Antinuclear

The dangerous one is the U.S. -not China

As for Taiwan, let’s remember that the international community recognises Taiwan as part of China and Taiwan has no seat by itself in the United Nations.

By Colin Mackerras, Apr 16, 2023 https://johnmenadue.com/the-dangerous-one-is-the-u-s/

The implication of AUKUS is that China constitutes a danger to Australian security. It borders on official Australian policy that China is an aggressive power bent on domination. But the history of the People’s Republic suggests its military is for defence, not aggression and that the cases where it has used external military force are very few. Under Xi Jinping it may be assertive and keen to extend influence, especially economic, but it shows no signs of political/military aggression. On the contrary, it is the U.S. that constantly uses external military force and is bent on maintaining domination at all costs.

It was less than a year after the birth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949 that the Korean War broke out. Korean history of the first years after World War II is too complex to pursue here. But essentially no sooner was Korea independent of a defeated Japan in 1945 than a divided country emerged, with the U.S. setting up the Republic of Korea (South Korea) on 15 August 1948 and the Democratic People’s Republic (North Korea) following on 9 September. Under U.S. dominance, it was the south that moved first formally to divide the country.

When the north attacked the south in June 1950, the U.S. got the United Nations to intervene under its own American leadership. China became involved only in October 1950, after the U.S. actively threatened to move north to invade the fledgling PRC. Yet, at U.S. behest, China was condemned for aggression.

Let’s be very clear: the U.S. was the first foreign power to be involved in this war, not China. After a truce reached in 1953, Chinese troops withdrew fully from the north by 1958, while American troops remain in the south to this day. The dangerous one is the U.S., which assumes its God-given right to control the world, not China. There is no peace treaty covering Korea to this day.

Following the Korean War, China has only rarely been involved in wars outside its own borders. In 1962, it fought a brief border war with India, but it is important to note that the rights and wrongs of this are extremely controversial. Although the Western media reported almost entirely India’s version of events, scholars such as the late Neville Maxwell (1926-2019) and Gregory Clark have shown convincingly that China had a perfectly respectable case.

The most recent time China sent troops to attack another country was in Vietnam in February and March 1979 in response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. During this very brief war, China made no attempt to take the capital or to change the Vietnamese government. It withdrew unilaterally.

In short, the longest war since 1949 to see Chinese troops fight outside their borders is still the Korean war. It was unfairly condemned of aggression by the first foreign power to participate in the war, with the U.S. version of events sticking for decades because of its world power.

Since the Korean War, the U.S. continues to be involved in numerous wars, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, among others, with Australia simply taking part to follow the boss. What’s striking is that the U.S. has lost these wars and ended up withdrawing humiliated. The U.S. has attempted to invent an ideological justification but frequently been attacked by protests from within its own borders. It has also been involved in proxy wars, some such as the present Ukraine war large in scale.

In contrast to China, the U.S. has hundreds of military bases outside its own borders and has installed numerous governments in foreign countries replacing those that don’t conform to its ideology it calls “democracy”.

Many in the West assume that under Xi Jinping China has become an aggressive nation, even if it was not before. It is true China is much more assertive in world affairs. But I see no sign that China has become aggressive. It shows no sign of wanting to use its armed forces outside its own territory.

As for Taiwan, let’s remember that the international community recognises Taiwan as part of China and Taiwan has no seat by itself in the United Nations. The U.S. may be goading China to retake Taiwan with violence, but has not succeeded up to now. China’s policy is now, and has always been, that it wants to reunify the country by retaking Taiwan, but it wants peaceful reunification, using force only as a last resort.

China extends its influence through trade and investment. We know that its Belt and Road Initiative has expanded China’s economic and to some extent political influence throughout Central Asia, Africa and Latin America, and even the South Pacific. We even hear increasing reports of China’s replacing the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency by trading in the Chinese yuan and other currencies.

Western countries, especially the U.S., express alarm at the increase of Chinese influence and have taken increasingly severe measures to thwart it. However, what the Chinese have not done is establish military bases, overthrow local regimes or even try to spread their ideology to those countries with which they trade. In this sense they are far less dangerous than the U.S.

Xi Jinping talks of a common shared future of humanity, not of dominance. Western commentators tend to assume that’s just words, and really he hides deception and conquest in his heart. I don’t see the evidence for that.

What China wants, and what seems to me in China’s interests, are two things. One is to protect China against external attack. The other is a multipolar world, in which China is one of the important poles. It does not want or aim for a Chinese-dominated unipolar world. True, it is becoming involved in the Middle East and in peace processes to an unprecedented extent, at the same time as the U.S. is in decline relative to China (and other countries). Personally, I can’t see why it should not. As a great civilisation, it has a right to extensive influence. Influence is quite different from dominance.

The U.S. currently assumes it is number 1. Its main aim is to retain that position. Its policies are geared to that end, to keep China down. What alarms the U.S. is China’s success. How can a country so recently impoverished and backward actually be prosperous enough to enjoy a life expectancy at birth longer than the U.S.? (World Bank data for 2020 have China at 78, and the U.S. at 77).

The way Australia has submitted itself to this dangerous and untrustworthy country, the U.S., is shameful. Our track-record of blindly following allies into wars that don’t concern us is unworthy of the independent country we should be and aspire to be.

April 17, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | AUSTRALIA - NATIONAL, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Rex Patrick on AUKUS submarines: “an astonishingly bad deal”

by Rex Patrick | Apr 14, 2023 https://michaelwest.com.au/rue-britannia-britannia-and-rue-aukus-subs/

The Defence Department has outdone itself with the AUKUS submarine project. In Paul Keating’s words, “it’s the worst deal in all history”. That’s not just because of the staggering $386 billion price tag, but because of the form the program is to take. Former submariner Rex Patrick looks at the most astonishingly irrational part of the announcement.

Our senior Defence bureaucrats, both uniformed and civilian, have a remarkable but unexplainable knack when it comes to acquiring new equipment. When simplicity confronts them, they always find some way to make it complex. In the face of something manageable, they’ll always find a way to make it unmanageable. SNAFU is the order of the day.

But, for Defence, it’s all OK – the admirals, air marshals, generals and top level public servants are immune from the consequences of failed procurement – no matter how big the disaster. No-one’s ever been fired from Defence for stuffing up an equipment purchase; after all, the wasted money is not theirs, it’s mine and yours.

Looking at the AUKUS plan, which some are now labelling USUKA [pronounced “you sucker”] after Paul Keating called it “the worst deal in all history,” Australia will initially acquire three second-hand but proven and highly capable Virginia Class submarines, but then jump off that safe pathway to a high-risk program involving a country that has a track record of being late, and over budget, on its past and current submarine programs.

It’s just reckless.

Virginia submarines, what we could do

The Virginia Class nuclear attack submarine is sea proven but also an evolving design. It’s even fitted with the combat system and weapons that we already have on our Collins Class submarines, or will acquire.

AUKUS is a bad deal. It comes at eye-watering cost, has huge opportunity costs and effectively puts all our Defence eggs in one basket.

It’s not going to deliver a capability within an even remotely sensible time frame either to help deter, let alone fight in, the very conflict Defence purports we need it for.

But if I put that aside and just went along with the whole thing, I’d advise that we could, and should, buy three US built Virginia Class submarines and then build our own, effectively providing the third Virginia shipyard (there are two shipyards in the US, both struggling with capacity).

That’s of benefit to us, and to the US, who would enjoy a surge build capability through us.”

But instead, we will pay to increase US industrial capability and then turn to the British.

Not a shadow of its old self

“Rule Britannia, Britannia rules the waves. Britons never, never, never shall be slaves.” It’s a song derived from a 1730s poem.

But like the billowing gowns and petticoats that were worn over dome-shaped panniers by women of the 1730s, “Rule Britannia” is no longer in fashion.

The Royal Navy is not even a shadow of its old self. The French Navy and Spanish Armada outnumber Royal Navy frigates and destroyers 32 to 18. Admiral Horatio Nelson would be turning in his grave.

And to make matters worse, the “great” left “Great Britain” soon after Brexit.

(Not so) Astute submarines

Back to the topic at hand, Britain’s recent submarine projects have been project management cluster fiascos.

The Royal Navy’s current Astute class nuclear-powered attack submarine program was approved by the British Government in 1997. Three boats were to be built for £2.6 billion, with the first boat to be in service in 2005. The first boat went in the water five years late, in 2010, and the first three boats blew out in cost by £1.9 billion. And by the way, the UK contracted the US submarine company, General Dynamics Electric Boat, to help them sort out some ‘issues’ within the Astute project in 2004.

Starting with approval for a fourth boat in 2007, the program has grown to seven boats all up. The last four “Batch II” boats were supposed to cost £5.7B but are now expected to total £6.7 billion. The latest boat, HMS Anson, was delivered 25 months late.

Dreadnought submarines

The parallel Dreadnought nuclear ballistic missile submarine is on track. On track to be late and over budget.

The Ministry of Defence established its Future Submarine Integrated Project Team in October 2007. The initial approval of the program was in May 2011, with an estimated cost for four submarines of between £11 and £14 billion. The first submarine was intended to be in service in 2028.

The most recent cost estimate for the four ballistic missile platforms is £31 billion. Bizarrely, as the program has advanced, less seems to be known about the in-service date. No-one is saying when the first boat will arrive, other than “some time in the 2030s.”

Refits and retirements

The first of the Royal Navy’s current nuclear ballistic missile submarines, HMS Vanguard, has just come out of refit. The refit was programmed for three years and was to cost around £200 million. It took seven long years and around £500 million. Nearly one quarter of Vanguard’s service life will have been spent in dock undergoing repairs and maintenance.

Earlier this year, a public scandal erupted when it was revealed that the lead contractor had concealed broken bolts in the submarine’s reactor compartment.

In terms of programmatic failure, even more disturbing is the state of dismantling retired Royal Navy nuclear submarines.

The first ever British nuclear-powered submarine, HMS Dreadnought, entered service 60 years ago and served for 17 years. For the last 43 years, it’s been sitting alongside a wharf in the UK. It’s not been dismantled. But neither have any of the other 21 retired Royal Navy nuclear-powered submarines.

It’s a national disgrace. The National Audit Office examined the issue in 2019 and estimated that the cost of maintaining these retired submarines alongside various docks had exceeded £500 million, and the total cost of dismantling the retired and in-service submarines would likely exceed £7.5 billion. Perhaps this will be covered by the AUKUS overheads.

Nuclear disaster

The state of Britain’s submarine enterprise is nothing short of a disaster. And yet the Australian Department of Defence thinks that for the next fifty years, maybe longer, we should hitch ourselves to the clapped out wagon that is Britain’s submarine construction industrial base.

Paul Keating had it right about the AUKUS strategic architecture. Instead of moving forward with focus on a relevant local team like the QUAD (Australian, India, Japan and the United States), we’re committing to a subordinate role with our US ally and an Anglosphere arrangement that’s a hangover from the former, now almost forgotten, British empire.

Yet it’s all “keep calm and carry on” in the Australian Department of Defence. They have no need to worry because all the bigwigs will have retired and moved onto highly paid consultancies and ‘think tanks’ before the proverbial hits the fan.

Pretty much the same goes for the few, timid, politicians who’ve signed off on all this, a gargantuan splurge of taxpayers’ dollars, because they’re all fearful they might be accused of being “weak on defence” if they don’t swallow the Department’s nuclear Kool Aid.

I guess I’ll just keep going to bed each night worrying about the Defence of Australia. Not about some country invading us, but by how much of my money, and your money, the Department’s going to waste tomorrow, next week, next year and for decades to come.

April 16, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | AUSTRALIA - NATIONAL, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Weapons-makers set to gain more influence in defence operations

Global weapons companies could be more deeply integrated into Australian military operations after legislative reforms. This comes on top of public unease about Australia’s independence under AUKUS.

MICHELLE FAHY, APR 14, 2023  https://undueinfluence.substack.com/p/weapons-makers-set-to-gain-more-influence?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=297295&post_id=114686170&isFreemail=true&utm_medium=email

Activity in the defence domain has reached peak overload. On top of AUKUS and the submarines, the high-level nuclear waste dump, the Defence Strategic Review, and a slew of multi-billion-dollar arms procurements, the Defence Department is also undertaking consequential reform of the Defence Act 1903 and related legislation. In March, Defence published a consultation paper on the reforms calling for public feedback. The deadline for submissions is Friday 21 April.

Among other things, the reform initiatives foreshadow a more deeply integrated involvement by the globally dominant US arms industry in Australia’s defence and national security establishment, including military operations, especially in the modern ‘warfighting’ domains of cyber and space. This is a profoundly consequential proposition that demands careful consideration.

Notice of the intended reforms was quietly released by the defence portfolio’s junior minister, Matt Thistlethwaite, just days before the Albanese-Biden-Sunak AUKUS extravaganza in San Diego. Saturation media coverage and ongoing analysis of that event has kept the intended reform of Australia’s defence legislation out of the spotlight. This confluence in timing was likely intentional. As a result, much of the limited time granted to the public to consider and prepare submissions has already elapsed.

The public needs to pay attention now because the bipartisan-lockstep nature of defence ‘debate’ in Australia makes it probable that once the legislative amendments hit parliament they will zip through both houses into legislative reality with far less scrutiny than they demand.

The government says legislative reform is necessary to ‘better position the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as an agile, integrated, warfighting enterprise’. The reforms are also intended to create a ‘technology-neutral’ legislative framework.

The consultation paper outlines three key initiatives:

1. support the full range of military activities and capabilities required to defend Australia and its national interests
2. design the law for seamless interoperability with international allies and partners
3. improve the security of Australia’s military capabilities, tangible and intangible.

The terms ‘integrated’, ‘seamless interoperability’, and ‘interchangeability’ appear throughout. The word ‘partner’ is used frequently and is undefined. It is often unclear to which type of entity it refers: foreign governments, foreign militaries, foreign intelligence services, or local or foreign arms industry entities. These distinctions are important, especially in a public consultation document, and the fact that they often aren’t clear creates considerable ambiguity.

Defence poses ten consultation questions for consideration. An important one is hinted at and needs to be made plain: What does the public think about the deeper integration of profit-making multinational weapons companies into Australian military operations across the breadth of operational domains, including cyber and space?

The AUKUS agreement is causing significant public unease about Australia’s ability to act independently of our major allies, and the loss of sovereignty this entails. Two former prime ministers have also expressed publicly their concerns about this. The shape of the proposed legislative reforms, the ambiguities in the consultation paper, and the muted manner of the document’s release add further cause for concern.

Worth adding in this futuristic context is the rapid development and significant funding of lethal autonomous weapons, occurring largely out of public view. (For the uninitiated, lethal autonomous weapons, known colloquially as ‘killer robots’, require no meaningful human involvement in the ‘kill chain’.) As yet, there is no international legal framework regulating their development or use. Such is the future we face.

If the above is not warning enough, we need only reflect on the US government’s outsourcing to defence contractors (and here) of parts of its morally bankrupt drone assassination program which has killed large numbers of civilians, including children, and instilled an abiding fear of clear skies in the populations of multiple countries. Pine Gap, part of the United States’ global surveillance network, has played a facilitative role in these killings.

This surely provides all the evidence we need that more time – and a vastly more transparent and genuine process of engagement – is needed from Defence for the public to consider and respond to its proposed initiatives for reform.

Download Defence’s consultation paper. Lodge your submission by 21 April.

This piece first appeared at John Menadue’s Pearl & Irritations on 14.4.23.

April 15, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | AUSTRALIA - NATIONAL, weapons and war | Leave a comment

CONTAINING THE BOMB: AN ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES – Australia is especially problematic

Australia poses a unique challenge to the SPNFZ due to its defensive alliance with the United States.

Australia is in a dilemma then of being a party to the SPNFZ and an ally of an NWS poised to potentially assist in a nuclear attack.

The Australia, New Zealand, and the United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) was signed in 1951, joining the three nations in a collective security arrangement.¹⁸ New Zealand banned nuclear-powered vessels in 1984 and later created its own nuclear-free zone with the passage of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987. In response, the Reagan Administration suspended New Zealand’s obligations under the ANZUS Treaty.¹⁹ Australia remains a party.

APRIL 12, 2023 Center for International Maritime Security, By LtCol Brent Stricker

This article is part of a series that will explore the use and legal issues surrounding military zones employed during peace and war to control the entry, exit, and activities of forces operating in these zones. These works build on the previous Maritime Operational Zones Manual published by the predecessor of the Stockton Center for International Law, the International Law Department, of the U.S. Naval War College. A new Maritime Operational Zones Manual is forthcoming.

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) are an attempt to prohibit the use or deployment of nuclear weapons within a nation’s territory. None of the signatories to these treaties possess nuclear weapons, where NFWZs stand as a pledge not to develop these weapons. The established nuclear powers of the world have similarly pledged to respect some NFWZs.¹ It remains to be seen whether such pledges will be observed or dismissed as a simple “scrap of paper.”²

Background

The legality of the use of nuclear weapons is an unsettled issue. The International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion stating the threat or use of nuclear weapons must be examined under the United Nations Charter Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force and Article 51’s right of self-defense.³ The Court could not “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense in which the very survival of the state was at stake.”⁴

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was an early attempt to limit and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. Article 1 of the NPT prohibits Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) from transferring nuclear weapons to a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) or encouraging a NNWS to develop nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the NPT requires states to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

Since the signing of NPT, the number of NWS has expanded. Two of the newly acknowledged nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, never signed the treaty. North Korea signed and subsequently withdrew. Finally, Israel, a suspected and unacknowledged nuclear power, never signed the treaty.⁵……………………………………………………………………..

Current Nuclear Weapons Free Zones

There are currently nine NWFZs in existence. Five of these were created by regional agreements. Three of them were created by international treaty but only occur in unpopulated areas: Outer Space, the Moon, and the seabed. The last NWFZ was created unilaterally by Mongolia. NWFZs cover more than two billion people and 111 countries.¹³

African NWFZ (ANWFZ)

The Treaty of Pelindaba established the African NWFZ. It was opened for signature on April 11, 1996, and came into effect on July 15, 1990.[14] Article 3 of the treaty renounces nuclear weapons, and the signatories pledge “not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere” and “not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device.” Article 4 is a prohibition on stationing nuclear weapons on their territory, but it allows individual nations the ability to allow foreign aircraft and ships to visit or exercise innocent passage without reference to whether such aircraft and ships may be armed with nuclear weapons. This thereby creates a loophole allowing nuclear weapons within the NWFZ…………………………………………….

South Pacific NWFZ (SPNFZ)

The Treaty of Rarotonga established the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. It was signed on August 6, 1985, and came into effect on December 11, 1985. All five acknowledged NWS have signed onto its Protocols. Annex 1 to the treaty describes the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, which includes both territorial land, waters, and the high seas. Article 3 of the treaty pledges signatories “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere inside or outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone” and “not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device.” Article 5 prohibits stationing nuclear weapons on the territory of signatory states. 

Article 5 also includes a loophole allowing signatory states to allow visits and transit by foreign aircraft and ships that may be armed with nuclear weapons. Article 7 includes a prohibition on dumping radioactive matter within the SPNFZ.”¹⁶

A second loophole appears in Article 3(c) of the treaty. There is no prohibition on the research of nuclear weapons. This leaves signatories the option to research nuclear weapons. The most likely being Australia if it needs to rapidly develop such weapons for nuclear deterrence.¹⁷

Australia poses a unique challenge to the SPNFZ due to its defensive alliance with the United States. The Australia, New Zealand, and the United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) was signed in 1951, joining the three nations in a collective security arrangement.¹⁸ New Zealand banned nuclear-powered vessels in 1984 and later created its own nuclear-free zone with the passage of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987. In response, the Reagan Administration suspended New Zealand’s obligations under the ANZUS Treaty.¹⁹ Australia remains a party.

Australia has publicly stated in its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper it would rely on the deterrence power of the United States’ nuclear weapons.²⁰ Australia also hosts US military installations that are vital to worldwide command and control.²¹ Undoubtedly, these facilities would be part of the Communication, Command, Control, and Intelligence (C3I) the United States would rely on during a nuclear crisis. Australia is in a dilemma then of being a party to the SPNFZ and an ally of an NWS poised to potentially assist in a nuclear attack. The treaty does not address this issue of C3I by a signatory state, with Article 3(c) only prohibiting the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons.²²…………………

Southeast Asian NWFZ (SEANWFZ)

The Bangkok Treaty established the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. The treaty was signed on December 15, 1995, and went into effect on March 28, 1997. The ten members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed not to “develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; station or transport nuclear weapons by any means; test or use nuclear weapons.”²³ The Treaty also prohibited control, stationing, or testing of nuclear weapons in the SEANWFZ.²⁴ The Bangkok Treaty thus closed the visit, transit, research, and control loopholes for vessels and aircraft with nuclear weapons.

Finally, the Bangkok Treaty prohibited dumping or discharging into the atmosphere of radioactive material or waste.²⁵ 

The SEANWFZ is striking due to the size of the zone defined in the treaty. The zone is expanded to include the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones of the signatory nations.²⁶ The Zone embraces an area of strategic importance to maritime shipping. The treaty would prevent the 5 NWS from transporting nuclear weapons through this zone. This is likely why no NWS has signed onto the treaty’s protocols and provides a negative security assurance to the ASEAN signatories.²⁷ 

Central Asian NWFZ (CANWFZ)

The Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone was created by the Treaty of Semipalatinsk. The treaty was signed on September 8, 2006, and went into effect on Mar 21, 2009. The CANWFZ is defined as the land, internal waters, and airspace of the signatories.²⁸ Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, all former Soviet Republics, agreed to prohibit research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession, or control over any nuclear weapon. The treaty also prohibited the location of such weapons in the zone. ………………………

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have a similar problem to Australia noted above. They are members of the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, which includes the Russian Federation, one of the five acknowledged NWS. Article 4 of the treaty requires the Member States to provide all assistance, including military assistance, if one member is attacked.²⁹ It remains to be seen how this will affect the CANWFZ.

Mongolian NWFZ

The Mongolian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone is unique as a unilateral action by domestic law similar to the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone noted above. Mongolia made this declaration in 1992 and called for a regional NWFZ.³⁰ This seemed improbable as Mongolia is surrounded by the Russian and Chinese NWS. The Mongolian NWFZ was recognized with UN General Assembly Resolution 53/77 D.³¹

Mongolia’s history makes its NWFZ unique, considering it was caught between the two struggling NWS for most of its existence…………………………………………

Latin American and the Caribbean NWFZ

The Treaty of Tlatelolco created the Latin American NWFZ. It was signed on February 1967 and went into effect on April 25, 1969. Article 1 of the treaty prohibits “the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition, by any means, of any nuclear weapon [signatory states] by order of third parties or in any other way,” and “the receipt, storage, installation, location or any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by [signatory states], by mandate to third parties or in any other way.”

The Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ has a similar problem shared by Australia and the CANWFZ due to the mutual defense obligations imposed by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. This treaty was signed in 1947 by all of the states in North and South America, including the nuclear-armed United States. While it may be in decline with the withdrawal of member states and attempts to replace this treaty with sub-regional treaties, it remains valid international law.

Antarctica, the Moon, and Seabed NWFZ

It is interesting to note that the first NWFZs were created in places that humans normally do not inhabit: Antarctica, Outer Space, and the deep seabed. Article V of the Antarctic Treaty prohibits nuclear explosions or the dumping of radioactive material on the continent. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies. This prohibition also prohibits the militarization of celestial bodies. The Outer Space Treaty does not address military activities in orbit, though. Article I of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction including structures to test, launch, or store such devices on the deep seabed.

It has been speculated that support for these NWFZs by the five acknowledged NWS was to limit the area to deploy nuclear weapons and the increased pressure on the arms race this would impose.³⁶ The strategic value of making Antarctica off-limits for nuclear weapons seems to belie this argument since all NWS, acknowledged or not, are located in the Northern Hemisphere. The future possibilities for weaponizing outer space may render the Space NWFZ irrelevant.

2017 United Nations Nuclear Prohibition Treaty

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could create the largest NWFZ in the world. It was proposed on 23 December 2016 with UN General Assembly Resolution 71/258. It was open for signature on September 20, 2017, and in effect on January 22, 2021.³⁷ The NWS acknowledged and unacknowledged, do not support the treaty.³⁸

Under Article 1 of the treaty: “Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:

(a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;

(c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;

(d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;

(f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;

(g) Allow any stationing, installation, or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.”

………………………………… more https://cimsec.org/containing-the-bomb-an-assessment-of-nuclear-weapons-free-zones/

April 13, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | AUSTRALIA - NATIONAL, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Absolutely disingenuous – DARC – the Deep-Space Advanced Radar Capability – Australia to join USA’s plan for Space as a War-fighting Domain

‘Absolutely critical’ to get DARC space situational system to Australia: Space Forces Indo-Pacific head

“So, what worries me most is China’s use of space to complete the kill chain necessary to generate long-range precision strikes against the maritime and air components scheme of maneuver. That’s what concerns me the most,” Brig. Gen. Anthony Mastalir, commander of Space Forces Indo-Pacific, said.

By   COLIN CLARKon April 07, 2023 

SYDNEY — The vast landmass of Australia, possessed of clear skies free of city lights or pollution, is the perfect spot to place the most acute space situational awareness systems. Which is why Brig. Gen. Anthony Mastalir, the head of Space Forces Indo-Pacific says it’s “absolutely critical” to get a new radar system there as quickly as can be.

“When you look at a place like Australia as a landmass, you have a lot of opportunity to contribute to that space picture,” Mastalir told Breaking Defense during an interview during the Sydney Dialogue, put on by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. “The Australians, the defense Space Command folks and the acquisition arms, they absolutely understand that, so they’re moving aggressively to embrace some of these opportunities and bring systems like DARC — deep space radar capability — here on the continent.”

DARC, officially the Deep-Space Advanced Radar Capability, was designed by Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory to provide global monitoring of geosynchronous orbits in all kinds of weather and during daylight. According to the APL, it relies heavily on commercial technology. The Space Force received DARC technology from APL last year, with demonstrations taking place at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.

Ultimately, the operational DARC program calls for three transmit/receive sites, spaced at mid-latitudes around the world, to detect and track satellites. Northrop Grumman won a $341 million contract from US Space Force’s Space Systems Command last February to begin building the global system, with the first location in Australia targeted for calendar year 2025. That will be followed by one in Europe and a third in the US, with those locations yet to be announced.

FY24 budget justification documents show $174M requested for DARC in the next fiscal year. It further states that “The total cost of the DARC Rapid Prototype Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA) effort is 844.6M. DARC Site 1 is not fully funded across the Future Years Defense Program.” $40 million is set aside for early work on sites 2 and 3.

“The DARC program will field a resilient ground-based radar providing our nation with significantly enhanced space domain awareness for geostationary orbit,” Pablo Pezzimenti, vice president for integrated national systems at Northrop Grumman said in a statement announcing the first contract award. “While current ground-based systems operate at night and can be impacted by weather conditions, DARC will provide an all-weather, 24/7 capability to monitor the highly dynamic and rapidly evolving geosynchronous orbital environment critical to national and global security.”

Discussions are underway about where to locate the system in Australia once it’s ready. Before anything can be released officially, negotiations must conclude on a treaty level document known as the Technology Safeguards Agreement. Negotiations began in mid-2021. Mastalir declined to discuss the talks, noting they are led by the Department of Commerce.

Russia And China Remain Top Concerns

During the panel Mastalir appeared on at the Sydney Dialogue, the general said that Russia had clearly possessed space superiority at the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine but had lost it. After the panel, Breaking Defense asked him to explain his remarks.

“Russia clearly is a dominant space power, relative to Ukraine. So they entered that conflict in that position,” he said. “Now you see no less than seven or eight different commercial entities, everything from GPS jammer detection, communications to tactical ISR that are bringing products to bear to support the Ukrainians. And has Russia been able to deny the adversary, in this case, Ukraine, from benefiting from space? And the answer, I think, is no — not really.”

His assessment is that the two countries have reached perhaps the most dangerous state for two militaries slugging it out on the battlefield: parity.

“Now parity, parity is dangerous, right? Because when you have parity — and I think this is what we’re kind of seeing play out — you have these prolonged conflicts, and a lot of destruction and death. And that’s not a situation that we ever want to be in as the United States.”

Asked if there are lessons for the United States military and intelligence community in light of what he called  “a potential paradigm shift.” the general said it raises many difficult policy and operational questions.

That includes the question of how commercial operators are protected, or not, by the government if they are being used for military operations.

“Number one, who’s going to defend those assets? Is there a responsibility for the United States to protect and defend commercial on-orbit capability that’s assisting the US military?” The related issue is, “to what extent should we integrate commercial across all of our space capabilities?”

Given these complexities, what keeps the general up at night in this region?

So, what worries me most is China’s use of space to complete the kill chain necessary to generate long-range precision strikes against the maritime and air components scheme of maneuver. That’s what concerns me the most,” Mastalir said. “I have to have the ability to deny China in this situation, as a potential adversary, the ability to do that. And so those are the kinds of things that that you know, worry me the most now.”

He stressed that the simple possession of such capabilities “doesn’t mean it’s wrong. But if you look at our efforts to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific, you quickly run into a situation where our ends, and what we see in terms of behavior coming from China, their ends don’t necessarily align.”

Theresa Hitchens in Washington contributed to this report. 

April 10, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | AUSTRALIA - NATIONAL, weapons and war | Leave a comment