‘Stupidly dangerous’: AUKUS won’t cause a Chernobyl but experts are still worried

The Greens dubbed them ‘floating Chernobyls’. Hyperbole, perhaps, but experts say there are real reasons to fear the nuclear submarines.

It’s the $368 billion friendship bracelet that the Greens suggested would lead to “floating Chernobyls” off the coast of our major cities, and marks the first transfer in history between a nuclear-weapon state of nuclear-powered submarines to a non-nuclear state.

So just how dangerous are the three AUKUS-born nuclear submarines we’re getting from the US, and the eight we plan to build by 2055? And is there enough nuclear material onboard or around for us to be afraid of a meltdown or malfunction?

Following the announcement of the deal in September 2021, Greens Leader Adam Bandt told the ABC it was a “dangerous decision that will make Australia less safe by putting floating Chernobyls in the heart of our major cities”………………..(Subscribers only)

April 24, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | AUSTRALIA - NATIONAL, weapons and war | Leave a comment

The dangerous one is the U.S. -not China

As for Taiwan, let’s remember that the international community recognises Taiwan as part of China and Taiwan has no seat by itself in the United Nations.

By Colin Mackerras, Apr 16, 2023 https://johnmenadue.com/the-dangerous-one-is-the-u-s/

The implication of AUKUS is that China constitutes a danger to Australian security. It borders on official Australian policy that China is an aggressive power bent on domination. But the history of the People’s Republic suggests its military is for defence, not aggression and that the cases where it has used external military force are very few. Under Xi Jinping it may be assertive and keen to extend influence, especially economic, but it shows no signs of political/military aggression. On the contrary, it is the U.S. that constantly uses external military force and is bent on maintaining domination at all costs.

It was less than a year after the birth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949 that the Korean War broke out. Korean history of the first years after World War II is too complex to pursue here. But essentially no sooner was Korea independent of a defeated Japan in 1945 than a divided country emerged, with the U.S. setting up the Republic of Korea (South Korea) on 15 August 1948 and the Democratic People’s Republic (North Korea) following on 9 September. Under U.S. dominance, it was the south that moved first formally to divide the country.

When the north attacked the south in June 1950, the U.S. got the United Nations to intervene under its own American leadership. China became involved only in October 1950, after the U.S. actively threatened to move north to invade the fledgling PRC. Yet, at U.S. behest, China was condemned for aggression.

Let’s be very clear: the U.S. was the first foreign power to be involved in this war, not China. After a truce reached in 1953, Chinese troops withdrew fully from the north by 1958, while American troops remain in the south to this day. The dangerous one is the U.S., which assumes its God-given right to control the world, not China. There is no peace treaty covering Korea to this day.

Following the Korean War, China has only rarely been involved in wars outside its own borders. In 1962, it fought a brief border war with India, but it is important to note that the rights and wrongs of this are extremely controversial. Although the Western media reported almost entirely India’s version of events, scholars such as the late Neville Maxwell (1926-2019) and Gregory Clark have shown convincingly that China had a perfectly respectable case.

The most recent time China sent troops to attack another country was in Vietnam in February and March 1979 in response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. During this very brief war, China made no attempt to take the capital or to change the Vietnamese government. It withdrew unilaterally.

In short, the longest war since 1949 to see Chinese troops fight outside their borders is still the Korean war. It was unfairly condemned of aggression by the first foreign power to participate in the war, with the U.S. version of events sticking for decades because of its world power.

Since the Korean War, the U.S. continues to be involved in numerous wars, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, among others, with Australia simply taking part to follow the boss. What’s striking is that the U.S. has lost these wars and ended up withdrawing humiliated. The U.S. has attempted to invent an ideological justification but frequently been attacked by protests from within its own borders. It has also been involved in proxy wars, some such as the present Ukraine war large in scale.

In contrast to China, the U.S. has hundreds of military bases outside its own borders and has installed numerous governments in foreign countries replacing those that don’t conform to its ideology it calls “democracy”.

Many in the West assume that under Xi Jinping China has become an aggressive nation, even if it was not before. It is true China is much more assertive in world affairs. But I see no sign that China has become aggressive. It shows no sign of wanting to use its armed forces outside its own territory.

As for Taiwan, let’s remember that the international community recognises Taiwan as part of China and Taiwan has no seat by itself in the United Nations. The U.S. may be goading China to retake Taiwan with violence, but has not succeeded up to now. China’s policy is now, and has always been, that it wants to reunify the country by retaking Taiwan, but it wants peaceful reunification, using force only as a last resort.

China extends its influence through trade and investment. We know that its Belt and Road Initiative has expanded China’s economic and to some extent political influence throughout Central Asia, Africa and Latin America, and even the South Pacific. We even hear increasing reports of China’s replacing the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency by trading in the Chinese yuan and other currencies.

Western countries, especially the U.S., express alarm at the increase of Chinese influence and have taken increasingly severe measures to thwart it. However, what the Chinese have not done is establish military bases, overthrow local regimes or even try to spread their ideology to those countries with which they trade. In this sense they are far less dangerous than the U.S.

Xi Jinping talks of a common shared future of humanity, not of dominance. Western commentators tend to assume that’s just words, and really he hides deception and conquest in his heart. I don’t see the evidence for that.

What China wants, and what seems to me in China’s interests, are two things. One is to protect China against external attack. The other is a multipolar world, in which China is one of the important poles. It does not want or aim for a Chinese-dominated unipolar world. True, it is becoming involved in the Middle East and in peace processes to an unprecedented extent, at the same time as the U.S. is in decline relative to China (and other countries). Personally, I can’t see why it should not. As a great civilisation, it has a right to extensive influence. Influence is quite different from dominance.

The U.S. currently assumes it is number 1. Its main aim is to retain that position. Its policies are geared to that end, to keep China down. What alarms the U.S. is China’s success. How can a country so recently impoverished and backward actually be prosperous enough to enjoy a life expectancy at birth longer than the U.S.? (World Bank data for 2020 have China at 78, and the U.S. at 77).

The way Australia has submitted itself to this dangerous and untrustworthy country, the U.S., is shameful. Our track-record of blindly following allies into wars that don’t concern us is unworthy of the independent country we should be and aspire to be.

April 17, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | AUSTRALIA - NATIONAL, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Rex Patrick on AUKUS submarines: “an astonishingly bad deal”

by Rex Patrick | Apr 14, 2023 https://michaelwest.com.au/rue-britannia-britannia-and-rue-aukus-subs/

The Defence Department has outdone itself with the AUKUS submarine project. In Paul Keating’s words, “it’s the worst deal in all history”. That’s not just because of the staggering $386 billion price tag, but because of the form the program is to take. Former submariner Rex Patrick looks at the most astonishingly irrational part of the announcement.

Our senior Defence bureaucrats, both uniformed and civilian, have a remarkable but unexplainable knack when it comes to acquiring new equipment. When simplicity confronts them, they always find some way to make it complex. In the face of something manageable, they’ll always find a way to make it unmanageable. SNAFU is the order of the day.

But, for Defence, it’s all OK – the admirals, air marshals, generals and top level public servants are immune from the consequences of failed procurement – no matter how big the disaster. No-one’s ever been fired from Defence for stuffing up an equipment purchase; after all, the wasted money is not theirs, it’s mine and yours.

Looking at the AUKUS plan, which some are now labelling USUKA [pronounced “you sucker”] after Paul Keating called it “the worst deal in all history,” Australia will initially acquire three second-hand but proven and highly capable Virginia Class submarines, but then jump off that safe pathway to a high-risk program involving a country that has a track record of being late, and over budget, on its past and current submarine programs.

It’s just reckless.

Virginia submarines, what we could do

The Virginia Class nuclear attack submarine is sea proven but also an evolving design. It’s even fitted with the combat system and weapons that we already have on our Collins Class submarines, or will acquire.

AUKUS is a bad deal. It comes at eye-watering cost, has huge opportunity costs and effectively puts all our Defence eggs in one basket.

It’s not going to deliver a capability within an even remotely sensible time frame either to help deter, let alone fight in, the very conflict Defence purports we need it for.

But if I put that aside and just went along with the whole thing, I’d advise that we could, and should, buy three US built Virginia Class submarines and then build our own, effectively providing the third Virginia shipyard (there are two shipyards in the US, both struggling with capacity).

That’s of benefit to us, and to the US, who would enjoy a surge build capability through us.”

But instead, we will pay to increase US industrial capability and then turn to the British.

Not a shadow of its old self

“Rule Britannia, Britannia rules the waves. Britons never, never, never shall be slaves.” It’s a song derived from a 1730s poem.

But like the billowing gowns and petticoats that were worn over dome-shaped panniers by women of the 1730s, “Rule Britannia” is no longer in fashion.

The Royal Navy is not even a shadow of its old self. The French Navy and Spanish Armada outnumber Royal Navy frigates and destroyers 32 to 18. Admiral Horatio Nelson would be turning in his grave.

And to make matters worse, the “great” left “Great Britain” soon after Brexit.

(Not so) Astute submarines

Back to the topic at hand, Britain’s recent submarine projects have been project management cluster fiascos.

The Royal Navy’s current Astute class nuclear-powered attack submarine program was approved by the British Government in 1997. Three boats were to be built for £2.6 billion, with the first boat to be in service in 2005. The first boat went in the water five years late, in 2010, and the first three boats blew out in cost by £1.9 billion. And by the way, the UK contracted the US submarine company, General Dynamics Electric Boat, to help them sort out some ‘issues’ within the Astute project in 2004.

Starting with approval for a fourth boat in 2007, the program has grown to seven boats all up. The last four “Batch II” boats were supposed to cost £5.7B but are now expected to total £6.7 billion. The latest boat, HMS Anson, was delivered 25 months late.

Dreadnought submarines

The parallel Dreadnought nuclear ballistic missile submarine is on track. On track to be late and over budget.

The Ministry of Defence established its Future Submarine Integrated Project Team in October 2007. The initial approval of the program was in May 2011, with an estimated cost for four submarines of between £11 and £14 billion. The first submarine was intended to be in service in 2028.

The most recent cost estimate for the four ballistic missile platforms is £31 billion. Bizarrely, as the program has advanced, less seems to be known about the in-service date. No-one is saying when the first boat will arrive, other than “some time in the 2030s.”

Refits and retirements

The first of the Royal Navy’s current nuclear ballistic missile submarines, HMS Vanguard, has just come out of refit. The refit was programmed for three years and was to cost around £200 million. It took seven long years and around £500 million. Nearly one quarter of Vanguard’s service life will have been spent in dock undergoing repairs and maintenance.

Earlier this year, a public scandal erupted when it was revealed that the lead contractor had concealed broken bolts in the submarine’s reactor compartment.

In terms of programmatic failure, even more disturbing is the state of dismantling retired Royal Navy nuclear submarines.

The first ever British nuclear-powered submarine, HMS Dreadnought, entered service 60 years ago and served for 17 years. For the last 43 years, it’s been sitting alongside a wharf in the UK. It’s not been dismantled. But neither have any of the other 21 retired Royal Navy nuclear-powered submarines.

It’s a national disgrace. The National Audit Office examined the issue in 2019 and estimated that the cost of maintaining these retired submarines alongside various docks had exceeded £500 million, and the total cost of dismantling the retired and in-service submarines would likely exceed £7.5 billion. Perhaps this will be covered by the AUKUS overheads.

Nuclear disaster

The state of Britain’s submarine enterprise is nothing short of a disaster. And yet the Australian Department of Defence thinks that for the next fifty years, maybe longer, we should hitch ourselves to the clapped out wagon that is Britain’s submarine construction industrial base.

Paul Keating had it right about the AUKUS strategic architecture. Instead of moving forward with focus on a relevant local team like the QUAD (Australian, India, Japan and the United States), we’re committing to a subordinate role with our US ally and an Anglosphere arrangement that’s a hangover from the former, now almost forgotten, British empire.

Yet it’s all “keep calm and carry on” in the Australian Department of Defence. They have no need to worry because all the bigwigs will have retired and moved onto highly paid consultancies and ‘think tanks’ before the proverbial hits the fan.

Pretty much the same goes for the few, timid, politicians who’ve signed off on all this, a gargantuan splurge of taxpayers’ dollars, because they’re all fearful they might be accused of being “weak on defence” if they don’t swallow the Department’s nuclear Kool Aid.

I guess I’ll just keep going to bed each night worrying about the Defence of Australia. Not about some country invading us, but by how much of my money, and your money, the Department’s going to waste tomorrow, next week, next year and for decades to come.

April 16, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | AUSTRALIA - NATIONAL, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Weapons-makers set to gain more influence in defence operations

Global weapons companies could be more deeply integrated into Australian military operations after legislative reforms. This comes on top of public unease about Australia’s independence under AUKUS.

MICHELLE FAHY, APR 14, 2023  https://undueinfluence.substack.com/p/weapons-makers-set-to-gain-more-influence?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=297295&post_id=114686170&isFreemail=true&utm_medium=email

Activity in the defence domain has reached peak overload. On top of AUKUS and the submarines, the high-level nuclear waste dump, the Defence Strategic Review, and a slew of multi-billion-dollar arms procurements, the Defence Department is also undertaking consequential reform of the Defence Act 1903 and related legislation. In March, Defence published a consultation paper on the reforms calling for public feedback. The deadline for submissions is Friday 21 April.

Among other things, the reform initiatives foreshadow a more deeply integrated involvement by the globally dominant US arms industry in Australia’s defence and national security establishment, including military operations, especially in the modern ‘warfighting’ domains of cyber and space. This is a profoundly consequential proposition that demands careful consideration.

Notice of the intended reforms was quietly released by the defence portfolio’s junior minister, Matt Thistlethwaite, just days before the Albanese-Biden-Sunak AUKUS extravaganza in San Diego. Saturation media coverage and ongoing analysis of that event has kept the intended reform of Australia’s defence legislation out of the spotlight. This confluence in timing was likely intentional. As a result, much of the limited time granted to the public to consider and prepare submissions has already elapsed.

The public needs to pay attention now because the bipartisan-lockstep nature of defence ‘debate’ in Australia makes it probable that once the legislative amendments hit parliament they will zip through both houses into legislative reality with far less scrutiny than they demand.

The government says legislative reform is necessary to ‘better position the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as an agile, integrated, warfighting enterprise’. The reforms are also intended to create a ‘technology-neutral’ legislative framework.

The consultation paper outlines three key initiatives:

1. support the full range of military activities and capabilities required to defend Australia and its national interests
2. design the law for seamless interoperability with international allies and partners
3. improve the security of Australia’s military capabilities, tangible and intangible.

The terms ‘integrated’, ‘seamless interoperability’, and ‘interchangeability’ appear throughout. The word ‘partner’ is used frequently and is undefined. It is often unclear to which type of entity it refers: foreign governments, foreign militaries, foreign intelligence services, or local or foreign arms industry entities. These distinctions are important, especially in a public consultation document, and the fact that they often aren’t clear creates considerable ambiguity.

Defence poses ten consultation questions for consideration. An important one is hinted at and needs to be made plain: What does the public think about the deeper integration of profit-making multinational weapons companies into Australian military operations across the breadth of operational domains, including cyber and space?

The AUKUS agreement is causing significant public unease about Australia’s ability to act independently of our major allies, and the loss of sovereignty this entails. Two former prime ministers have also expressed publicly their concerns about this. The shape of the proposed legislative reforms, the ambiguities in the consultation paper, and the muted manner of the document’s release add further cause for concern.

Worth adding in this futuristic context is the rapid development and significant funding of lethal autonomous weapons, occurring largely out of public view. (For the uninitiated, lethal autonomous weapons, known colloquially as ‘killer robots’, require no meaningful human involvement in the ‘kill chain’.) As yet, there is no international legal framework regulating their development or use. Such is the future we face.

If the above is not warning enough, we need only reflect on the US government’s outsourcing to defence contractors (and here) of parts of its morally bankrupt drone assassination program which has killed large numbers of civilians, including children, and instilled an abiding fear of clear skies in the populations of multiple countries. Pine Gap, part of the United States’ global surveillance network, has played a facilitative role in these killings.

This surely provides all the evidence we need that more time – and a vastly more transparent and genuine process of engagement – is needed from Defence for the public to consider and respond to its proposed initiatives for reform.

Download Defence’s consultation paper. Lodge your submission by 21 April.

This piece first appeared at John Menadue’s Pearl & Irritations on 14.4.23.

April 15, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | AUSTRALIA - NATIONAL, weapons and war | Leave a comment