Ambassador John Bolton tells 7NEWS Donald Trump re-election could mean AUKUS nuclear submarines plan torn up
7 News, By David Woiwod – US Bureau Chief, 27 Oct 24
Australia’s plans to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines would be torn-up if Donald Trump is re-elected next week, according to a former top Republican party security advisor.
The AUKUS defence pact would be one of the first US alliances to undergo a major review under an incoming Trump administration – with the official warning Australia not to take the agreement “for granted”.
“I think it could be in jeopardy,” former US ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton told 7NEWS.
“All Trump looks at is the balance sheet, and if he sees more US expenditure than those of other parties to the agreement, then I think there will be trouble.”
The defence bill that passed on Capitol Hill late last year requires the president of the day to give the final tick of approval before any US submarines are delivered to Australia.
And Ambassador Bolton is now encouraging America’s ally to immediately mount arguments in favour of the alliance if Trump wins the November poll……..
The Australian government forked out $4.5 billion dollars to help soothe US fears after lawmakers questioned America’s ability to deliver the specialised boats while meeting its own submarine production targets.
Under the first steps of the deal aimed at deterring Chinese aggression, Australia is set to receive at least three Virginia Class nuclear-powered submarines before Australian-built vessels enter service in the 2040s. https://7news.com.au/news/ambassador-john-bolton-tells-7news-donald-trump-re-election-could-mean-aukus-subs-plan-torn-up-c-16518429
Australia’s evolving nuclear posture: avoiding a fait accompli (Part 1 of 2)

Pearls and Irritations, By Vince Scappatura, Oct 12, 2024
A monumental transformation: There has been a great deal of public criticism of Australia’s decision to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) via the AUKUS security partnership. The criticism has been both broad and deep, spanning political and industrial challenges, budgetary consequences, safety and environmental concerns, strategic risks, and the erosion of national sovereignty.
While these are all worthy issues to bring to the fore of the public debate, one set of issues that have not received nearly as much attention are the ways in which AUKUS implicates Australia in US nuclear war planning.
From one perspective this is understandable given AUKUS does not involve plans for Australia to acquire nuclear-armed submarines or to station US nuclear weapons on Australian soil. However, when viewed from a wider perspective, AUKUS epitomises Australia’s geostrategic transformation and evolving nuclear posture within the US alliance.
The significance of this transformation is reflected in the fact that Australia will soon become ‘the only ally in the world to host and support military operations by forward-deployed US strategic bombers and SSN attack submarines’. This comes in addition to hosting mature US expeditionary Marine capabilities and a more recent rotational presence of US Army personnel and permanent associated support infrastructure.
Perhaps more significant than providing a ‘vast military launchpad’ for multiple forms of US power projection is the developing role of the ADF to seamlessly integrate with American military forces and to provide what is approaching full-spectrum support operations, including for nuclear missions.
AUKUS and nuclear war
Although the focus of AUKUS ‘pillar one’ is the acquisition by Australia of nuclear-powered, but conventionally-armed submarines, there are in fact several nuclear war planning dimensions to the broader security partnership.
The Australian government refuses to publicly broach the questions of how, where and against whom Australia’s future SSN force might be expected to operate both in peacetime and in the event of conflict. …………………………………………….
It would not be surprising if all of these contingencies are perceived by Beijing as posing an existential threat, particularly as China’s nuclear submarine deterrent continues to develop into an assured second-strike capability…………………………………………………………………
Australia’s evolving nuclear posture
AUKUS is more than just an international arms agreement. By Scott Morrison’s admission the political framework is intended to secure a ‘forever partnership’ and a ‘forever responsibility’ between Australia and the United States. The unprecedented scale, cost, time frame and interdependence generated by the singular AUKUS deal clearly signals a decision to lock Australia into America’s distinctive military strategy for containing China into the future.
A key objective of America’s strategy is to achieve seamless high-end defence integration with its global network of allies and partners. While obstacles to full realisation remain, Canberra’s embrace of ‘integrated deterrence’ is already transforming Australia into both a critical base of operations and provider of full-spectrum support for US force projection into the region. It is also leading to the development of a new and unprecedented role for the ADF in support of US nuclear operations.
………………………………………………………………………………………. Avoiding a fait accompli
The situation emerging is one of enduring high-level tactical and institutional integration between the defence forces of Australia and the United States, creating the conditions for extreme political pressure and expectations from Washington of Australian support for any future US war with China……………………………………………………………..
The time to put a halt to any plans for expanding Australia’s nuclear posture is now. If no public pressure is forthcoming the Australian government is likely, in time, to move forward with precommitments to support US nuclear operations behind closed doors, and if presented to the public at all, will be done so as a fait accompli, as was the case with AUKUS, the forward-deployment of B-52 bombers and the US Force Posture Initiatives generally. https://johnmenadue.com/australias-evolving-nuclear-posture-avoiding-a-fait-accompli-part-1-of-2/
Big Super is still investing in nuclear weapons: report

| Quit Nukes / The Australia Institute, 1 October 24 https://theaimn.com/big-super-is-still-investing-in-nuclear-weapons-report/ |
A new report has found that despite claiming not to invest in ‘controversial weapons’ 13 of the top 14 Australian super funds are still investing in nuclear weapons companies, in some cases even in an option described as ‘responsible’.
One of the 14, Hostplus, has excluded nuclear weapons companies across its portfolio since December 2021.
At least $3.4 billion of Australian retirement savings are invested by these funds in companies involved in making nuclear weapons, according to the new research conducted by Quit Nukes in collaboration with The Australia Institute.
The report analyses financial returns and finds that the exclusion of nuclear weapon companies from portfolios has an immaterial impact on returns.
Rosemary Kelly, Director, Quit Nukes:
“It’s frankly unconscionable to sell super fund members a responsible investment option and then use their money to invest in nuclear proliferation.
“The thing that makes this baffling is that investing in nuclear weapon companies is just completely unnecessary in the broader scheme of things..
“Superannuation funds should divest immediately from weapons manufacturers who produce nuclear weapons. If you’re a member of 13 of these 14 leading funds you can request that your fund divest or threaten to take your savings elsewhere.
“Super funds are being sneaky by boasting of policies to exclude “controversial weapons” but not counting nuclear weapons as “controversial.” That’s pretty hard to swallow when you consider that most ESG advisers now consider nuclear weapons as controversial weapons, given the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that came into force in 2021.
Alice Grundy, Research Manager, The Australia Institute
“The most frustrating thing about the lack of process in this area is that excluding nuclear weapon companies from super portfolios is so easy. Divesting has an immaterial impact on investment returns.
“Your super fund could divest your money from nuclear weapon companies without materially impacting your returns.
“So long as nuclear weapons exist, nuclear war is an ever-present risk. Its impacts would be catastrophic. Even a limited nuclear war, involving say 250 of the over 12,000 nuclear weapons in the world, would kill 120 million people outright and cause nuclear famine, putting 2 billion lives at risk. There would be massive impacts on global supply chains and manufacturing.
“The long-term financial implications should be factored into decisions about where to invest Australian super.”
The full report Media contacts: Anil Lambert 0416 426 722
In the Woomera Manual, International Law Meets Military Space Activities

by David A. Koplow, September 12, 2024, https://www.justsecurity.org/100043/woomera-manual-international-law-military-space/
The law of outer space, like so much else about the exoatmospheric realm, is under stress. The prodigious growth in private-sector space activities (exemplified by SpaceX’s proliferating Starlink constellation, and other corporations following only shortly behind) is matched by an ominous surge in military space activities – most vividly, the creation of the U.S. Space Force and counterpart combat entities in rival States, the threat of Russia placing a nuclear weapon in orbit, and China and others continuing to experiment with anti-satellite weapons and potential techniques. The world is on the precipice of several new types of space races, as countries and companies bid for first-mover advantages in the highest of high ground.
The law of outer space, in contrast, is old, incomplete, and untested. A family of foundational treaties dating to the 1960s and 1970s retains vitality, but provides only partial guidance. Space is decidedly not a “law-free zone,” but many of the necessary guard rails are obscure, and few analysts or operators have ventured into this sector.
A new treatise, the Woomera Manual on the International Law of Military Space Activities and Operations, has just been published by Oxford University Press to provide the first comprehensive, detailed analysis of the existing legal regime of space. As one of the editors of the Manual, I can testify to the long, winding, and arduous – but fascinating – journey to produce it, and the hope that it will provide much-needed clarity and precision about this fast-moving legal domain.
Military Manuals
This Manual follows a grand tradition of prior efforts to articulate the applicable international military law in contested realms, including the 1994 San Remo Manual on Naval Warfare, Harvard’s 2013 Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Manual on Air and Missile Warfare, and the 2013 and 2017 Tallinn Manuals on Cyber Operations. The Woomera Manual was produced by a diverse team of legal and technical experts drawn from academia, practice, government, and other sectors in several countries (all acting in their personal capacities, not as representatives of their home governments or organizations). The process consumed six years (slowed considerably by the Covid-19 pandemic, which arrested the sequence of face-to-face drafting sessions).
The Manual is co-sponsored by four universities, among other participants: the University of Nebraska College of Law (home of Professor Jack Beard, the editor-in-chief), the University of Adelaide (with Professor Dale Stephens on the editorial board), the University of New South Wales—Canberra, and the University of Exeter (U.K.) The name “Woomera” was chosen in recognition of the small town of Woomera, South Australia, which was the site of the country’s first space missions, and in acknowledgement of the Aboriginal word for a remarkable spear-throwing device that enables greater accuracy and distance.
Comprehensive Coverage of a Broad Field
Three features of the Woomera Manual stand out. The first is the comprehensive nature of the undertaking. The Manual presents 48 rules, spanning the three critical time frames: ordinary peace time, periods of tension and crisis, and during an armed conflict. There may be a natural tendency to focus on that last frame, given the high stakes and the inherent drama of warfare, but the editors were keen to address the full spectrum, devoting due attention and analysis to the background rules that apply both to quotidian military space activities and to everyone else in space.
Complicating the legal analysis is the fragmentation of the international legal regime. In addition to “general” international law – which article III of the Outer Space Treaty declares is fully applicable in space – two “special” areas of law are implicated here. One, the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law) provides particularized jus in bello rules applicable between States engaged in war, including wars that begin in, or extend to, space. But the law of outer space is also recognized as another lex specialis, and it accordingly provides unique rules that supersede at least some aspects of the general international law regime. What should be done when two “special” areas of international law overlap and provide incompatible rules? The Woomera Manual is the first comprehensive effort to unravel that riddle.
The Law as It Is
A second defining characteristic of this Manual is the persistent, rigid focus on lex lata, the law as it currently is, rather than lex ferenda, the law as it may (or should) become. The authors, of course, each have their own policy preferences, and in their other works they freely opine about how the international space law regime should evolve (or be abruptly changed) to accommodate modern dangers and opportunities. But in this Manual, they have focused exclusively on describing the current legal structure, concentrating on treaties, customary international law, and other indicia of State practice. This is not the sort of manual in which the assembled experts “vote” on their competing concepts of the legal regime; instead, Woomera addresses what States (the sources and subjects of international law) say, do, and write. The authors have assembled a monumental library of State behaviors (including words as well as deeds, and silences as well as public pronouncements), while recognizing that diplomacy (and national security classification restrictions) often impede States explaining exactly why they did, or did not, act in a particular way in response to some other State’s provocations.
One feature that enormously facilitated the work on the Manual was a phase of “State engagement.” In early 2022, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the government of the Netherlands circulated a preliminary draft of the Woomera Manual to interested national governments and invited them to a June 2022 conference in The Hague to discuss it. Remarkably, two dozen of the States most active in space attended, providing two days of sustained, thoughtful, constructive commentary. The States were not asked to “approve” the document, but their input was enormously valuable (and resulted in an additional several months of painstaking work in finalizing the manuscript, as the editors scrambled to take into account the States’ voluminous comments and the new information they provided).
Space as a Dynamic Domain
Third, a manual on space law must acknowledge the rapidly-changing nature and scope of human activities in this environment, and the great likelihood that even more dramatic alterations are likely in the future. Existing patterns of behavior may alter abruptly, as new technologies and new economic opportunities emerge. The Manual attempts to peer into the future, addressing plausible scenarios that might foreseeably arise, but it resists the temptation to play with far-distant “Star Wars” fantasies.
The unfortunate reality here is that although the early years of the Space Age were remarkably productive for space law, the process stultified shortly thereafter. Within only a decade after Sputnik’s first orbit, the world had negotiated and put into place the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which still provides the cardinal principles guiding space operations today. And within only another decade, three additional widely-accepted treaties were crafted: the 1968 astronaut Rescue Agreement, the 1971 Liability Convention, and the 1975 Registration Convention, as well as the 1979 Moon Convention (which has not attracted nearly the same level of global support and participation). But the articulation of additional necessary increments of international space law has been constipated since then – no new multilateral space-specific treaties have been implemented in the past four decades, and none is on the horizon today.
Sources and Shortcomings of International Space Law
The corpus of international space law is not obsolete, but it is under-developed. We have the essential principles and some of the specific corollaries, but we are lacking the detailed infrastructure that would completely flesh out all those general principles. Some important guidance may, however, be found in State practice, including the understudied negotiating history of the framework treaties for space law, particularly the Outer Space Treaty. The Manual provides important insights in this area, notably with respect to several ambiguous terms embedded in the treaties.
The authors of the Woomera Manual, therefore, were able to start their legal analysis with the framework treaties – unlike, for example, the authors of the Tallinn Manuals, covering international law applicable to cyber warfare, who had to begin without such a structured starting point. Still, the Woomera analysis confronted numerous lacunae, where the existing law and practice leave puzzling gaps. The persistent failure of the usual law-making institutions to craft additional increments of space arms control is all the more alarming as the United States, NATO, and others have declared space to be an operational or war-fighting domain.
Conclusion
It is hoped that the process of articulating the existing rules – and identifying the interstices between them – can provide useful day-to-day guidance for space law practitioners in government, academia, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and elsewhere. The prospect of arms races and armed conflict in space unfortunately appears to be growing, and clarity about the prevailing rules has never been more important. It is a fascinating, dynamic, and fraught field.
Marles, with all pretension, flogging a dead seahorse

By Paul Keating, Sep 28, 2024, https://johnmenadue.com/marles-with-all-pretention-flogging-a-dead-seahorse/
Richard Marles and his mate, the US defence secretary, are beginning to wilt under the weight of sustained comment in Australia critical of the AUKUS arrangement.
Marles, unable to sustain a cogent argument himself, has his US friend propping him up in London to throw a 10,000-mile punch at me – and as usual, failing to materially respond to legitimate and particular criticisms made of the AUKUS arrangement.
The US Defence Secretary, Lloyd Austin, claims AUKUS would not compromise Australia’s ability to decide its own sovereign defence issues, a claim made earlier by Richard Marles and the prime minister.
But this would only be true until the prime minister and Marles got their phone call from the president, seeking to mobilise Australian military assets – wherein, both would click their heels in alacrity and agreement. The rest of us would read about it in some self-serving media statement afterwards. As my colleague, Gareth Evans, recently put it, “it defies credibility that Washington will ever go ahead with the sale of Virginias to us in the absence of an understanding that they will join the US in any fight in which it chooses to engage anywhere in our region, particularly over Taiwan”.
In London, Marles claimed that the logic behind AUKUS matched my policy as prime minister, in committing to the Collins class submarine program. This is completely untrue.
The Collins class submarine, at 3,400 tonnes, was designed specifically for the defence of Australia – in the shallow waters off the Australian continental shelf.
The US Virginia class boats at 10,000 tonnes, are attack submarines designed to stay and stand on far away station, in this case, principally to wait and sink Chinese nuclear weapon submarines as they exit the Chinese coast.
At 10,000 tonnes, the Virginias are too large for the shallow waters of the Australian coast – their facility is not in the defence of Australia, rather, it is to use their distance and stand-off capability to sink Chinese submarines. They are attack-class boats.
When Marles wilfully says “AUKUS matches the Collins class logic” during the Keating government years, he knows that statement to be utterly untrue. Factually untrue. The Collins is and was a “defensive” submarine – designed to keep an enemy off the Australian coast. It was never designed to operate as far away as China or to sit and lie in wait for submarine conquests.
And as Evans also recently made clear, eight Virginia class boats delivered in the 2040s-50s would only ever see two submarines at sea at any one time. Yet Marles argues that just two boats of this kind in the vast oceans surrounding us, materially alters our defensive capability and the military judgment of an enemy. This is argument unbecoming of any defence minister.
As I said at the National Press Club two years ago, two submarines aimed at China would be akin to throwing toothpicks at a mountain. That remains the position.
The fact is, the Albanese Government, through this program and the ambitious basing of American military forces on Australian soil, is doing nothing other than abrogating Australia’s sovereign right to command its own continent and its military forces.
Marles says “there has been demonstrable support for AUKUS within the Labor Party”. This may be true at some factionally, highly-managed national conference — like the last one — but it is utterly untrue of the Labor Party’s membership at large – which he knows.
The membership abhors AUKUS and everything that smacks of national sublimation. It does not expect these policies from a Labor Government.
AUKUS boss insists project remains on track despite frustrations and staff upheaval within submarine agency

In an interview coinciding with the third anniversary of the AUKUS agreement, Admiral Mead rejected criticism within defence that the multi-billion-dollar push to acquire nuclear-powered submarines was cannibalising the budget for other military projects
ABC News, by defence correspondent Andrew Greene, 20 Sept 4
In short:
The head of Australia’s submarine agency has acknowledged staff turnover but insists the $368 billion AUKUS project is on track.
Privately, Australian Submarine Agency insiders and other officials have expressed frustrations with the progress of Australia’s nuclear submarine endeavour.
Staff upheaval and frustrations with leadership are emerging inside the new government agency that is overseeing Australia’s $368 billion AUKUS project, as concerns mount about the ambitious push to acquire nuclear-powered submarines.
Australian Submarine Agency (ASA) boss Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead has rejected claims his organisation is “top heavy” but acknowledged some recent departures of senior figures, while also insisting “AUKUS is real and it’s happening”.
Defence figures, foreign officials and industry representatives have privately spoken to the ABC about their disquiet with the ASA’s progress on preparing for AUKUS, contradicting recent optimistic statements about the trilateral venture.
AUKUS was first unveiled in 2021 by former prime minister Scott Morrison and aims to deliver a nuclear submarine capability for Australia through a security partnership struck with the United States and United Kingdom.
In July last year, the ASA was established to “safely and securely acquire, construct, deliver, technically govern, sustain and dispose of Australia’s conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine capability” under the AUKUS partnership.
Several weeks ago, ASA staff say they were stunned to learn one of the organisation’s most senior technical directors was leaving after playing a significant role that he had taken on following years of distinguished service in defence and the private sector.
“There’s a lot of disquiet here and we are really struggling to keep staff,” one ASA insider told the ABC, speaking under the condition of anonymity through fear of retribution by defence.
Another source connected to the agency claimed “several” relatively senior and experienced people left the organisation in recent months because of “concerns with the ASA’s top leadership”…………………………………………………………………………………….
Mead defends AUKUS project
Since its establishment under Admiral Mead, the ASA has grown to almost 700 full-time staff, including a dozen military officers holding a 1-star rank or higher, and an annual budget of $330 million, which is mainly comprised of salary costs.
In an interview coinciding with the third anniversary of the AUKUS agreement, Admiral Mead rejected criticism within defence that the multi-billion-dollar push to acquire nuclear-powered submarines was cannibalising the budget for other military projects…………………..
Under stage one of AUKUS, British and American nuclear submarines will rotate out of Perth from 2027. Then in the 2030s, Australia will receive second-hand Virginia boats from the United States, before constructing a new SSN-AUKUS fleet in Adelaide.
Privately, US officials have also expressed alarm at the slow progress in preparing for the stationing of nuclear-powered submarines out of Western Australia, under Submarine Rotational Force-West, and the transfer of second-hand boats in the 2030s.
We keep hearing announcements of new workforce recruitment initiatives, but they need to be far greater and much faster — the sense of urgency just isn’t there,” an American official who is not authorised to speak publicly told the ABC.
Admiral Mead insists “the US is very happy” with Australia’s progress but also declined to say what would happen if American shipyards do not deliver 2.33 Virginia submarines a year by 2028, the target required before boats can be transferred here…………………….
Frustration over slow progress
Frustration with the ASA’s direction is also privately shared by local defence industry representatives who have expressed disquiet with the slow progress in striking a joint venture to build the future SSN-AUKUS fleet in Adelaide.
In March, the government announced the Commonwealth-owned ASC would partner with British-owned company BAE Systems Australia to construct the nuclear-powered boats in Adelaide, but the joint venture is yet to be finalised.
One figure involved in the process claims targets are already being missed, highlighting the competing tensions and agendas between defence and ASC, which is run by the finance department……………………… more https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-09-20/aukus-boss-defends-project-amid-frustrations-staff-turnover/104372920?utm_source=abc_news_app&utm_medium=content_shared&utm_campaign=abc_news_app&utm_content=mail
The lucrative charity, yes CHARITY, running the Land Forces weapons expo

by Michael West | Sep 14, 2024, https://michaelwest.com.au/the-lucrative-charity-yes-charity-running-the-land-forces-weapons-fair/
The promoters behind the Land Forces weapons expo are registered as a charity. This charity, AMDA, pays no tax but does pay high salaries and just tripled its income to $35m. Michael West
It was rubber bullets and tear gas for peace protestors but special police mollycoddling and a Victorian Government sponsorship for the merchants of death.
What do we know about the promoters of the Land Forces weapons fair which the Victorian government so avidly protected from anti-war protestors this week with a $15m police presence, stun grenades, pepper spray and batons?
We know from regulatory filings the promoter behind Land Forces is a charity called AMDA Foundation. We know from AMDA’s financial disclosures that this charity is highly profitable. Its income shot up from $13m in 2022 to $34.6m last year
That was for the year to June; at which point it was sitting on a financial investment portfolio of $43m in cash, stocks and bonds. AMDA even gets government grants – grant revenue is booked at $6.6m over the past 2 years. The principal sponsor for Land Forces expo this year was none other than the Victorian Government, which went to extraordinary lengths to protect and promote its investment.
The mainstream media was bizarrely strident in its anti-protest coverage, running the story (not disavowed by the government and Victoria Police) that protestors sprayed police with acid. That was later downgraded to ‘irritants’ and ‘low-level acid’ bringing speculation it might have been orange juice (citric acid) or maybe the chemicals in the bubble liquid from the bubble machine with which the outnumbered protestors entertained the police blockade at one point.
It’s all a rort on the public, on the very taxpayers and citizens the Victorian government had its police assaulting this week, because weapons companies – the likes of AMDA’s exhibitors BAE, Lockheed Martin, Thales and Boeing – are funded by governments globally.
In Australia, the Defence budget is soaring amid rising weapons sales; so it is a fair bet that the income of AMDA will be higher in 2024.
AMDA’s $30m in expenses last year included $8m in pay for its 31 employees (FTE equivalent), which averages out at almost $260k per employee. The 5 KMP – the crew at the top of the charity – shared $1.5m or almost $300k apiece in ‘charity pay’.
The fake charity AMDA Foundation is exposed by Michael West Media’s Michelle Fahy.
Landforces’ brothers in arms: how a weapons peddler qualified for charitable status . https://www.michaelwest.com.au/landforces-brothers-in-arms-how-a-weapons-peddler-qualified-for-charitable-status/

by Michelle Fahy | Jun 4, 2021 The Coalition is cracking down on charitable organisations. However, the Australian charity promoting arms deals on behalf of weapons makers that profit from humanitarian catastrophes is unlikely to be in the government’s sights. With the weapons expo LandForces wrapping up in Brisbane this week, Michelle Fahy delves into the charity behind LandForces.
The Morrison government has charitable organisations in its sights. It proposes to amend the legislation covering charities so that minor legal misdemeanours by staff or supporters of a charity could be used as a prompt by the regulator for a review of a charity’s privileged status.
St Vincent de Paul told The Saturday Paper that if an activist wearing a Vinnies T-shirt refused to move along when asked by police, Vinnies could risk having its charitable status removed.
Hands Off Our Charities, an alliance of Australian charities, said in a submission to government: “The proposal is a major overreach and the need for further regulation has not been (and in our view cannot be) properly explained.”
Yet consider the activities of a not-for-profit organisation that many Australians will be astounded to discover has gained privileged charitable status – AMDA Foundation Limited (AMDA).
AMDA is the organiser of Land Forces, a biennial military and weapons exhibition running in Brisbane this week showcasing organisations “operating across the full spectrum of land warfare”.
The 600 exhibitors at Land Forces include local and multinational weapons manufacturers and other suppliers to military forces. Event sponsors include global arms corporations such as Boeing, BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin, Rheinmetall, General Dynamics, Saab and Hanwha, along with local companies Electro Optic Systems (EOS), CEA, and NIOA. Representatives from foreign governments and militaries are among the attendees.
Several of AMDA’s arms-maker sponsors have supplied their weaponry to the two countries leading the coalition fighting the war in Yemen – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The UN has been pleading for years for countries to cease supplying weaponry to these countries.
In late 2018, the New York Times published distressing photographs of emaciated children in Yemen dying as a result of aid blockades during the war. The mass starvation continues. UNICEF has said more than 400,000 Yemeni children under five could die preventable deaths this year.
Promoting arms deals on behalf of corporations that have profited from this unspeakable humanitarian catastrophe is the antithesis of what an Australian registered charity should be doing.
But the political posturing evident in the government’s proposed changes is unlikely to result in any repercussions for the AMDA Foundation. Instead, it is ‘activist’ environmental charities that are being targeted by the changes. Which is precisely the problem with such sweeping broad powers. They can be implemented selectively to silence voices the government does not want heard.
“It is the principle that underpins the change that is wrong, regardless of who it is used to target,” said Matt Rose, Economy & Democracy Program Manager at the Australian Conservation Foundation.
Arms trade promotion a “charitable activity”?
AMDA runs numerous major military and weapons-related trade exhibitions around Australia. Its roster of events includes Avalon, a biennial aerospace military and weapons expo in Victoria, next slated for early December 2021. The Indo Pacific Expo, a maritime warfare exhibition, is scheduled for May 2022 in Sydney.
These and other industry trade shows bring together sellers and buyers of weaponry and other military and security-related equipment. “Doing business is easy at Land Forces,” says its website, noting that Land Forces serves as a “powerful promotional and industry engagement forum”.
AMDA says it exists to help the “general community in Australia”. But the general community is not permitted to attend Land Forces nor AMDA’s other arms exhibitions. (The public can attend the Avalon Air Show, a separate public event run at the same time as the Avalon arms expo.)
AMDA is part of a group of companies registered with ACNC which operates around the country. It had 24 full-time-equivalent employees and a gross income in 2020 of $11.7 million – 32% of which came from government grants and 61% from operating revenue. Its income in 2019 was $26.2 million, mostly from operating revenue.
Revolving doors and conflicted interests
The AMDA board is an all-male affair. Its chair is former chief of the Royal Australian Navy, Christopher Ritchie, who joined the board in May 2017 while concurrently sitting on the boards of Lockheed Martin Australia (until 2020) and German naval shipbuilder Luerssen Australia, both multibillion dollar contractors to the Defence Department.
Former chief of army Kenneth Gillespie sits on the AMDA board while also sitting on the board of Naval Group, the French multinational building Australia’s controversial new submarines. Gillespie is also chair of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Council, the highly influential and supposedly “independent” think tank tasked with providing strategic advice to the government.
ASPI is sponsored by Naval Group as well as other global arms manufacturers including Lockheed Martin, Thales, Saab and Northrop Grumman. ASPI has been vocal in its anti-China ‘war drums’ rhetoric, stoking regional tensions, along with the Asia Pacific arms race.
That time when Canada cancelled its nuclear submarine order

The decision to cut the Australian community out altogether — except where we will be called upon to service the US military as it builds its base in WA — puts us in the relationship of a vassal state, existing only to do the bidding of our powerful friend.
By Julie Macken and Michael Walker, Aug 30, 2024, https://johnmenadue.com/that-time-when-canada-cancelled-its-nuclear-submarine-order/
Back in 1987, when no one knew that the Cold War was just about to end, the Canadian Government signed up to build 10 nuclear-powered submarines. That submarine program lasted for all of two years before being cancelled in 1989. No nuclear Canadian sub ever even began construction, let alone getting put in the water.
There is a very real sense of déjà vu when we look at the Canadian experience and the current Australian experience of AUKUS. The good news is that it is not too late to learn the lessons the Canadians learnt for us.
One of the reasons for the Canadian cancellation was the $8 billion price tag, or about $19 billion in today’s money. Two billion dollars per submarine now sounds like a bargain compared to the astronomical $45 billion per submarine under AUKUS. Canada decided it had other priorities where that money could be put to better use.
But before the contract was cancelled in Canada, the ministries involved in its construction became embroiled in conflict, the Government itself was in a cost-of-living-crisis with immediate, real-world needs pressing and the hasty and secretive choice of vessel design came under withering criticism from the Treasury department for poor procurement with the cost expected to blow out to $30 billion ($70 billion today). And finally, media support eroded, with 71% of the population opposed to the project.
Déjà vu much?
On 12 June, the US Congressional Research Document service produced a research and advice document called the Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress.
The document points out the AUKUS deal was a three-step process. The first was to establish a US-UK rotational submarine force in Western Australia. The second was that the US would sell us three or five Virginia nuclear powered submarines and the third would be that the UK assists us in building our own AUKUS class nuclear submarines.
But the Congressional report outlines when comparing the “potential benefits, costs, and risks” of the three stage plan, it might just be better for the US to operate more of its own boats out of WA. That is, “procuring up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs that would be retained in US Navy service and operated out of Australia along with the US and UK SSNs”.
That’s right, why bother with the whole step two and three when the US is best served by simply operating its nuclear-powered attack submarines out of WA?
This is an extraordinary development and one that demands more attention than has been given previously because a number of issues flow from this kind of thinking.
First, this potentially frees up $400 billion that could be put to far better use on a national housing construction program or high-speed rail network running the entire east coast of Australia or other large and much-needed nation-building projects. But not so fast.
The US Congressional Research Document suggests that “those funds (the $400 billion) could be invested in other military capabilities”, such as long-range missiles and bombers, “so as to create an Australian capacity for performing non-SSN military missions for both Australia and the United States”.
The decision to cut the Australian community out altogether — except where we will be called upon to service the US military as it builds its base in WA — puts us in the relationship of a vassal state, existing only to do the bidding of our powerful friend.
The fact that the document only referenced the “potential benefits, costs, and risks” from the US perspective, without any attempt to imagine how Australia may view becoming a life support for a US submarine base, makes the nature of our relationship pretty clear.
Australia’s Government may not consider it necessary to have done its due diligence on AUKUS but the Americans are happy to do that for us and, you guessed it, even though they quietly have doubts about the SSN project, they’ve already thought of plenty of other ways to spend our money on their own defence objectives. Spending it on the well-being and prosperity of our own people didn’t even rate a mention.
AUKUS 2.0: Albanese Drives It Like He Stole It, and Then Gives It Away to the US

by Paul Gregoire, 15 Aug 2024, Fact Checked, https://www.sydneycriminallawyers.com.au/blog/aukus-2-0-albanese-drives-it-like-he-stole-it-and-then-gives-it-away-to-the-us/

On his jaunt to the US last week, not only did defence minister Richard Marles glorify the US presence across the entire Australian military domain at the AUSMIN, but he also signed an updated version of the AUKUS Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement (ENNPIA).
Then in announcing the updated AUKUS agreement had been tabled on Monday, Marles explained that it “will be central to Australia’s acquisition of a sovereign nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) capability from the 2030s”, including US-made SSN and UK-assisted Australian-made SSN.
“It will also enable Australia to prepare for Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) at HMAS Stirling from 2027, supporting the rotational presence of up to four Virginia class submarines from the US and one Astute class submarine from the UK,” the deputy PM added in his press release.
Yet, while Marle’s first proposition, that Australia will ever acquire any of the eight proposed SSN of its own, has been shown to be full of holes, a recent paper by the US congress’ thinktank reveals that the mainly US submarine force stationed in WA is a given and it recommends no Australian SSN.
And despite these questions, the Albanese government did table the updated EENPIA, which, if all parties provide a note assuring that domestic requirements are completed, will replace the 2022 original agreement, and this rather lopsided treaty will continue to be in force until the end of 2075.
A lack of sovereignty
The AUKUS ENNPIA establishes a legally-binding framework to facilitate the communication and exchange of naval nuclear propulsion information and nuclear material and equipment from the UK and the US to Australia – the AUKUS powers – in regard to our own coming “sovereign” SSN.
The reason it’s questionable that any boats we may acquire will be sovereign is that the deal adheres to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which guards against new states acquiring the ability to produce such weapons, so therefore, the reactors in the subs are off-limits.
The plan is to purchase three to five second-hand Virginia class SSN from the states, starting in the early 1930s, with sealed nuclear reactors in them, and in terms of the five Australian-made AUKUS subs, the UK will provide welded naval nuclear propulsion plants to be inserted into the AUKUS SSN.
And author of Nuked, investigative journalist Andrew Fowler told the ABC last month in reference to the Virginia class SSN that if Australia buys these boats, it’s questionable that they can every really be referred to as owned solely by the nation, as treaty obligations guard against that final step.
Non-proliferation requirements
The updated ENNPIA further requires Australia to establish an Article 14 Arrangement under the Agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
This 1974 agreement permits Australia to use nuclear material in relation to “peaceful” activities, which is safeguarded under its provisions, and this further entails ensuring that the “material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.
Article 14 of the agreement requires that if Australia plans to use nuclear material in a “non-proscribed military activity”, that our nation and the IAEA must come to an arrangement, so that Australia is permitted to use it in this non-safeguarded manner.
And if Australia is found to be in breach of the NPT, it’s agreement with the IAEA or the Article 14 agreement, the US and the UK have the right to cease the AUKUS agreement and will require the return of all nuclear material and equipment transferred to it, which again raises sovereignty.
Pulling the plug
Australians have been told that the nation is committing at least $368 billion to this AUKUS sub deal, which certainly signals a nation sliding towards a war economy with less social services. And the ENNPIA notes that no public consultation has been undertaken because the process is classified.
But as Greens Senator David Shoebridge told Sydney Criminal Lawyers in April, our nation has already committed AU$4.6 billion to the US for its nuclear submarine industrial base, and another AU$4.6 billion for the UK’s nuclear submarine industrial base.
The updated ENNPIA further provides that “any party may, by giving at least one year’s written notice to the other parties, terminate this agreement”. Yet, there is nothing within it stipulating that Australia will be receiving any refunds on these already progressing investments.
And on such termination or if one party has breached the deal “each other party has the right to require the return or destruction of any naval nuclear propulsion information, nuclear material and equipment that it communicated, exchanged, or transferred pursuant to the agreement”.
So, while this last clause does technically apply to all AUKUS powers, it doesn’t really have any bearing on our nation, as we are to pay for the transference of information, nuclear material and related equipment, and we’re not supposed to provide any in the other direction.
So, Australia is left in a precarious situation where everything can be taken away.
A dumping ground for nuclear waste
In terms of nuclear waste, the AUKUS ENNPIA only “obligates Australia” to store and dispose of “any spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste resulting from naval nuclear propulsion plants that are transferred”.
However, this document only relates to the exchange of naval nuclear propulsion information coming from the US and the UK. And it does not, for instance, dictate what will happen to the nuclear waste generated by SRF-West: the US and UK SSN force that will operating out of WA from 2027 onwards.
Indeed, the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency last month, signed off on storing the nuclear waste produced by SRF-West on Garden Island, off the coast of Perth, and this will be both low-grade and intermediate-grade waste. And such arrangements could be expanded.
And the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 continues to sit in the lower house, after it went through the parliamentary committee process, which, amongst other measures, facilitates the establishment of a high level nuclear waste dump/s on First Nations land.
There’s a new sheriff in town
So, while the new AUKUS ENNPIA doesn’t facilitate our nation taking on high grade radioactive waste that the US and the UK hasn’t been able to store themselves, the updated document neither rules out that this will be facilitated via other means in the future.
And nor does it spell out what was clear at last week’s AUSMIN meet, which was that increasing interoperability between the US and Australian defence forces is coming, with Washington being the senior partner, and it will have a much greater military presence and in turn, control on the ground.
“If you look at the force posture of the United States on the Australian continent, we’ve seen a growth in marine rotation in Darwin,” our deputy PM said during the AUSMIN, and added that “in fact, that force posture lay down of the United States in Australia is across all domains”.
Nuclear industry front group? The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) enthuses over nuclear-armed submarines’

COMMENT. It really is about time that the Australian government stopped heeding this hawkish pretend-independent “think tank”.
Its thinking is limited to whatever the military-industrial-corporate-media complex tells it to think.
Australia could soon be hosting nuclear-armed US submarines The Strategist 23 Aug 2024.Alex Bristow
“……………………………………………………..One way to demonstrate that Canberra has real skin in the deterrence game is to host more US nuclear forces.
Australia is yet to follow South Korea’s example of welcoming a visit by a US ballistic missile submarine, which would always carry dozens of nuclear warheads. But changes afoot in Washington mean Australia could soon be regularly hosting other types of nuclear-capable submarines—those that can deliver nuclear weapons even if the US neither confirms nor denies that any are aboard.
Largely overlooked in Australia, the US Congress has funded development of a nuclear-tipped cruise missile for use at sea, formally called SLCM-N, to become provisionally operational by 2034. Such nuclear cruise missiles have not been deployed on US Navy vessels since the early 1990s.
The new ones seem to be primarily earmarked for Virginia-class attack submarines—a type of boat that visits Australia regularly and will form part of the rotational force being established at the base HMAS Stirling in Western Australia later this decade as part of AUKUS.
Politics could still get in the way, but there is bipartisan support for SLCM-N in the US Congress and the Biden administration’s opposition has lessened. If Trump wins, its future should be secure. Elbridge Colby, who is widely tipped for a top national security role in a second Trump administration, is a fan.
………………………Australia will have a greater say over changes to US nuclear posture if it does more to support extended deterrence than host such joint facilities as Pine Gap. But doing more will require public understanding and support, which the government must build.
Canberra’s first task is ensuring that disinformation about US nuclear weapons does not undermine AUKUS.
…………………………Ministers must make the case to the Australian public and the international community that the US nuclear umbrella, which relies on support from allies, helps make the world more stable and less prone to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
………………………..Australian interests are best served by contributing more actively to extended nuclear deterrence, including being open to hosting more US nuclear forces, without seeking nuclear weapons……
Gareth Evans: AUKUS is terrible for Australian national interests – but we’re probably stuck with it

as Paul Keating continues to put it so articulately, that we need to find our security in Asia, not from Asia.
The Conversation, Gareth Evans, Distinguished Honorary Professor, Australian National University, August 16, 2024
This is an edited extract of a presentation by Gareth Evans, Distinguished Honorary Professor at ANU and former Australian foreign minister, to the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia Conference.
Politics played a significant part in the birth of AUKUS in Australia, and politics both here and in the United States will play a crucial role in determining whether it lives or dies. That is so at least for its core submarine component. The second pillar of the agreement, relating to technical cooperation on multiple new fronts, is both much less clear in its scope and less obviously politically fraught.
On the Australian side, partisan political opportunism was a factor in the initiation of the submarine deal, bipartisan political support was a condition of US agreement to it, and maintenance of that bipartisan support into the future presumably will be a precondition of its continuance, at least when it comes to highly sensitive elements like the handover of three Virginia class submarines.
On the American side, it was perception of US strategic advantage that drove Washington’s agreement to the deal, rather than any domestic political considerations. But strong cross-party support in Congress will remain necessary for its complete delivery. And, at the even more critical executive level, it cannot be assumed the deal is now Trump-proof.
It is only in the United Kingdom that we can reasonably regard domestic politics to be irrelevant to AUKUS’s future. The deal is so obviously a gift to the national Treasury, and has so little impact on national defence and security interests, that no one on any side of politics is ever likely to find it unpalatable.
In Australia, domestic politics have been a factor from the outset. While for the Morrison government the primary driver of the AUKUS decision was, no doubt, the ideological passion of senior Coalition ministers for all things American, it is hard to deny political opportunism came a close second.
Morrison was deeply conscious of the opportunity the deal presented to wedge the Labor opposition in the defence and security space, where the Labor Party has long been perceived, rightly or wrongly, as electorally vulnerable. That the nuclear dimension of the deal was bound to ruffle some feathers in Labor ranks was an added political attraction…………………………………………..
What I am now critical of, is that when Labor did come into office in May 2022, it is clear no such serious review of the whole AUKUS deal ever took place. Crucial questions were never seriously addressed; clearly articulated answers to them have never been given by the prime minister, defence minister or anyone else. The answers that are in fact emerging as further time passes are deeply troubling…………………………………..
……..there is zero certainty of the timely delivery of the eight AUKUS boats. We now know that both the US and UK have explicit opt-out rights. And even in the wholly unlikely event that everything falls smoothly into place in the whole vastly complex enterprise, we will be waiting 40 years for the last boat to arrive, posing real capability gap issues.
………………, the final fleet size – if its purpose really is the defence of Australia – appears hardly fit for that purpose. ………………..
…….the eye-watering cost of the AUKUS submarine program, up to $368 billion, will make it very difficult, short of a dramatic increase in the defence share of GDP, to acquire the other capabilities we will need if we are to have any kind of self-reliant capacity in meeting an invasion threat. Those capabilities include, in particular, state-of-the-art missiles, aircraft and drones, that are arguably even more critical than submarines for our defence in the event of such a crisis.
..the price now being demanded by the US for giving us access to its nuclear propulsion technology is extraordinarily high.
……… The notion that we will retain any kind of sovereign agency in determining how all these assets are used, should serious tensions erupt, is a joke in bad taste.
…….the purchase price we are now paying, for all its exorbitance, will never be enough to guarantee the absolute protective insurance that supporters of AUKUS think they are buying. ANZUS, it cannot be said too often, does not bind the US to defend us, even in the event of existential attack. And extended nuclear deterrence is as illusory for us as for ever other ally or partner believing itself to be sheltering under a US nuclear umbrella. The notion that the US would ever be prepared to run the risk of sacrificing Los Angeles for Tokyo or Seoul, let alone Perth, is and always has been nonsense.
We can rely on military support if the US sees it in its own national interest to offer it, but not otherwise.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………..as Paul Keating continues to put it so articulately, that we need to find our security in Asia, not from Asia.
Australia’s no-holds-barred embrace of AUKUS is more likely than not to prove one of the worst defence and foreign policy decisions our country has made, not only putting at profound risk our sovereign independence, but generating more risk than reward for the very national security it promises to protect. I cannot imagine this decision being made by any of the Hawke-Keating governments of which I was part. Times have changed. https://theconversation.com/gareth-evans-aukus-is-terrible-for-australian-national-interests-but-were-probably-stuck-with-it-236938
Forced Posture: has Australia already ceded military control to the US?

by Michelle Fahy Aug 13, 2024, https://michaelwest.com.au/forced-posture-has-australia-already-ceded-military-control-to-the-us/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_term=2024-08-15&utm_campaign=Michael+West+Media+Weekly+Update
The war of words between Defence Minister Richard Marles and Paul Keating belies how the US bid for military control of Australia has been underway for over a decade, supported by both the Coalition and Labor. Michelle Fahy and Elizabeth Minter explain the Force Posture Agreement.
The Albanese government has not explained the full picture in its rejection of Paul Keating’s concerns about Australia’s defence policy. The former Labor prime minister said on ABC’s 7:30 last Thursday that AUKUS was likely to turn Australia into the 51st state of the United States: “AUKUS is really about, in American terms, the military control of Australia.”
The next morning deputy prime minister Richard Marles claimed Keating’s remarks were “not a fair characterisation” and that Keating’s remarks were not news.
Unmentioned by either Keating or Marles was that America’s bid for military control of Australia has been under way for more than a decade, with the enthusiastic support of both Coalition and Labor governments. As we write this, the US is spending $630 million as part of an extensive militarisation of the Australian Top End to suit its purposes.
Furthermore, five days ago, after the annual Ausmin (Australia-US Ministerial Consultations) talks, it was announced that the US was planning more frequent deployments to Australia of long-range B-52 bombers, which can carry nuclear weapons.

When asked last year whether Australia would allow US aircraft operating out of Tindal air base in the Northern Territory to carry nuclear weapons, the response of Foreign Minister Penny Wong was simply: “We understand and respect the longstanding US policy of neither confirming or denying.”
Compare that stance with that of Malcolm Fraser’s government. As John Menadue explained in a recent podcast “The Americanisation of our public policy, media and national interest”, then prime minister Fraser stood up in Parliament and insisted that no US aircraft or ships carrying nuclear weapons could access Australian ports or operate over Australia without the permission of the Australian government.
As Menadue said: “This is our territory, this is our sovereignty, [yet today] we won’t even ask the Americans operating out of Tindal whether they’re carrying nuclear weapons.”
Unimpeded access for the US
A critical piece of evidence regarding Australia’s sellout is the little-known Force Posture Agreement (FPA) with the United States, which the Abbott Coalition government signed in 2014, building on agreements made with the US by the Gillard Labor government. Her government allowed up to 2,500 US marines to be stationed on a permanent rotation in Darwin, and increased the number of military aircraft that could fly in and out of the Top End and use Australia’s outback bombing ranges.
The FPA provides the legal basis for the extensive militarisation of Australia by the US. In short, it permits the US to prepare for, launch and control its own military operations from Australian territory: “United States Forces and United States Contractors shall have unimpeded access to and use of Agreed Facilities and Areas for activities undertaken in connection with this Agreement.”
Defence Minister Marles has been effusive in his support for the force posture agreement and the control the US has been given over Australian soil.
Just last week, he announced that: “American force posture now in Australia involves every domain: land, sea, air, cyber and space.” Yet the longstanding Outer Space Treaty, which each AUKUS ally has ratified, reserves outer space for purely peaceful purposes.
Two months after Labor won office in May 2022, Marles was in Washington DC announcing that Labor would “continue the ambitious trajectory of its force posture cooperation” with the US.
He added that Australia’s military engagement with the US military would “move beyond interoperability to interchangeability” and Australia would “ensure we have all the enablers in place to operate seamlessly together, at speed”.
While the FPA strongly supports America’s ability to wage war against China, politicians have not explained its significance to the Australian public. Moreover, public consultation on the FPA was virtually non-existent. The Northern Territory government was consulted, while other state and territory governments merely received advice about it.
Defence Minister Marles speaks of the “appreciation for the contribution that America is making to the stability and the peace of the Indo-Pacific region by its presence in Australia”, but numerous critics, including Sam Roggeveen, the director of the Lowy Institute’s international security program and a former Australian intelligence analyst, warn of the risks of bringing “US combat forces, and its military strategy to fight China, on to our shores”.
The FPA allows the following and much more:
- unimpeded access to our airfields and airport facilities for US combat aircraft and bombers;
- unimpeded access to our seaports for US naval vessels, including US nuclear submarines at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia;
- the construction of a US Air Force mission planning, intelligence and operations centre in Darwin as part of $630 million in American spending across the Top End over the next two years;
- the establishment, under US military control, of several storage facilities for aircraft fuel, spare parts and munitions, including 11 giant jet fuel storage tanks near Darwin’s main port, which “will allow the US to run large-scale exercises and operations from Northern Australia”.
AUKUS, in conjunction with the FPA, ensures that Australia’s navy, in particular, will be tightly integrated with the US navy for the purpose of fighting China, and that the two navies can operate as one from Australian ports and waters.
Handcuffed to the US
Australia’s high-tech major weapons systems also make us more reliant than ever on the United States. As respected veteran journalist Brian Toohey reported in 2020, “The US … denies Australia access to the computer source code essential to operate key electronic components in its ships, planes, missiles, sensors and so on.”
This includes the F-35 fighter jets, which both Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Defence Minister Marles have noted this year form the largest proportion of the Australian Air Force’s fast jet capacity.
The significant erosion of Australian sovereignty did not start with AUKUS. Australians were warned as far back as 2001 of the high costs of our dependence on the US by a Parliamentary Library research paper that stated: “It is almost literally true that Australia cannot go to war without the consent and support of the US.”
The paper also noted that the Australian Defence Force is critically dependent on US supply and support for the conduct of all its operations except those at the lowest level and of the shortest duration.
It is more than dependency though? Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles boasts that “American force posture now in Australia involves every domain: land, sea, air, cyber and space” yet the Albanese government denies that Australia is turning into the 51st state of America.
Resisting AUKUS: The Paul Keating Formula

The venomous icing on the cake – at least for AUKUS critics – comes in the form of an undisclosed “Understanding” that involves “additional related political commitments.”
The contents of Biden’s letter irked Keating less than the spectacular show of servility shown by Australia’s Defence Minister Richard Marles, and Foreign Minister Penny Wong on their visit to Annapolis for the latest AUSMIN talks. In what has become a pattern of increasing subordination of Australian interests to the US Imperium, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken played happy hosts and must have been delighted by what they heard.
August 13, 2024, : Dr Binoy Kampmark, https://theaimn.com/resisting-aukus-the-paul-keating-formula/

From his own redoubt of critical inquiry, the former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating has made fighting the imperialising leprosy of the AUKUS security pact between Australia, the UK and the United States a matter of solemn duty.
In March 15, 2023, he excoriated a Canberra press gallery seduced and tantalised by the prospect of nuclear-powered submarines, calling the Albanese government’s complicit arrangements with the US and UK to acquire such a capability “the worst international decision by an Australian Labor government since the former Labor leader, Billy Hughes, sought to introduce conscription to augment Australian forces in World War one.
His latest spray was launched in the aftermath of a touched-up AUKUS, much of it discussed in a letter by US President Joe Biden to the US House Speaker and President of the Senate. The revised agreement between the three powers for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion is intended to supersede the November 22, 2021 agreement between the three powers on the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (ENNPIA)
The new agreement permits “the continued communication and exchange of NNPI, including certain RD, and would also expand the cooperation between the governments by enabling the transfer of naval nuclear propulsion plants of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, including component parts and spare parts thereof, and other related equipment.” The new arrangements will also permit the sale of special nuclear material in the welded power units, along with other relevant “material as needed for such naval propulsion plants.”
The contents of Biden’s letter irked Keating less than the spectacular show of servility shown by Australia’s Defence Minister Richard Marles, and Foreign Minister Penny Wong on their visit to Annapolis for the latest AUSMIN talks. In what has become a pattern of increasing subordination of Australian interests to the US Imperium, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken played happy hosts and must have been delighted by what they heard.
The details that emerged from the conversations held between the four – details which rendered Keating passionately apoplectic – can only make those wishing for an independent Australian defence policy weep. Words such as “Enhanced Force Posture Cooperation” were used to describe the intrusion of the US armed forces into every sphere of Australian defence:the domains of land, maritime, air, and space.
Ongoing infrastructure investments at such Royal Australian Air Force Bases as Darwin and Tindal continue to take place, not to bolster Australian defence but fortify the country as a US forward defensive position. To these can be added, as the Pentagonfact sheet reveals, “site surveys for potential upgrades at RAAF Bases Curtin, Learmonth, and Scherger.”
The degree of subservience Canberra affords is guaranteed by increased numbers of US personnel to take place in rotational deployments. These will include “frequent rotations of bombers, fighter aircraft, and Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft.” Secret arrangements have also been made involving the disposal of nuclear propulsion plants that will feature in Australia’s nuclear powered submarine fleet, though it is unclear how broad that commitment is.
The venomous icing on the cake – at least for AUKUS critics – comes in the form of an undisclosed “Understanding” that involves “additional related political commitments.” The Australian Greens spokesperson on Defence, Senator David Shoebridge, rightly wonders “what has to be kept secret from the Australian public? There are real concerns the secret understanding includes commitments binding us to the US in the event they go to war with China in return for getting nuclear submarines.”
Marles has been stumblingly unforthcoming in that regard. When asked what such “additional political commitments” were, he coldly replied that the agreement was “as we’ve done it.” The rest was “misinformation” being spread by detractors of the alliance.
It is precisely the nature of these undertakings, and what was made public at Annapolis, that paved the way for Keating’s hefty salvo on ABC’s 7.30. The slavishness of the whole affair had made Keating “cringe”. “This government has sold out to the United States. They’ve fallen for the dinner on the White House lawn.”
He proved unsparing about Washington’s intentions. “What AUKUS is about in the American mind is turning [Australia into suckers], locking us up for 40 years with American bases all around … not Australian bases.” It meant, quite simply, “in American terms, the military control of Australia. I mean, what’s happened … is likely to turn Australia into the 51st state of the United States.”
Having the US as an ally was itself problematic, largely because of its belligerent intentions. “If we didn’t have an aggressive ally like the United States – aggressive to others in the region – there’d be nobody attacking Australia. We are better left alone than we are being ‘protected’ by an aggressive power like the United States.”
As for what Australian obligations to the US entailed, the former PM was in little doubt. “What this is all about is the Chinese laying claim to Taiwan, and the Americans are going to say ‘no, no, we’re going to keep these Taiwanese people protected’, even though they’re sitting on Chinese real estate.” Were Australia to intervene, the picture would rapidly change: an initial confrontation between Beijing and Washington over the island would eventually lead to the realisation that catastrophic loss would simply not be worth it, leaving Australia “the ones who have done all the offence.”
As for Australia’s own means of self-defence against any adversary or enemy, Keating uttered the fundamental heresy long stomped on by the country’s political and intelligence establishment: Canberra could, if needed, go it alone. “Australia is capable of defending itself. There’s no way another state can invade a country like Australia with an armada of ships without it all failing.” Australia did not “need to be basically a pair of shoes hanging out of Americans’ backside.” With Keating’s savage rhetoric, and the possibility that AUKUS may collapse before the implosions of US domestic politics, improbable peace may break out.
Revamped AUKUS document reveals how US and UK can walk away from nuclear submarine deal

ABC News, By defence correspondent Andrew Greene 14 Aug 24
In short:
A revamped AUKUS agreement has been tabled in federal parliament revealing the submarine project can be cancelled with a year’s notice.
Under the deal, Australia has also agreed to indemnify the US and UK against any loss or injury connected to nuclear materials transferred here.
What’s next?
The deal will last until December 2075, provided the ANZUS alliance continues and the US and UK remain in NATO.
Australia would foot the bill for any loss or injury caused by sensitive technology and radioactive materials transferred by the United States and United Kingdom for nuclear submarines, under a revamped version of the AUKUS agreement.
An updated document for the trilateral partnership reveals Australia would indemnify the United States and the United Kingdom against such an outcome.
It also reveals the US or the UK could pull out of the submarine deal with just a year’s notice if either nation decides the deal weakens their own nuclear submarine programs
Details of the “understanding” signed by all three AUKUS partners last week in Washington have now been tabled in federal parliament with the agreement to “remain in force until 31 December 2075”.
Article I specifies that the US and UK can transfer “material and equipment relating to conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines to Australia” providing this does not constitute an “unreasonable risk” to their own defence and security.
“This is a $368 billion gamble with taxpayers’ money from the Albanese government,” Greens senator David Shoebridge said following the tabling of the document on Monday.
“Article I of the new AUKUS agreement says that if at any point the United States thinks supplying material under the AUKUS agreement to Australia prejudices their defence, they can effectively terminate the agreement and pull out.
“What this agreement makes clear in black and white: If the United States at any point thinks they don’t have enough submarines for themselves, they can pull out of AUKUS 2.0 — why isn’t the Albanese government being honest about the size of the gamble?”
According to the document, “Australia shall be responsible for the management, disposition, storage, and disposal of any spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste resulting from the operation of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Plants”.
The Albanese government has also agreed to indemnify the US and UK against “any liability, loss, costs, damage or injury (including third-party claims) arising out of, related to, or resulting from Nuclear Risks” connected with the project……………….
The head of the AUKUS submarine program has refused to say whether an almost $5 billion government payment to the United States would be refunded if no nuclear-powered boats were delivered to Australia.
The agreement for “cooperation for naval nuclear propulsion” is also contingent on Australia and the US remaining in the ANZUS alliance, along with the US and UK staying as NATO members.
Defence Minister Richard Marles said the agreement “expressly rules out enriching uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel in Australia” and prevents AUKUS partners from any activity that would contravene international non-proliferation obligations.
“The Albanese government, alongside AUKUS partners, continues to re-affirm that Australia’s acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will set the highest non-proliferation standards through the AUKUS partnership.
“The agreement is unequivocal that, as a non-nuclear weapons state, Australia does not seek to acquire nuclear weapons,” Mr Marles stressed.
Last week, President Joe Biden revealed the existence of a new agreement in a letter to Congress in which he said the non-legally binding “understanding” had provided “additional related political commitments”. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-08-12/revamped-aukus-document-reveals-how-us-and-uk-can-walk-away/104214398
