government will take three, potentially second-hand Virginia-class submarines early next decade, pending the approval of the US Congress.
There will also be an option to purchase another two under the landmark AUKUS defence and security pact, announced in San Diego this morning.
In the meantime, design and development work will continue on a brand new submarine, known as the SSN-AUKUS, “leveraging” work the British have already been doing to replace their Astute-class submarines.
That submarine — which will form the AUKUS class — would eventually be operated by both the UK and Australia, using American combat systems.
One submarine will be built every two years from the early 2040s through to the late 2050s, with five SSN-AUKUS boats delivered to the Royal Australian Navy by the middle of the 2050s.
Eventually, the fleet would include eight Australian submarines built in Adelaide into the 2060s, but the federal government is leaving open the option of taking some from British shipyards if strategic circumstances change.
Meanwhile, the federal government estimates the cost of the submarine program will be between $268 billion and $368 billion over the next 30 years.
As part of that figure, $8 billion will be spent on upgrading the naval base HMAS Stirling in Western Australia.
From as early as 2027, four US and one UK submarine will start rotating through Western Australia, to be known as the Submarine Rotational Forces West.
No decision has been made on a future east coast base for submarines, although Port Kembla has firmed as the most likely location.
Standing alongside Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, US President Joe Biden spoke of the strength of the alliance already………..
US subs to rotate off Australian coast
During the announcement, President Biden flagged that, from this year, Australian navy personnel would embed with both US and UK crew on submarines and at their shipyards………………………
Mr Albanese confirmed that Australian submariners were already undergoing nuclear power training in the US……………
Money for US shipyards
Australia will also contribute $3 billion over the next four years to US and UK production lines, with the bulk of that money heading stateside.
White House officials insisted Australia was preparing to make a “substantial contribution” to US submarine production facilities.
The US government will also request an extra $US4.6 billion from Congress to upgrade the nation’s submarine infrastructure, with a concession that the readiness of American production lines are “not where it should be”.
Included in its overall project budget, Australia will spend $2 billion over the next four years upgrading the Osborne shipyards in South Australia.
The purchase of Virginia-class submarines from the United States was described by American officials as “a potent nuclear powered submarine force in the 2030s, much earlier than many had expected”.
US officials tried to allay concerns about restrictions on sharing its nuclear technology with Australia…………..
The three AUKUS leaders made the announcement at Naval Base Point Loma, in front of the Virginia-class submarine USS Missouri, which arrived in San Diego Harbor late last week.
Opposition Leader Peter Dutton said the Coalition would support the submarine deal “come hell or high water”.
“We were the authors of it. We give full credit to the government for continuing it and arriving at today,” he said.
Marles: Aukus program includes commitment to dispose of spent nuclear reactors
Marles: the sealed nuclear reactor is our friend, because by virtue of having a sealed reactor, we can provide assurance in respect of every piece of nuclear material through the life cycle of the nuclear material.
We are making a commitment that we will dispose of the nuclear reactor. That is a significant commitment to make. This is going to require a facility to be built in order to do a disposal that will be remote from populations. We are announcing that will be on defence land, current or future.
Now, to be clear, the first of the [nuclear material] we will dispose of will not happen until the 2050s, but within the year, we will announce a process by with this facility will be identified.
We are also a proud signatory to the treaty of Rarotonga. That commits us to not operate nuclear weapons from our territory.
Richard Marles says he is confident that the agreement will hold, even if America has a change in political direction……….
Q: Is it possible that we’ll be maintaining and operating three classes of submarines? That is the Virginia, the Collins and the Aukus submarines? And if so, is there any concern? And can I ask the admiral as well, is there any concern in defence about the prospect of operating three different submarines?
Marles:We obviously will be operating two as a result of this announcement. You know, the preference is to operate as few classes as possible.
Vice Admiral Mead: And once we work with the submarines coming to Western Australia and develop our own capabilities on the Virginias, then the move to SNN-AUKUS, which will have incredible commonality with propulsion systems, platforms, weapons, combat systems and sensors…………………. It remains the position of the Albanese government, that there won’t be foreign bases in Australia and this will not be a foreign base. It’s a forward rotation.…………..
Marles: ‘This is as good a value-for-money spend in defence as you will get’..……
Q: Is a high-level nuclear waste dump the price that South Australia will have to pay for the jobs that go to the state?
Marles:
Well, as I indicated earlier there will be a process that we will determine in the next 12 months … how the site will be identified. You’ve made a leap that we won’t make for some time. It will be a while before a site is identified but we will establish a process.
Q: The $9bn the government is spending over the forwards has a neutral impact on the budget, $6bn because of what was allocated to the attack class but $3bn is coming from the integrated investment program. Can you give more detail about … where that money is coming from? And if not today, when?
Marles: I won’t give you the detail today except you’re right to identify the integrated investment program and obviously the strategic review has had a good look at all of that. It will be plain in time of the budget.
Q: Why not now, though? You must have an idea where those cuts are going to be? In the interests of transparency, people want to judge what the opportunity cost of the nuclear submarines are. Unless you’re suggesting it’s cuts first and work it out later? Where are the cuts coming from?
In response to the news Australia will build and purchase nuclear submarines from the USA and the UK at a cost of up to $368bn between now and the mid-2050s, the Australian Conservation Foundation’s nuclear analyst Dave Sweeney said:
“The arrangement announced today will undoubtedly elevate regional tensions and increase risks for Australians and our neighbours.
“This deal introduces new and significant safety risks that Australia has never had to deal with before.
“There are risks of possible future accidents in our ports and waters, especially given nuclear regulator ARPANSA’s assessment that emergency management arrangements in Australia ‘are not fit for purpose for a future with nuclear powered submarines.’
“Pacific nations, Indonesia and others in our region have deep concerns about AUKUS.
“This arrangement further entangles Australia in the USA’s war-fighting plans.
“It raises serious non-proliferation concerns relating to access to highly enriched weapons-grade uranium and sets a disturbing precedent for imitation and escalation.
“Australia would be the only nation without nuclear weapons but with nuclear submarines. It may embolden other nations to go down this path, increasing global nuclear risks.
“There is no clarity about how the government intends to manage the resulting high level nuclear waste for the thousands of years it remains radioactive.
“As many Australians face daily cost of living pressures – and we all face the pressures of the climate crisis – this deal comes with a massive financial cost we will all bear.
“This whole process has lacked rigour or transparency and will cost Australians many billions of dollars that would be much better spent on social and environmental problems.
“ACF calls for the Albanese government to sign the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to give the Australian public and our region a clear commitment that nuclear subs are not a precursor to nuclear weapons.
“The Prime Minister should rule out Australia facilitating or hosting nuclear weapons – ‘neither confirm, nor deny’ is not an acceptable position. Australia must not facilitate unlawful weapons of mass and indiscriminate destruction.
“The PM should also rule out domestic nuclear power – nuclear subs must not become a Trojan Horse for subsidies for a deeply controversial and contaminating energy source.”
the Australian order will be filled with a new and advanced SSN® model still in development. This is where the British come in. In a sense, Australia will be (a) serving as a test run and (b) will be creating extra economies of scale for the British Navy’s plans to develop and build SSN( R) models to replace its Astute class submarines by the early to mid 2040s.
China may well regard Taiwan as a renegade province. Yet the invasion of Taiwan – as the Australian economist and commentator John Quiggin points out – would pose massive challenges for the forces or Xi Jinping……………………………………………………What Quiggin is getting at here is that a concerted campaign is currently being waged by sections of the Aussie media with the aim of scaring the pants off the Australian public about the imminent threat from China in the Pacific, in the South China Sea and with regard to Taiwan.
The aim of this campaign is to justify a sky-high level of new defence spending by the Australian government. New Zealand is at risk of being carted along by the same momentum into authorising increases in our own defence spending that we don’t need, and can’t afford.
Acting the part
The campaign kicks into high gear today. As the Oscars get handed out in Los Angeles, another pantomime of power will be playing out on the docks just down the coast, in San Diego. Anthony Albanese, Rishi Sunak and Joe Biden will be standing shoulder to shoulder as they announce the first concrete manifestation of the AUKUS pact – a military alliance between Australia, Britain and the Americans that has China as its common target……………………………………
. As Reuters put it:
….[The] AUKUS pact, will have multiple stages with at least one U.S. submarine visiting Australian ports in the coming years and end in the late 2030’s with a new class of submarines being built with British designs and American technology, one of the officials said….after the annual port visits, the United States would forward deploy some submarines in Western Australia by around 2027.
In the early 2030’s, Australia would buy 3 Virginia class submarines and have the option to buy two more. AUKUS is expected to be Australia’s biggest-ever defence project and offers the prospect of jobs in all three countries.
That last bit is very important. Like his predecessors, Albanese will be treating Australia’s defence policy as a cutting edge ingredient of its manufacturing policy.
Australia’s defence policy as a cutting edge ingredient of its manufacturing policy. For Australian politicians, military policy and defence spending is as much about (a) creating jobs for Aussie workers, (b) gaining technology upgrades for Aussie industry and (c) scoring lucrative contracts for Aussie goods and services firms as it is about the actual defence of the nation.
…………………………………………………………………. In a worst case scenario, the Australians could well invite New Zealand to join AUKUS and assign us some “friend of AUKUS” status, as an observer. Our anti-nuclear legislation would complicate such a role. That aside, and given the ocean currents and prevailing winds, New Zealand has every good reason to feel nervous about the prospect of our near-neighbour learning on the job about how to build and maintain the nuclear reactors on its new submarine fleet.
Luckily, most of the new Aussie subs won’t be delivered until the early to mid 2030s. That means these massively expensive new purchases probably wouldn’t arrive in time to deter China from invading Taiwan, given that this is supposed to be imminent.
In the US, the building of Virginia-class subs are shared between two shipyards, one in Groton Connecticut and the other in Newport News, Virginia. Reportedly, the design variant that Australia has in mind will have been a three-headed upgrade project to the Virginia-class that will have been co-designed by Britain and the US, as amended to Australian specifications, with at least some of the subs being built by US-trained Australians who had no prior experience in this sort of construction. On top of these complications, all participants will be coming under pressure to deliver every stage of the project at the lowest cost possible. I mean, what could possibly go wrong with such a design and construction plan? And in this case, I don’t just mean the danger of cost blowouts.
Attack and defence
AUKUS is likely to make New Zealanders feel more unsafe in a number of other ways as well. For starters, AUKUS is not a “defend the homeland” pact. It is a forward projection alliance, to attack enemy targets and stifle the enemy’s ability to defend itself and respond. (Enemy = China.) Before we bow to the pressure coming from our traditional allies to join in with their chest-bumping rivalries with China, it is probably worth looking at the Aussie nuclear submarine deal in more detail.
The Albanese government has said the Aussie subs will not be nuclear-armed. (Not yet, anyway) However, the roughly 40 Tomahawk cruise missiles (the final design will limit the number) that each submarine will carry can all carry nuclear warheads. Only previous treaty commitments with Russia have prevented the cruise missiles carried on Virginia-class subs from being nuclear-armed.
Yet with the scrapping of nuclear proliferation treaties with Russia in the wake of the war in Ukraine, we could well be sailing in a few years time into “neither confirm nor deny” territory with our Australian neighbours. Regardless of their potential for carrying nuclear tipped Tomahawk cruise missiles alongside the usual torpedoes, mines, autonomous undersea drones, etc etc ….Would these nuclear-powered Australian subs be barred from docking at New Zealand ports under the terms of our anti-nuclear legislation? Yes, they would.
Therefore, it would be good to know if our current political leaders share a bi-partisan agreement to preserve our anti-nuclear stance in its current form and thereby ban those Aussie subs from our ports, now and forever more. Even if Labour and National did agree, the reality is that our new and expensive Poseidon anti-submarine surveillance aircraft will still be taking part in exercises which will increasingly have (a) a nuclear component and (b) an anti-submarine (ASW) component, courtesy of our ANZAC buddies. Lest we forget. (The growing ASW role for Virginia-class SSN category subs is mentioned on page 9 of the Congressional Review Service evaluation of the SSN programme. )
From what can be gleaned at this point i.e. prior to the formal announcement, the Australian order will be filled with a new and advanced SSN® model still in development. This is where the British come in. In a sense, Australia will be (a) serving as a test run and (b) will be creating extra economies of scale for the British Navy’s plans to develop and build SSN( R) models to replace its Astute class submarines by the early to mid 2040s.
To repeat: It would be unwise for New Zealand to be stampeded by the “defence” lobbyists both here and offshore into making significant increases to the allocations for Defence in the May Budget. If nothing else, the Aussie subs saga is a useful reminder that the regional tensions in the Pacific and the China bogey are both being driven and monetised by firms within the military-industrial complex, via the pork barrel politicking (lucrative jobs and contracts for our neighbourhood! ) that is so rife among our traditional military allies.
Footnote: While we spend billions on a fleet of new Poseidon anti-submarine aircraft, and the Aussies buy their fleet of mega-expensive nuclear submarines, the future of underwater warfare is seen by some observers to rest with unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Apparently, the Australian military has a programme to develop UUVs called Ghost Shark, cutely named after the US Ghost Bat programme.
Apr 15, 2026 01:00 AM in Canberra, Melbourne, Sydney
Join the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) on Tuesday, April 14th for a timely webinar exploring the risks associated with nuclear power and challenging the myth that it offers a simple, safe, carbon-free solution to the climate crisis
21 April Webinar: No Nuclear Weapons in Australia
Start: 2026-04-21 18:00:00 UTC Canberra, Melbourne, Sydney (GMT+10:00)
End: 2026-04-21 19:30:00 UTC Canberra, Melbourne, Sydney (GMT+10:00)
Event Type: Virtual A virtual link will be communicated before the event.
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