Antinuclear

Submission to AUKUS Public Inquiry- dubious security value, breaching treaties, radioactive wastes, huge costs – Ian Lowe

227. Ian Lowe

To summarise my relevant experience, my doctoral research at University of York
was funded by the UK Atomic Energy Authority. I studied the basic physics of a
problem affecting the useful life of fuel elements in nuclear reactors. As a member
of the UK Open University’s Energy Research Group, I participated in a
comparative study of the whole-of-life operating costs of nuclear or coal-fired
power stations. I was for twelve years a member of the Radiation Health and
Safety Advisory Council, which advises the nuclear regulator ARPANSA, and I was a
member of the Expert Advisory Committee for the South Australia Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Royal Commission, which reported in 2016.

The critical question is whether owning and operating eight nuclear-powered
submarines would actually enhance our security. I participated in a one-day
seminar run by the Submarine Institute of Australia well before the AUKUS
agreement was negotiated. The submariners were clearly divided about the
question of whether the next generation of submarines should be
nuclear-powered. While they could operate away from base for longer periods and
at greater depth than conventional submarines, their size would prevent them
operating in the comparatively shallow waters around Australia’s northern
coastline, making them less useful for defending our territory. That observation
poses an obvious related question about sovereignty and independence. Would
the AUKUS arrangement move Australia away from being an independent
middle-sized country like Japan or Indonesia, locking us into the US war machine
and increasing the risk of being dragged into great-power conflict with China, our
major trading partner? Some observers fear that AUKUS could actually make
Australia a nuclear target. Given that China is our major trading partner, it seems
bizarre to imagine that we need to protect our ocean-going trade from the Chinese
navy, but that has been proposed as a reason for acquiring nuclear-powered
submarines.

A whole group of questions arise from the specific problems of nuclear-powered
boats. If nuclear technology is transferred from the USA and the UK to Australia to
allow submarines to be built here using weapons-grade uranium, does that
contravene the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? The proposal has certainly been
seen by some of our South Pacific neighbours as inconsistent with our treaty
obligations. What are the environmental risks of operating nuclear-powered
submarines in Australian waters? Some technologists who are quite enthusiastic
about nuclear power stations are worried about installing reactors in vessels which
an enemy would understandably try to destroy in any serious conflict.

The final issue under this heading is the long-term problem of managing the
radioactive waste when the submarines reach the end of their lives. The AUKUS
agreement makes Australia responsible for waste management. That would be a
huge problem. Our government has made three unsuccessful attempts to
establish a national repository for the comparatively benign low-level radioactive
waste from nuclear medicine and industrial applications. In every case, the
proposals have been successfully opposed by local First Nations groups. Their
memories are critically shaped by their experiences when the Menzies government
allowed the British military to test nuclear weapons on our land. But the problem
of managing the waste from nuclear submarines is orders of magnitude more
difficult than storing low-level waste. The small reactors use highly enriched
uranium, weapons-grade material, which produces a much more intractable set of
waste products than emerges from nuclear power stations. The USA and the UK
have been operating nuclear submarines for more than sixty years, but have still
not worked out how to manage the wastes. The decommissioned boats are just
sitting at docksides while the government scientists ponder the issue.

Assuming we do prove able to solve the problem and develop a system for
managing the waste, it is likely to add another huge sum to the overall costs of the
project. In 2015, a South Australian Royal Commission considered the possibility of
going into business managing the waste from nuclear power stations in Asian
nations that do not have suitably stable geology for long-term secure containment.
I was a member of that inquiry’s expert advisory committee. We sponsored a
serious study of the likely cost of building and operating a secure repository for
high-level radioactive waste from power stations. The consultants came up with an
estimate of $145 billion; adjusting that total to 2026 costs gives a figure of about
$190 billion. So accepting responsibility for managing the wastes will mean a
further eye-watering cost burden on future generations. In fact, that figure is likely
to be a conservative estimate, because the consultants were asked to calculate
the cost of managing waste from nuclear power stations. Not only is the mix of
waste products from a nuclear submarine nastier, it also contains enough
weapons-grade uranium to make at least 20 bombs. So the waste management
facility will require military security to ensure the fissile material is not misused.

October 11, 2026 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | Uncategorized